This is interesting because, by Rice theorem, it’s impossible to have a general procedure to do semantic inspection, even if “general” is considered to be a simple recursively enumerable set (on the opposite side, structural inspection, e.g. how many states a machine has, is trivial). This implies that “pain” is a structural property of the human brain instead of a semantic property. I wonder: is there a property of my mind that is inaccessible to inspection by a super-agent if not by emulation? Or are all my thoughts accessible because each is reflected in the structural changes of my brain chemical architecture?
This is interesting because, by Rice theorem, it’s impossible to have a general procedure to do semantic inspection, even if “general” is considered to be a simple recursively enumerable set (on the opposite side, structural inspection, e.g. how many states a machine has, is trivial).
This implies that “pain” is a structural property of the human brain instead of a semantic property. I wonder: is there a property of my mind that is inaccessible to inspection by a super-agent if not by emulation? Or are all my thoughts accessible because each is reflected in the structural changes of my brain chemical architecture?