If the truth is hard to determine, I think that in itself is very worrying. When you have vulnerable people imprisoned and credible fears that they are being mistreated, any response from those in power other than transparency is a bad sign. Giving them the benefit of the doubt as long as they can prevent definitive evidence from coming out is bad epistemics and IMO even worse politics (not in a party-political sense; just in a ‘how to disincentivise human rights abuses’ sense).
When something is true, I desire to believe it’s true. When something is false, I desire to believe it’s false. This is the proper epistemics. If your epistemic goals are different, then they’re different. But “If the accused is in power, increase the probability estimate” is not how good epistemics are achieved.
Tangent here, just occurred to me while writing. The correct adjustment might be in the other direction: there are way more accusations against people in power, so part of the problem when considering them is: how do you keep your False Discovery Rate low? Like, if your neighbor is accused of a crime, he probably did it. But top politicians are accused of crimes every week, and many of those aren’t real, or aren’t criminal. And most or all False Discovery Rate adjustments lower the estimated probability of each instance. (Tangent over).
I think you may have a case about how one’s decision theory should adjust based on power and risk. Something like “I think there’s a 15% chance this is true, but if it were, it would be really bad, so 15% is high enough that I think we should investigate”. But taking that decision theory thought process, and using it to speak as if the 15% thing has a greater-than-50% probability, for example, isn’t correct.
“If the accused is in power, increase the probability estimate” is not how good epistemics are achieved.
It is when our uncertainty is due to a lack of information, and those in power control the flow of information! If the accusations are false, the federal government has the power to convincingly prove them false; if the accusations are true, it has the power to suppress any definitive evidence. So the fact that we haven’t seen definitive evidence in favour of the allegations is only very weak evidence against their veracity, whereas the fact that we haven’t seen definitive evidence against the allegations is significant evidence in favour of their veracity.
I suspect that, to many readers, what gives urgency to the Krome claims is that two people have allegedly died at the facility. For example, the fourth link OP provides is an instagram video with the caption “people are dying under ICE detainment in Miami”.
The two deceased are Genry Ruiz Guillen and Maksym Chernyak. ICE has published deaths reports for both:
Notably, Mr. Ruiz-Guillen was transferred to medical and psychiatric facilities multiple times, and my read of the timeline is that he was in the custody of various hospitals from December 11 up through his January 23 death, i.e. over a month separates his death and his time at Krome. (It’s possible I’m reading this wrong so let me know if others have a different read). Ruiz-Guillen was transferred to hospital a month before inauguration day.
Chernyak’s report is much shorter and I don’t know what to make of it. Hemmorhagic stroke is hypothesized. He died February 20.
These are fairly detailed timelines. Guillen-Ruiz’s in particular involves many parties (normal hospital, psychiatric hospital, different doctors), so would be a pretty bold fabrication.
You said:
>the fact that we haven’t seen definitive evidence against the allegations is significant evidence in favour of their veracity.
But “detainees are dying because of overcrowding and lack of water” is an allegation made by one of OP’s links, and these timelines and symptoms, especially Guillen-Ruiz’s, are evidence against.
If the truth is hard to determine, I think that in itself is very worrying. When you have vulnerable people imprisoned and credible fears that they are being mistreated, any response from those in power other than transparency is a bad sign. Giving them the benefit of the doubt as long as they can prevent definitive evidence from coming out is bad epistemics and IMO even worse politics (not in a party-political sense; just in a ‘how to disincentivise human rights abuses’ sense).
When something is true, I desire to believe it’s true. When something is false, I desire to believe it’s false. This is the proper epistemics. If your epistemic goals are different, then they’re different. But “If the accused is in power, increase the probability estimate” is not how good epistemics are achieved.
Tangent here, just occurred to me while writing. The correct adjustment might be in the other direction: there are way more accusations against people in power, so part of the problem when considering them is: how do you keep your False Discovery Rate low? Like, if your neighbor is accused of a crime, he probably did it. But top politicians are accused of crimes every week, and many of those aren’t real, or aren’t criminal. And most or all False Discovery Rate adjustments lower the estimated probability of each instance. (Tangent over).
I think you may have a case about how one’s decision theory should adjust based on power and risk. Something like “I think there’s a 15% chance this is true, but if it were, it would be really bad, so 15% is high enough that I think we should investigate”. But taking that decision theory thought process, and using it to speak as if the 15% thing has a greater-than-50% probability, for example, isn’t correct.
It is when our uncertainty is due to a lack of information, and those in power control the flow of information! If the accusations are false, the federal government has the power to convincingly prove them false; if the accusations are true, it has the power to suppress any definitive evidence. So the fact that we haven’t seen definitive evidence in favour of the allegations is only very weak evidence against their veracity, whereas the fact that we haven’t seen definitive evidence against the allegations is significant evidence in favour of their veracity.
I suspect that, to many readers, what gives urgency to the Krome claims is that two people have allegedly died at the facility. For example, the fourth link OP provides is an instagram video with the caption “people are dying under ICE detainment in Miami”.
The two deceased are Genry Ruiz Guillen and Maksym Chernyak. ICE has published deaths reports for both:
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/reports/ddr-GenryRuizGuillen.pdf
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/reports/ddrMaksymChernyak.pdf
Notably, Mr. Ruiz-Guillen was transferred to medical and psychiatric facilities multiple times, and my read of the timeline is that he was in the custody of various hospitals from December 11 up through his January 23 death, i.e. over a month separates his death and his time at Krome. (It’s possible I’m reading this wrong so let me know if others have a different read). Ruiz-Guillen was transferred to hospital a month before inauguration day.
Chernyak’s report is much shorter and I don’t know what to make of it. Hemmorhagic stroke is hypothesized. He died February 20.
These are fairly detailed timelines. Guillen-Ruiz’s in particular involves many parties (normal hospital, psychiatric hospital, different doctors), so would be a pretty bold fabrication.
You said:
>the fact that we haven’t seen definitive evidence against the allegations is significant evidence in favour of their veracity.
But “detainees are dying because of overcrowding and lack of water” is an allegation made by one of OP’s links, and these timelines and symptoms, especially Guillen-Ruiz’s, are evidence against.