The first part of this turned seemed like mostly politics—oversimple and flat-out non-real example being used to justify a policy without any nuance or sense.
The example is just to illustrate that it’s possible for everyone to prefer taxation but not want to donate unilaterally. Maybe this is an easy enough point that it wasn’t worth illustrating with an example. I tried to make the example obviously silly so that it wouldn’t be taken as politically live, but I think that failed.
you haven’t specified even what “redistribution” means, especially in a dynamic equilibrium where wealth and income are related but distinct.
e.g. policies justified by benefiting poor people at the expense of rich people, e.g. an income tax which the state then spends to benefit people equitably.
I absolutely agree that this is not a case for an income tax, it’s one argument for an income tax (which is different from arguments about justice or fairness and seems worth having in a separate mental category).
Point 2 is completely missing the fundamental question of what people want—Friedman’s point that if people actually were self-aligned that they care about feeding specific poor people rather than getting a new iPhone, they’d do it. Instead, they want abstract poor people to get fed, and only if they can force others to do so (along with themselves, in many cases, but rarely just unilaterally). You don’t address this disparity.
It seems consistent for me to prefer that all poor people get food than that all rich people get iPhones, yet to prefer that I get an iPhone than that a particular poor person get food (since I care more about myself than the average rich person). Do you disagree that this would be a consistent set of preferences? Do you agree that it’s consistent but just disagree that it’s empirically plausible? At any rate, it seems like we should agree that Friedman’s argument doesn’t work without some additional assumptions.
Sure, it’s consistent to prefer non-you poor people get food over non-you rich people getting iphones. But most actual people prefer THEY get an iphone over feeding any specific poor person. People aren’t fungible, and no actual humans are fully indifferent to which humans are helped or harmed.
The example is just to illustrate that it’s possible for everyone to prefer taxation but not want to donate unilaterally. Maybe this is an easy enough point that it wasn’t worth illustrating with an example. I tried to make the example obviously silly so that it wouldn’t be taken as politically live, but I think that failed.
e.g. policies justified by benefiting poor people at the expense of rich people, e.g. an income tax which the state then spends to benefit people equitably.
I absolutely agree that this is not a case for an income tax, it’s one argument for an income tax (which is different from arguments about justice or fairness and seems worth having in a separate mental category).
It seems consistent for me to prefer that all poor people get food than that all rich people get iPhones, yet to prefer that I get an iPhone than that a particular poor person get food (since I care more about myself than the average rich person). Do you disagree that this would be a consistent set of preferences? Do you agree that it’s consistent but just disagree that it’s empirically plausible? At any rate, it seems like we should agree that Friedman’s argument doesn’t work without some additional assumptions.
Sure, it’s consistent to prefer non-you poor people get food over non-you rich people getting iphones. But most actual people prefer THEY get an iphone over feeding any specific poor person. People aren’t fungible, and no actual humans are fully indifferent to which humans are helped or harmed.