Non-signatories to the NPT (Israel, India, Pakistan), were able to and did develop nuclear weapons without being subject to military action. By contrast (and very much contrary to international law) Yudkowsky proposes that non-signatories to his treaty be subject to bombardment.
Yes, the analogy is imperfect. An anti-AGI treaty with the absoluteness that Eliezer describes, would treat the creation of AGI not just as an increase in danger that needs to be deterred, but as a tipping point that must never be allowed to happen in the first place. And that could lead to military intervention in a specific case, if lesser interventions (diplomacy, sabotage) failed to work.
Whether such military intervention—a last resort—would satisfy international law or not, depends on the details. If all the great powers supported such a treaty, and if e.g. the process of its application was supervised by the Security Council, I think it would necessarily be legal.
On the other hand, if tomorrow some state on its own attacked the AI infrastructure of another state, on the grounds that the second state is endangering humanity… I’m sure lawyers could be found to argue that it was a lawful act under some principle or statute; but their arguments might meet resistance.
The main thing I am arguing is that a global anti-AI regime does not inherently require nuclear brinkmanship or sovereign acts of war.
Non-signatories to the NPT (Israel, India, Pakistan), were able to and did develop nuclear weapons without being subject to military action. By contrast (and very much contrary to international law) Yudkowsky proposes that non-signatories to his treaty be subject to bombardment.
Yes, the analogy is imperfect. An anti-AGI treaty with the absoluteness that Eliezer describes, would treat the creation of AGI not just as an increase in danger that needs to be deterred, but as a tipping point that must never be allowed to happen in the first place. And that could lead to military intervention in a specific case, if lesser interventions (diplomacy, sabotage) failed to work.
Whether such military intervention—a last resort—would satisfy international law or not, depends on the details. If all the great powers supported such a treaty, and if e.g. the process of its application was supervised by the Security Council, I think it would necessarily be legal.
On the other hand, if tomorrow some state on its own attacked the AI infrastructure of another state, on the grounds that the second state is endangering humanity… I’m sure lawyers could be found to argue that it was a lawful act under some principle or statute; but their arguments might meet resistance.
The main thing I am arguing is that a global anti-AI regime does not inherently require nuclear brinkmanship or sovereign acts of war.