If consciousness is implementable on a digital computer, all imaginable conscious experiences already exist.
Justification: the state of any program can be encoded as an integer. What does it mean for an integer to “exist”? Does three “exist”? If a computer program gives rise to “actually existing” subjective experiences, then so does the decimal expansion of the x-coordinate of some particle in the Magellanic Cloud when written out in trinary.
That is not what the word “exist” means. You claim that everything imaginable exists; I say that there are imaginable things which do not exist, and as proof, I point to the flying spaghetti monster. Note that there is nothing in this argument which is specific to conscious experiences, or which depends on consciousness being emulatable; if you define existence in such a way that everything which can be represented as an integer must exist, and the universe is discrete (as we suspect it is), then every possible arrangement of particles in the universe “exists”.
I think you didn’t understand the argument. I never took it for an axiom that everything imaginable “exists”.
Point 1 says that conscious observers “exist”. Whatever that means. That having or not having subjective experience is an objective yes/no question. (That’s what is specific to conscious experiences in my argument.)
Point 3 says that, if something simulated by a computer possesses subjective experience (yes/no question!), then something encoded in the decimal expansion of some particle’s coordinate possesses the same subjective experience. Because the word “simulation” is ill-defined: we can’t produce a hard criterion which detects whether a specific part of our world “simulates” a specific integer-state of a specific ideal Turing machine, and simultaneously excludes “non-obvious” simulation interpretations.
something encoded in the decimal expansion of some particle’s coordinate possesses the same subjective experience
No, it doesn’t. First of all, the fact that the state of a computer can be represented as a number does not mean that any particular number is a representation of a computer. Especially if that number is obviously something else, like the position of a particle.
Second, you have snuck in two major assumptions: that the universe contains infinitely many particles, and that every particle’s coordinates contain an infinite amount of information. Neither of these is a settled question in physics, and I can easily assert that the universe is finite and discrete.
Now I think I don’t get your objection. What does it mean for a number to “be something”? What if we stop the computer and run a single step of the simulation with pen and paper? And for the next step, run an unrelated calculation that searches for it within the digits of pi. Where exactly do you draw the line at which the conscious things inside the algorithm suddenly stop being conscious?
Of course not the value! But according to you, some physical law must exist that says aah, here’s a simulation of this particular Turing machine, so the beings inside it are now conscious. How might this law do its work? Does it look at me intently as I sit there rewriting stacks of ones and zeroes in the candlelight, running a simulation unbeknownst to myself?
At this point I can’t make up my mind whether something ought to “click” for me or for you.
Of course not the value! But according to you, some physical law must exist that says aah, here’s a simulation of this particular Turing machine, so the beings inside it are now conscious.
I never said that. But if insist, I can think of at least one such law which would have that consequence: a number cannot constitute consciousness unless something in the universe exists which uniquely specifies that number. According to this rule, writing down complete the state of a conscious Turing machine would make it exist, but writing the words “a conscious Turing machine” or “the set of all integers” would not.
What counts as “something in the universe that uniquely specifies a number”? I take it a particle’s coordinate written out in inches in trinary doesn’t count (why?), even if the universe is continuous. But the contents of a PC’s memory—if Nature assumes a certain voltage means 1 and another means 0 - do count for some reason. Okaaay, let’s pick a border case: a computer calculating successive digits of pi. Will it make every possible world with its conscious inhabitants suddenly spring into subjective life if we wait long enough? Should a span of digits count if it specifies a world when inverted? What if its square specifies a world? How about an off-by-one error? We could go on.
Those aren’t just nitpicks; most any rule you can think up is going to have the same problems. I confess to seeing no logical way out except to say that all “abstract” concepts like numbers or algorithms must be either equally real or equally unreal for purposes of creating “real” things like subjective experience.
Anyway, if consciousness isn’t a “state” but a “process” or “causal” whatever, the whole argument still stands. It doesn’t depend one whit on what consciousness is. I just evaluate two possibilities without giving favor to either: either an algorithm can give rise to consciousness, or it can’t.
How do I know what? Defining consciousness this way makes things clearer and easier to discuss, but doesn’t actually explain consciousness in any way. I’m advocating a definition, not proving a fact.
You start out talking about algorithms, as you say, but then switch to talking about states of (or produced by) algorithms. A MS Word document is not the instance of MS Word that produced it. [Edit: bad example. Reworded: a snapshot of the state of a computer running MS Word is not, itself, a running instance of MS Word. That’s a more precise analogy, but unfortunately more debatable. ;)]
I don’t have any objection to the idea that an algorithm can give rise to (I would say “be”) consciousness. I do object to the idea that numbers exist in the same sense that matter and energy exist. I am not a Platonist.
