The first essay is by far the best introduction to TDT-like reasoning that I’ve ever read. In fact this paragraph sums up the whole informal part of the idea:
This solution depends in no way on telepathy or bizarre forms of causality. It’s just that the statement I’ll choose C and then everyone will, though entirely correct, is somewhat misleadingly phrased. It involves the word choice, which is incompatible with the compelling quality of logic. Schoolchildren do not choose what 507 divided by 13 is; they figure it out. Analogously, my letter really did not allow choice; it demanded reasoning. Thus, a better way to phrase the voodoo statement would be this: If reasoning guides me to say C, then, as I am no different from anyone else as far as rational thinking is concerned, it will guide everyone to say C.
Hofstadter’s comparison of “choice” and “reasoning” is getting at the idea that people have decision routines rooted in physics, which can themselves be reasoned about, including reasoning that they are similar to one’s own. I think this is really the core insight of the TDT idea.
And then the one-sentence:
Likewise, the argument “Whatever I do, so will everyone else do” is simply a statement of faith that reasoning is universal, at least among rational thinkers, not an endorsement of any mystical kind of causality.
I didn’t perceive it as talking about the same thing. Randaly’s comment defined what acausal means (which I already knew). alexflint’s comment explained why acausal influences aren’t mysterious.
“as I am no different from anyone else as far as rational thinking is concerned” is the part that bothers me about this. This approach makes sense to me in the context of clones or Tegmark duplicates or ideal reasoning agents, sure, but in the context of actual other human beings? Not a chance. And I think the results of Hoftstadter’s experiments proved that trusting other humans in this sense wouldn’t work.
I keep thinking that this is one of the big reasons identity and group politics are so prevalent. It helps answer the question “is this person sufficiently like me?”.
Can you expand what TDT represents in “TDT-like reasoning” and “TDT idea”? [I’m new here, and this is the first time I’ve seen this abbreviation on the site.]
The first essay is by far the best introduction to TDT-like reasoning that I’ve ever read. In fact this paragraph sums up the whole informal part of the idea:
Hofstadter’s comparison of “choice” and “reasoning” is getting at the idea that people have decision routines rooted in physics, which can themselves be reasoned about, including reasoning that they are similar to one’s own. I think this is really the core insight of the TDT idea.
And then the one-sentence:
— Heraclitus
Wow. The whole acausal thing feels a lot less mysterious now. Thanks.
Did you miss this comment or did you perceive it to be less intelligible?
I didn’t perceive it as talking about the same thing. Randaly’s comment defined what acausal means (which I already knew). alexflint’s comment explained why acausal influences aren’t mysterious.
“as I am no different from anyone else as far as rational thinking is concerned” is the part that bothers me about this. This approach makes sense to me in the context of clones or Tegmark duplicates or ideal reasoning agents, sure, but in the context of actual other human beings? Not a chance. And I think the results of Hoftstadter’s experiments proved that trusting other humans in this sense wouldn’t work.
I keep thinking that this is one of the big reasons identity and group politics are so prevalent. It helps answer the question “is this person sufficiently like me?”.
Can you expand what TDT represents in “TDT-like reasoning” and “TDT idea”? [I’m new here, and this is the first time I’ve seen this abbreviation on the site.]
Timeless Decision Theory.
Thank you. :)