Coordination not to build wouldn’t help (even if successful), you can’t defeat an abstract entity, prevent it from doing something in its own abstract world, by preventing existence of its instances in the physical world (intentionally or not), and it can still examine everyone’s motivations and act accordingly. I just suspect that the step of actually building it is a major component of anxiety this seems to produce in some people.
Without the step where an extortion ASI actually gets built, this seems closely analogous to Pascal’s wager (not mugging). There are too many possible abstract entities that act in all sorts of ways in response to all sorts of conditions to make it possible to just point at one of them and have it notice this in an important way. Importance of what happens with all possible abstract entities has to be divided among them, and each of them only gets a little, cashing out as influence of what happens with the entity on what you should do.
So I don’t think there is any reason to expect that any particular arbitrarily selected abstract bogeyman is normatively important for your decision making, because there are all the other abstract bogeymen you are failing to consider. And when you do consider all possible abstract bogeymen, it should just add up to normality.
“Without the step where an extortion ASI actually gets built, this seems closely analogous to Pascal’s wager (not mugging). ” The problem is, I expect it to be built, and I expect being built to be something instrumentally valuable to it in a way which cannot be inverted without making it much less likely, whereas the idea of a god who would punish those who don’t think it exists can be inverted.
Then that is a far more salient issue than any acausal blackmail it might have going in its abstract form, which is the only thing that happens in the outcomes where it doesn’t get built (and where it remains unimportant). This just illustrates how the acausal aspects of any of this don’t seem cruxy/relevant, and why I wrote the (top level) answer above the way I did, getting rid of anything acausal from the structure of the problem (other than what acausal structure remains in ordinary coordination among mere humans, guided by shared/overlapping abstract reasons and explanations).
I don’t think I can prevent it from being created. But I do have some ability to influence whether it has an acausal incentive to hurt me (if in fact it has one).
If you can’t affect creation of an extortion ASI, then you can’t affect its posited acausal incentives either, since these things are one and the same.
Within the hypothetical of expecting likely creation of an extortion ASI, what it does and why is no longer unimportant, Pascal’s wager issues no longer apply. Though it still makes sense to remain defiant (to the extent you do have the ability to affect the outcomes), feeding the principle that blackmail works more rarely and that there’s coordination around defying it, maintaining integrity of the worlds that (as a result) remain less affected by its influence.
“Within the hypothetical of expecting likely creation of an extortion ASI, what it does and why is no longer unimportant, Pascal’s wager issues no longer apply.” I disagree with this. It makes sense for an ASI to want to increase the probability (by which I mean the proportion of the platonic/mathematical universe in which it exists) of its creation, even if it’s already likely (and certain in worlds where it already exists) . “Though it still makes sense to remain defiant (to the extent you do have the ability to affect the outcomes), feeding the principle that blackmail works more rarely and that there’s coordination around defying it, maintaining integrity of the worlds that (as a result) remain unaffected by its influence. ” All else being equal, yes, but when faced with the possibility of whatever punishment a ‘basilisk’ might inflict on me, I might have to give in.
“So in your mind the counterpart to lethal misalignment ASI by default is s-risk extortion ASI by default. ” Possibly.
“I don’t think the arguments about decision making here depend on talking about s-risk as opposed to more mundane worse outcomes.”
I agree. It seems like you are not aware of the main reason to expect acausal coordination here. Maybe I shouldn’t tell you about it...
Coordination not to build wouldn’t help (even if successful), you can’t defeat an abstract entity, prevent it from doing something in its own abstract world, by preventing existence of its instances in the physical world (intentionally or not), and it can still examine everyone’s motivations and act accordingly. I just suspect that the step of actually building it is a major component of anxiety this seems to produce in some people.
Without the step where an extortion ASI actually gets built, this seems closely analogous to Pascal’s wager (not mugging). There are too many possible abstract entities that act in all sorts of ways in response to all sorts of conditions to make it possible to just point at one of them and have it notice this in an important way. Importance of what happens with all possible abstract entities has to be divided among them, and each of them only gets a little, cashing out as influence of what happens with the entity on what you should do.
So I don’t think there is any reason to expect that any particular arbitrarily selected abstract bogeyman is normatively important for your decision making, because there are all the other abstract bogeymen you are failing to consider. And when you do consider all possible abstract bogeymen, it should just add up to normality.
“Without the step where an extortion ASI actually gets built, this seems closely analogous to Pascal’s wager (not mugging). ” The problem is, I expect it to be built, and I expect being built to be something instrumentally valuable to it in a way which cannot be inverted without making it much less likely, whereas the idea of a god who would punish those who don’t think it exists can be inverted.
Then that is a far more salient issue than any acausal blackmail it might have going in its abstract form, which is the only thing that happens in the outcomes where it doesn’t get built (and where it remains unimportant). This just illustrates how the acausal aspects of any of this don’t seem cruxy/relevant, and why I wrote the (top level) answer above the way I did, getting rid of anything acausal from the structure of the problem (other than what acausal structure remains in ordinary coordination among mere humans, guided by shared/overlapping abstract reasons and explanations).
I don’t think I can prevent it from being created. But I do have some ability to influence whether it has an acausal incentive to hurt me (if in fact it has one).
If you can’t affect creation of an extortion ASI, then you can’t affect its posited acausal incentives either, since these things are one and the same.
Within the hypothetical of expecting likely creation of an extortion ASI, what it does and why is no longer unimportant, Pascal’s wager issues no longer apply. Though it still makes sense to remain defiant (to the extent you do have the ability to affect the outcomes), feeding the principle that blackmail works more rarely and that there’s coordination around defying it, maintaining integrity of the worlds that (as a result) remain less affected by its influence.
“Within the hypothetical of expecting likely creation of an extortion ASI, what it does and why is no longer unimportant, Pascal’s wager issues no longer apply.” I disagree with this. It makes sense for an ASI to want to increase the probability (by which I mean the proportion of the platonic/mathematical universe in which it exists) of its creation, even if it’s already likely (and certain in worlds where it already exists) . “Though it still makes sense to remain defiant (to the extent you do have the ability to affect the outcomes), feeding the principle that blackmail works more rarely and that there’s coordination around defying it, maintaining integrity of the worlds that (as a result) remain unaffected by its influence. ” All else being equal, yes, but when faced with the possibility of whatever punishment a ‘basilisk’ might inflict on me, I might have to give in.