Thanks! All your arguments about uncertainty and intersubjectivity seem very reasonable to me, but I still do not understand why purpose or ethics should be intersubjective.
(Laws and customs are obviously intersubjective phenomena, but ethics?)
They are intersubjective because everything we know is intersubjective, though to be fair sometimes “intersubjectivity” doesn’t address the question that’s really being asked.
For example, in ethics the question is more often “why these ethics?” rather than “how do we know ethics?”. And if we set aside metaphysical questions about moral facts (not because they are totally uninteresting, but because we can’t know the answers), what we’re left with is a set of normative rules and heuristics for how to behave, which changes the question “why these ethics?” to “why these norms?”, and this is an easier question to answer that involves game theory, cultural evolution, and adaptation to local circumstances.
For purpose, the question is again often “why this purpose?” or “why any purpose?” rather than “how do we know what someone or something’s purpose is?”. And why any particular person or system has the particular purpose they do is a complicated but ultimately physical question about teasing out causality to find why things are the way they are. I find cybernetics models helpful for understanding purpose, but many other tools like Pearl’s causality can be helpful in explaining the mechanisms.
And if we set aside metaphysical questions about moral facts
Now hoooold your horses! IMO the metaphysical questions are absolutely key to the distinction between eternalism, nihilism, and (what Chapman calls) existentialism.
what we’re left with is a set of normative rules and heuristics for how to behave, which changes the question “why these ethics?” to “why these norms?”, and this is an easier question to answer that involves game theory, cultural evolution, and adaptation to local circumstances.
Wouldn’t every nihilist and existentialist agree with this?
And why any particular person or system has the particular purpose they do is a complicated but ultimately physical question about teasing out causality to find why things are the way they are.
Could you please give some concrete examples of the purposes you have in mind here?
Now hoooold your horses! IMO the metaphysical questions are absolutely key to the distinction between eternalism, nihilism, and (what Chapman calls) existentialism.
Yes, this is true, the positions David argues against are metaphysical positions. Part of his argument is that strong metaphysical claims are nonsensical. He gives a kind of argument against metaphysics here (and elsewhere, this is just the most recent link I could find). I think this is not the best argument, and I give what I consider a better one in my book (draft chapter linked).
what we’re left with is a set of normative rules and heuristics for how to behave, which changes the question “why these ethics?” to “why these norms?”, and this is an easier question to answer that involves game theory, cultural evolution, and adaptation to local circumstances.
Wouldn’t every nihilist and existentialist agree with this?
Yes, but only on the surface. They’d further assert that this is fundamentally the only way to think about ethics because they claim there are no moral facts. I am saying something different, which is that whether or not there are moral facts is unknowable, so we must understand ethics ignorant of them. This is a position that is also compatible with moral realism, since a realist can argue that ethics is the discipline of how we discover what moral facts are since any workable ethical system will be a natural expression of moral truth.
And why any particular person or system has the particular purpose they do is a complicated but ultimately physical question about teasing out causality to find why things are the way they are.
Could you please give some concrete examples of the purposes you have in mind here?
Sure. Living things generally have purposes like survive and reproduce. Tea kettles have purposes like heating whatever is inside them. Thermostats have purposes like keeping the thermometer reading the desired temperature.
I’ve written about this in this chapter, although that chapter doesn’t stand alone very well, so I don’t know how useful reading it would be without reading the whole book (and it needs some substantial improvements anyway).
Yes, but only on the surface. They’d further assert that this is fundamentally the only way to think about ethics because they claim there are no moral facts. I am saying something different, which is that whether or not there are moral facts is unknowable, so we must understand ethics ignorant of them.
This position seems compatible with existentialism. The existentialist could just say: “Your game theory and evolution explains why other people believe what they believe. It neither proves nor suggests that they are right. I choose to view ethics like this...”
(I am not sure whether your claim is compatible with nihilism. I am not an expert on nihilism.)
Sure. Living things generally have purposes like survive and reproduce. Tea kettles have purposes like heating whatever is inside them. Thermostats have purposes like keeping the thermometer reading the desired temperature.
As far as I can see, this fails to cross the is-ought divide. The existentialist would agree that living beings have been shaped by evolution, and that this could in some sense be called a “purpose”, but each of us still can and must choose our own purpose.
(The topic of the purposes of man-made tools seems to me irrelevant to the question. Chapman also brings that up, and there I also failed to understand what that has to do with the topic of the book.)
