Existing consciousness theories do not make predictions.
Huh? There are many predictions. The obvious ones:
Global Workspace Theory: If you’re conscious of something, your brain “broadcasts” it widely; if you’re not, processing stays local. If you knock out the broadcast network, awareness fades.
Recurrent Processing Theory: You see something consciously only when sensory areas send feedback loops. If the feedback is blocked, you can still process it a bit, but you don’t experience it.
Higher Order Theory: A thought becomes conscious when your mind forms a thought about that thought (e.g., “I’m seeing red”). If the self-monitoring layer is damaged, awareness of and confidence in the perceoption collapses.
Empirically measurable effects of at least some aspects of consciousness are totally routine in anesthesia—otherwise, how would you be confident the patient is unconscious during a procedure. The Appendix of my Metacognition post lists quite a few measurable effects.
I think the problem is again that people can’t agree on what they mean by consciousness. I’m sure there is a reading where there are no predictions. But any theory that models it as a Physical Process necessarily makes predictions.
Huh? There are many predictions. The obvious ones:
Global Workspace Theory: If you’re conscious of something, your brain “broadcasts” it widely; if you’re not, processing stays local. If you knock out the broadcast network, awareness fades.
Recurrent Processing Theory: You see something consciously only when sensory areas send feedback loops. If the feedback is blocked, you can still process it a bit, but you don’t experience it.
Higher Order Theory: A thought becomes conscious when your mind forms a thought about that thought (e.g., “I’m seeing red”). If the self-monitoring layer is damaged, awareness of and confidence in the perceoption collapses.
Empirically measurable effects of at least some aspects of consciousness are totally routine in anesthesia—otherwise, how would you be confident the patient is unconscious during a procedure. The Appendix of my Metacognition post lists quite a few measurable effects.
I think the problem is again that people can’t agree on what they mean by consciousness. I’m sure there is a reading where there are no predictions. But any theory that models it as a Physical Process necessarily makes predictions.