The mode of discussion present in this book (based on your summary) seems like sloppy reasoning, full of leaky abstractions and attempts to build something out of them. Perhaps the book is mostly about merely describing common forms of sloppy reasoning, and I suppose a sufficiently careful reader could avoid confusion, but that would be despite the text, not because of it. I think it’s a bad idea to endorse discussion in this mode.
(Confused discussion is useful for representing a particular problem in the process of figuring out how to think about it, if it’s the only form in which motivation for the problem is available, because confused discussion is more informative than refusing to admit that you have any form of data to work with. But it seems to be usually counterproductive as a mode of reasoning, including reasoning about a confusing problem. Confusion only works as a representation of the problem, not as a tool for resolving it. So we could consider any given confused position about epistemology as an object of study, but it seems to be a bad idea to use the other confused positions to reason about it.)
I’ve skated over a lot of the detail in many of the arguments, which may make them look sloppier than they really are. I’m trying to summarize 70 pages of material in one blog post, remember. In fact Feldman tries very hard to present the arguments carefully, at least by the standards of careful reasoning that currently prevail in philosophy.
On the other hand, from a LessWrong point of view, the entire thing could very easily look like it’s based on a failure to realize that certain generalizations are always going to be leaky no matter what you do.
The mode of discussion present in this book (based on your summary) seems like sloppy reasoning, full of leaky abstractions and attempts to build something out of them. Perhaps the book is mostly about merely describing common forms of sloppy reasoning, and I suppose a sufficiently careful reader could avoid confusion, but that would be despite the text, not because of it. I think it’s a bad idea to endorse discussion in this mode.
(Confused discussion is useful for representing a particular problem in the process of figuring out how to think about it, if it’s the only form in which motivation for the problem is available, because confused discussion is more informative than refusing to admit that you have any form of data to work with. But it seems to be usually counterproductive as a mode of reasoning, including reasoning about a confusing problem. Confusion only works as a representation of the problem, not as a tool for resolving it. So we could consider any given confused position about epistemology as an object of study, but it seems to be a bad idea to use the other confused positions to reason about it.)
I’ve skated over a lot of the detail in many of the arguments, which may make them look sloppier than they really are. I’m trying to summarize 70 pages of material in one blog post, remember. In fact Feldman tries very hard to present the arguments carefully, at least by the standards of careful reasoning that currently prevail in philosophy.
On the other hand, from a LessWrong point of view, the entire thing could very easily look like it’s based on a failure to realize that certain generalizations are always going to be leaky no matter what you do.
I didn’t get this impression. Could you name some examples? I wonder whether we’re interpreting the text differently.
You have something better in mind?