(I am not sure whether your claim is compatible with nihilism. I am not an expert on nihilism.)
I think it should be, though a nihilist probably doesn’t care because it doesn’t mean anything anyway.
As far as I can see, this fails to cross the is-ought divide. The existentialist would agree that living beings have been shaped by evolution, and that this could in some sense be called a “purpose”, but each of us still can and must choose our own purpose.
Can you say more? I personally dissolved my original is-ought confusion a while ago and I’m not sure sure what you mean by failing to cross the divide.
My guess is you’re talking about the metaphysical kind of divide many people put between is and ought, treating them as fundamentally different things? If so, I’d just say we don’t know. What I know is that I know is from what I observe, and I know ought from what I expect, and these are both known through beliefs, which are all one kind of thing, and the only divide is in how I relate to certain beliefs as observations vs. expectations.
Thanks! All your arguments about uncertainty and intersubjectivity seem very reasonable to me, but I still do not understand why purpose or ethics should be intersubjective.
(Laws and customs are obviously intersubjective phenomena, but ethics?)
They are intersubjective because everything we know is intersubjective, though to be fair sometimes “intersubjectivity” doesn’t address the question that’s really being asked.
For example, in ethics the question is more often “why these ethics?” rather than “how do we know ethics?”. And if we set aside metaphysical questions about moral facts (not because they are totally uninteresting, but because we can’t know the answers), what we’re left with is a set of normative rules and heuristics for how to behave, which changes the question “why these ethics?” to “why these norms?”, and this is an easier question to answer that involves game theory, cultural evolution, and adaptation to local circumstances.
For purpose, the question is again often “why this purpose?” or “why any purpose?” rather than “how do we know what someone or something’s purpose is?”. And why any particular person or system has the particular purpose they do is a complicated but ultimately physical question about teasing out causality to find why things are the way they are. I find cybernetics models helpful for understanding purpose, but many other tools like Pearl’s causality can be helpful in explaining the mechanisms.
Now hoooold your horses! IMO the metaphysical questions are absolutely key to the distinction between eternalism, nihilism, and (what Chapman calls) existentialism.
Wouldn’t every nihilist and existentialist agree with this?
Could you please give some concrete examples of the purposes you have in mind here?
Yes, this is true, the positions David argues against are metaphysical positions. Part of his argument is that strong metaphysical claims are nonsensical. He gives a kind of argument against metaphysics here (and elsewhere, this is just the most recent link I could find). I think this is not the best argument, and I give what I consider a better one in my book (draft chapter linked).
Yes, but only on the surface. They’d further assert that this is fundamentally the only way to think about ethics because they claim there are no moral facts. I am saying something different, which is that whether or not there are moral facts is unknowable, so we must understand ethics ignorant of them. This is a position that is also compatible with moral realism, since a realist can argue that ethics is the discipline of how we discover what moral facts are since any workable ethical system will be a natural expression of moral truth.
Sure. Living things generally have purposes like survive and reproduce. Tea kettles have purposes like heating whatever is inside them. Thermostats have purposes like keeping the thermometer reading the desired temperature.
I’ve written about this in this chapter, although that chapter doesn’t stand alone very well, so I don’t know how useful reading it would be without reading the whole book (and it needs some substantial improvements anyway).
This position seems compatible with existentialism. The existentialist could just say: “Your game theory and evolution explains why other people believe what they believe. It neither proves nor suggests that they are right. I choose to view ethics like this...”
(I am not sure whether your claim is compatible with nihilism. I am not an expert on nihilism.)
As far as I can see, this fails to cross the is-ought divide. The existentialist would agree that living beings have been shaped by evolution, and that this could in some sense be called a “purpose”, but each of us still can and must choose our own purpose.
(The topic of the purposes of man-made tools seems to me irrelevant to the question. Chapman also brings that up, and there I also failed to understand what that has to do with the topic of the book.)
I think it should be, though a nihilist probably doesn’t care because it doesn’t mean anything anyway.
Can you say more? I personally dissolved my original is-ought confusion a while ago and I’m not sure sure what you mean by failing to cross the divide.
My guess is you’re talking about the metaphysical kind of divide many people put between is and ought, treating them as fundamentally different things? If so, I’d just say we don’t know. What I know is that I know is from what I observe, and I know ought from what I expect, and these are both known through beliefs, which are all one kind of thing, and the only divide is in how I relate to certain beliefs as observations vs. expectations.