“First, a generalized argument about worrying.” I meant an argument for why the idea is not sufficiently concerning that it could explain why a rational being would worry, or equivalently, an argument for why acausal extortion ‘does not work’. I have now changed the title to clarify this.
“Second, an appeal to consequentialism—it’s acausal, so none of your acts will change it.”
Within causal decision theory this is true, but if it were true in general then acausal decision theory would be pointless(in my opinion, as an approximate consequentialist ). The reason why I don’t agree with that statement hinges on what I am: If I considered myself to be a single instantiation of a brain in one particular part of an individual physical universe, I would agree, but I think it is more appropriate to consider myself a pattern which is distributed throughout different parts of a platonic/logical/mathematical universe. This means that it’s certainly possible for one instance of me to influence something which is completely causally disconnected from another one.
Within causal decision theory this is true, but if it were true in general then acausal decision theory would be pointles
Acausal decision theory is pointless, sure. Are there any? TDT and FDT are distict from CTD, but they’re not actually acausal, just more inclusive of causality of decisions. CDT is problematic only because it doesn’t acknowledge that the decisions being made themselves have causes and constraints.
“TDT and FDT are distict from CTD, but they’re not actually acausal, just more inclusive of causality of decisions.” I agree that the term ‘acausal’ is misleading; I take it to refer to anything which takes the possibility of being instantiated in different parts of a ‘platonic /mathematical universe’ into account. That CDT as it’s usually referred to does not is the main reason why I find it problematic and why it doesn’t allow an agent to profit in Newcomb’s problem.
“First, a generalized argument about worrying.” I meant an argument for why the idea is not sufficiently concerning that it could explain why a rational being would worry, or equivalently, an argument for why acausal extortion ‘does not work’. I have now changed the title to clarify this.
“Second, an appeal to consequentialism—it’s acausal, so none of your acts will change it.”
Within causal decision theory this is true, but if it were true in general then acausal decision theory would be pointless(in my opinion, as an approximate consequentialist ). The reason why I don’t agree with that statement hinges on what I am: If I considered myself to be a single instantiation of a brain in one particular part of an individual physical universe, I would agree, but I think it is more appropriate to consider myself a pattern which is distributed throughout different parts of a platonic/logical/mathematical universe. This means that it’s certainly possible for one instance of me to influence something which is completely causally disconnected from another one.
Acausal decision theory is pointless, sure. Are there any? TDT and FDT are distict from CTD, but they’re not actually acausal, just more inclusive of causality of decisions. CDT is problematic only because it doesn’t acknowledge that the decisions being made themselves have causes and constraints.
“TDT and FDT are distict from CTD, but they’re not actually acausal, just more inclusive of causality of decisions.” I agree that the term ‘acausal’ is misleading; I take it to refer to anything which takes the possibility of being instantiated in different parts of a ‘platonic /mathematical universe’ into account. That CDT as it’s usually referred to does not is the main reason why I find it problematic and why it doesn’t allow an agent to profit in Newcomb’s problem.