Point 2. It’s either possible or impossible in principle to implement consciousness on a >Turing-equivalent digital computer.
Justification: obvious corollary of Point 1.
You need the law of the excluded middle as well here. It might be undecidable whether any thing is an implementation of consciousness, from the outside. Due perhaps to the self-referential nature of a consciousness studying consciousness.
The whole argument isn’t about decidability at all, whether internal or external. And if you consider the existence of subjective experience to be neither true nor false in some cases, you fail Point 1.
Point 1 accepts the possibility that consciousness may not be binary, but could instead have degrees. Point 2 fudges this. Point 3 then assumes that it’s binary.
Thanks, you have found a mistake in the post. But it seems minor to me because the whole reasoning from Point 2 on can be applied to a specific degree of consciousness, e.g. the waterline of neurologically intact humans.
You need the law of the excluded middle as well here. It might be undecidable whether any thing is an implementation of consciousness, from the outside. Due perhaps to the self-referential nature of a consciousness studying consciousness.
My argument doesn’t require decidability from the outside, only that the presence of consciousness is a yes/no question from the inside.
Well, it certainly can’t be a no question from the inside, at least.
The whole argument isn’t about decidability at all, whether internal or external. And if you consider the existence of subjective experience to be neither true nor false in some cases, you fail Point 1.
Point 1 accepts the possibility that consciousness may not be binary, but could instead have degrees. Point 2 fudges this. Point 3 then assumes that it’s binary.
Thanks, you have found a mistake in the post. But it seems minor to me because the whole reasoning from Point 2 on can be applied to a specific degree of consciousness, e.g. the waterline of neurologically intact humans.