choose to believe is, in my experience, about situations where what is true depends on what you believe because your actions affect what is true and thus your beliefs affect your motivation to action which affects what you can believe. “I choose to believe that humanity is good” is a common one, which if a lot of people choose, will in fact be more true. “I choose to believe I can handle this problem” is another, where again, the truth in question is (partially) downstream of your beliefs. see also https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/8dbimB7EJXuYxmteW/fixdt
Even in situations where my beliefs affect my action those beliefs are not choices. If I notice that if I had a certain belief I would act in a way that would give me more utility, well then that observation becomes instead my motivation to act as if i have that belief.
“act as if you hold a belief” and “hold a belief for justified reasons” aren’t the same thing, the latter seems to me to produce higher quality actions if the belief is true. eg:
believing [someone cares about you if-and-only-if you care about them, AND you care about them if-and-only-if they care about you, AND they don’t care about you now, AND you don’t care about them, AND (you will act as if they care about you now ⇒ you will act as if you care about them) ]
vs believing [someone cares about you if-and-only-if you care about them, AND you care about them if-and-only-if they care about you, AND you care about them ⇒ they care about you)]
vs believing [someone cares about you if-and-only-if you care about them, AND you care about them if-and-only-if they care about you, AND you don’t care about each other ever]
in the first one your innate trust falls on they-care-about-you will be less reliable, your caring for them will have little hints anywhere you aren’t a good enough actor, etc. if neither of you pick up on it, the first can emulate the second, and thereby produce a world where the second becomes a past-justified true belief. but if you’re able to instead reliably make the second a *future-*justified true belief, then you can avoid the first collapsing into the third. (I’m eliding some details about what the uncertainty looks like between these beliefs and what it looks like if you’re both uncertain about which of the three statements is true, which makes it a lot more complicated if you’re particularly uncertain).
if you have multiple conflicting beliefs you can hold for justified reasons (because what is true comes after the picking between the beliefs), then there can be situations where it’s objectively the case that one can choose the beliefs first, and thereby choose actions. maybe your thoughts aren’t organized this way! but this is what it seems to me to mean when someone who is being careful to only believe things in proportion to how likely they are (aka “rational”) still gets to say the phrase “I choose to believe”. I also think that people who say “I choose to believe” in situations where it’s objectively irrational (because their beliefs can’t affect what is true) are doing so based on incorrectly expecting their beliefs to affect reality, eg “I choose to believe in a god who created the universe” cannot affect whether that’s true but is often taken to. (“I choose to believe in a god that emerges from our shared participation in a religion” is entirely rational, that’s just an egregore/memeplex/character fandom).
choose to believe is, in my experience, about situations where what is true depends on what you believe because your actions affect what is true and thus your beliefs affect your motivation to action which affects what you can believe. “I choose to believe that humanity is good” is a common one, which if a lot of people choose, will in fact be more true. “I choose to believe I can handle this problem” is another, where again, the truth in question is (partially) downstream of your beliefs. see also https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/8dbimB7EJXuYxmteW/fixdt
Even in situations where my beliefs affect my action those beliefs are not choices. If I notice that if I had a certain belief I would act in a way that would give me more utility, well then that observation becomes instead my motivation to act as if i have that belief.
“act as if you hold a belief” and “hold a belief for justified reasons” aren’t the same thing, the latter seems to me to produce higher quality actions if the belief is true. eg:
believing [someone cares about you if-and-only-if you care about them, AND you care about them if-and-only-if they care about you, AND they don’t care about you now, AND you don’t care about them, AND (you will act as if they care about you now ⇒ you will act as if you care about them) ]
vs believing [someone cares about you if-and-only-if you care about them, AND you care about them if-and-only-if they care about you, AND you care about them ⇒ they care about you)]
vs believing [someone cares about you if-and-only-if you care about them, AND you care about them if-and-only-if they care about you, AND you don’t care about each other ever]
in the first one your innate trust falls on they-care-about-you will be less reliable, your caring for them will have little hints anywhere you aren’t a good enough actor, etc. if neither of you pick up on it, the first can emulate the second, and thereby produce a world where the second becomes a past-justified true belief. but if you’re able to instead reliably make the second a *future-*justified true belief, then you can avoid the first collapsing into the third. (I’m eliding some details about what the uncertainty looks like between these beliefs and what it looks like if you’re both uncertain about which of the three statements is true, which makes it a lot more complicated if you’re particularly uncertain).
if you have multiple conflicting beliefs you can hold for justified reasons (because what is true comes after the picking between the beliefs), then there can be situations where it’s objectively the case that one can choose the beliefs first, and thereby choose actions. maybe your thoughts aren’t organized this way! but this is what it seems to me to mean when someone who is being careful to only believe things in proportion to how likely they are (aka “rational”) still gets to say the phrase “I choose to believe”. I also think that people who say “I choose to believe” in situations where it’s objectively irrational (because their beliefs can’t affect what is true) are doing so based on incorrectly expecting their beliefs to affect reality, eg “I choose to believe in a god who created the universe” cannot affect whether that’s true but is often taken to. (“I choose to believe in a god that emerges from our shared participation in a religion” is entirely rational, that’s just an egregore/memeplex/character fandom).