Our access to the external world is entirely mediated by models
Pragmatic evaluation, on the other hand, is world-involving. You’re testing your models against the world, seeing how effective they are at helping you accomplish your goal.
If you claim that (1) we do not have direct access to the world and that (2) access to the world is mediated through models then you also need to explain how (3) pragmatism allows us to test our models against the world, and you need to explain it in terms of (2) since models are the only mediator to the world.
I don’t think you give a satisfactory explanation for that, possibly a key is to precisely define what you mean by “world”. Given (1) and (2) I think that if you posit an external world it needs to be defined in terms of (2).
Note that I am not agreeing or disagreeing about the truth of 1), 2) and 3), just pointing out a contradiction or a missing explanation.
My stab at defining “world”:
a) we make observations
b) we create mathematical models of those observations
c) what we call “world” is actually a logical object defined by the widest possible application of all our mathematical models
In this view we only need to make sure that our models match our observations so the correspondence theory of truth is fine, however the “territory” or world turns out to be a super-model which I think is a significant departure from the usual map-territory distinction.
Maybe off topic, but I misread your comment as “my stab at defining would”—and thought you were making the point that counterfactuals are defined only relative to someone’s model of reality, not to reality itself. Which is a pretty cool point.
You claim:
If you claim that (1) we do not have direct access to the world and that (2) access to the world is mediated through models then you also need to explain how (3) pragmatism allows us to test our models against the world, and you need to explain it in terms of (2) since models are the only mediator to the world.
I don’t think you give a satisfactory explanation for that, possibly a key is to precisely define what you mean by “world”. Given (1) and (2) I think that if you posit an external world it needs to be defined in terms of (2).
Note that I am not agreeing or disagreeing about the truth of 1), 2) and 3), just pointing out a contradiction or a missing explanation.
My stab at defining “world”:
a) we make observations
b) we create mathematical models of those observations
c) what we call “world” is actually a logical object defined by the widest possible application of all our mathematical models
In this view we only need to make sure that our models match our observations so the correspondence theory of truth is fine, however the “territory” or world turns out to be a super-model which I think is a significant departure from the usual map-territory distinction.
Maybe off topic, but I misread your comment as “my stab at defining would”—and thought you were making the point that counterfactuals are defined only relative to someone’s model of reality, not to reality itself. Which is a pretty cool point.