Thanks! Upon some consideration this makes sense, seems to be correct and turns my whole post into nonsense. Namely, consciousness could require physical causality, which falsifies point 3 while keeping simulations possible. Updated the post.
That is not what the word “exist” means. You claim that everything imaginable exists; I say that there are imaginable things which do not exist, and as proof, I point to the flying spaghetti monster. Note that there is nothing in this argument which is specific to conscious experiences, or which depends on consciousness being emulatable; if you define existence in such a way that everything which can be represented as an integer must exist, and the universe is discrete (as we suspect it is), then every possible arrangement of particles in the universe “exists”.
I think you didn’t understand the argument. I never took it for an axiom that everything imaginable “exists”.
Point 1 says that conscious observers “exist”. Whatever that means. That having or not having subjective experience is an objective yes/no question. (That’s what is specific to conscious experiences in my argument.)
Point 3 says that, if something simulated by a computer possesses subjective experience (yes/no question!), then something encoded in the decimal expansion of some particle’s coordinate possesses the same subjective experience. Because the word “simulation” is ill-defined: we can’t produce a hard criterion which detects whether a specific part of our world “simulates” a specific integer-state of a specific ideal Turing machine, and simultaneously excludes “non-obvious” simulation interpretations.
No, it doesn’t. First of all, the fact that the state of a computer can be represented as a number does not mean that any particular number is a representation of a computer. Especially if that number is obviously something else, like the position of a particle.
Second, you have snuck in two major assumptions: that the universe contains infinitely many particles, and that every particle’s coordinates contain an infinite amount of information. Neither of these is a settled question in physics, and I can easily assert that the universe is finite and discrete.
Now I think I don’t get your objection. What does it mean for a number to “be something”? What if we stop the computer and run a single step of the simulation with pen and paper? And for the next step, run an unrelated calculation that searches for it within the digits of pi. Where exactly do you draw the line at which the conscious things inside the algorithm suddenly stop being conscious?
Whether a number constitutes a simulation depends on its color, not its value.
Of course not the value! But according to you, some physical law must exist that says aah, here’s a simulation of this particular Turing machine, so the beings inside it are now conscious. How might this law do its work? Does it look at me intently as I sit there rewriting stacks of ones and zeroes in the candlelight, running a simulation unbeknownst to myself?
At this point I can’t make up my mind whether something ought to “click” for me or for you.
I never said that. But if insist, I can think of at least one such law which would have that consequence: a number cannot constitute consciousness unless something in the universe exists which uniquely specifies that number. According to this rule, writing down complete the state of a conscious Turing machine would make it exist, but writing the words “a conscious Turing machine” or “the set of all integers” would not.
Gotcha.
What counts as “something in the universe that uniquely specifies a number”? I take it a particle’s coordinate written out in inches in trinary doesn’t count (why?), even if the universe is continuous. But the contents of a PC’s memory—if Nature assumes a certain voltage means 1 and another means 0 - do count for some reason. Okaaay, let’s pick a border case: a computer calculating successive digits of pi. Will it make every possible world with its conscious inhabitants suddenly spring into subjective life if we wait long enough? Should a span of digits count if it specifies a world when inverted? What if its square specifies a world? How about an off-by-one error? We could go on.
Those aren’t just nitpicks; most any rule you can think up is going to have the same problems. I confess to seeing no logical way out except to say that all “abstract” concepts like numbers or algorithms must be either equally real or equally unreal for purposes of creating “real” things like subjective experience.
The encoding of a conscious state is not consciousness. Consciousness is the process of successive causally-related conscious states.
What?? How do you know?
Anyway, if consciousness isn’t a “state” but a “process” or “causal” whatever, the whole argument still stands. It doesn’t depend one whit on what consciousness is. I just evaluate two possibilities without giving favor to either: either an algorithm can give rise to consciousness, or it can’t.
How do I know what? Defining consciousness this way makes things clearer and easier to discuss, but doesn’t actually explain consciousness in any way. I’m advocating a definition, not proving a fact.
You start out talking about algorithms, as you say, but then switch to talking about states of (or produced by) algorithms. A MS Word document is not the instance of MS Word that produced it. [Edit: bad example. Reworded: a snapshot of the state of a computer running MS Word is not, itself, a running instance of MS Word. That’s a more precise analogy, but unfortunately more debatable. ;)]
I don’t have any objection to the idea that an algorithm can give rise to (I would say “be”) consciousness. I do object to the idea that numbers exist in the same sense that matter and energy exist. I am not a Platonist.
Thanks! Upon some consideration this makes sense, seems to be correct and turns my whole post into nonsense. Namely, consciousness could require physical causality, which falsifies point 3 while keeping simulations possible. Updated the post.
Because it’s obvious.
(Sorry, couldn’t resist...)
Not really an objection: a single number could encode more successive causally related states than your whole life contains.