Michael Sandel has made communitarian arguments for concern with existential risk, along the lines of “the loss of the chain of generations, the dreams of progress, the scientific and artistic and religious and cultural traditions, etc, have value beyond that accruing to individual lives” in his book Public Philosophy.
Derek Parfit briefly considers a similar argument in the concluding section of Reasons and Persons. On this argument, “what matters are what Sidgwick called the ‘ideal goods’—the Sciences, the Arts, and moral progress, or the continued advance towards a wholly just world-wide community. The destruction of mankind would prevent further achievements of these three kinds. This would be extremely bad because what matters most would be the highest achievements of these kinds, and these highest achievements would come in future centuries.” (p. 454) However, although not strictly utilitarian, the argument is still broadly consequentialist.
Sandel thinks in terms of loyalties and obligations, and is not coming from a universalist aggregative person-centered axiological perspective. He often makes arguments against performing various welfare-enhancing courses so as to signal/affirm communal loyalty. He’s not of the utilitarian school, at least, and hard to capture precisely as a consequentialist.
Michael Sandel has made communitarian arguments for concern with existential risk, along the lines of “the loss of the chain of generations, the dreams of progress, the scientific and artistic and religious and cultural traditions, etc, have value beyond that accruing to individual lives” in his book Public Philosophy.
Derek Parfit briefly considers a similar argument in the concluding section of Reasons and Persons. On this argument, “what matters are what Sidgwick called the ‘ideal goods’—the Sciences, the Arts, and moral progress, or the continued advance towards a wholly just world-wide community. The destruction of mankind would prevent further achievements of these three kinds. This would be extremely bad because what matters most would be the highest achievements of these kinds, and these highest achievements would come in future centuries.” (p. 454) However, although not strictly utilitarian, the argument is still broadly consequentialist.
That sounds consequentialist to me.
Sandel thinks in terms of loyalties and obligations, and is not coming from a universalist aggregative person-centered axiological perspective. He often makes arguments against performing various welfare-enhancing courses so as to signal/affirm communal loyalty. He’s not of the utilitarian school, at least, and hard to capture precisely as a consequentialist.