You’re changing the subject. The question was whether actually having akrasia is compatible with rationality. The question was not whether someone who claims to have akrasia actually has akrasia, or whether it is rational for someone who has akrasia to complain about akrasia and treat it as not worth trying to solve.
Having akrasia is no more compatible with rationality than having myopia is: saying “if only I had better eyesight” while not wearing eyeglasses is not terribly rational.
I’m pretty sure I expressed my opinion on this topic precisely (“no, it’s not compatible”). It’s up to you how you choose to misunderstand it, I have no control over it.
spending their life complaining about how they would do this and that if only they didn’t have akrasia
Do you agree the quoted property differs from the property of “having akrasia” (which is the property we’re interested in); that one might have akrasia without spending one’s life complaining about it, and that one might spend one’s life complaining about akrasia without having (the stated amount of) akrasia (e.g. with the deliberate intent to evade obligations)? If this inaccuracy were fixed, would your original response retain all its rhetorical force?
(It’s worth keeping in mind that “akrasia” is more a problem description saying someone’s brain doesn’t produce the right output, and not an actual specific mechanism sitting there impeding an otherwise-functioning brain from doing its thing, but I don’t think that affects any of the reasoning here.)
You’re changing the subject. The question was whether actually having akrasia is compatible with rationality. The question was not whether someone who claims to have akrasia actually has akrasia, or whether it is rational for someone who has akrasia to complain about akrasia and treat it as not worth trying to solve.
Having akrasia is no more compatible with rationality than having myopia is: saying “if only I had better eyesight” while not wearing eyeglasses is not terribly rational.
I’m pretty sure I expressed my opinion on this topic precisely (“no, it’s not compatible”). It’s up to you how you choose to misunderstand it, I have no control over it.
Do you agree the quoted property differs from the property of “having akrasia” (which is the property we’re interested in); that one might have akrasia without spending one’s life complaining about it, and that one might spend one’s life complaining about akrasia without having (the stated amount of) akrasia (e.g. with the deliberate intent to evade obligations)? If this inaccuracy were fixed, would your original response retain all its rhetorical force?
(It’s worth keeping in mind that “akrasia” is more a problem description saying someone’s brain doesn’t produce the right output, and not an actual specific mechanism sitting there impeding an otherwise-functioning brain from doing its thing, but I don’t think that affects any of the reasoning here.)