I had heard of the survey of damaged planes which came up with the “counterintuitive” idea of adding armor to the parts that were found undamaged, but this is the first time I’ve heard of another group coming to the opposite conclusion.
Blackett suggested that, instead, the armour be placed in the areas which were completely untouched by damage in the bombers which returned. He reasoned that the survey was biased, since it only included aircraft that returned to Britain. The untouched areas of returning aircraft were probably vital areas, which, if hit, would result in the loss of the aircraft.
In retrospect, sure. But regardless of how many bombers get shot down, it takes a certain clarity of mind to look at the survivors and realize that the damage they’ve received isn’t necessarily representative of the damage the non-survivors received.
On consideration, I suspect the inverse error gets made quite a lot when analyzing failure modes in situations where failure renders an instance unavailable for further analysis.
You’re right, of course: I’d heard the story without working out the solution myself, and my mind leapt to the “obvious” solution.
I suspect the inverse error gets made quite a lot when analyzing failure modes in situations where failure renders an instance unavailable for further analysis.
s/inverse error/identical error? I’m having trouble imagining the inverse error, unless it’s leaning too hard on boolean, non-probabilistic anthropic reasoning and ignoring real damage distributions.
I meant the error that was (sloppily phrased) the inverse of “look at the survivors and realize that the damage they’ve received isn’t necessarily representative of the damage the non-survivors received”. So, yes, the identical error to the one we’ve been discussing all along.
Speculation: if they were ‘damaged planes’ as opposed to ‘destroyed planes’, the parts that were damaged were obviously non-critical. All the planes that got hit in the critical parts didn’t make it back.
I had heard of the survey of damaged planes which came up with the “counterintuitive” idea of adding armor to the parts that were found undamaged, but this is the first time I’ve heard of another group coming to the opposite conclusion.
Really? Was there there a counterintuitive point that they had or is this just an example of crazy?
This is kind of brilliant.
Seems (at least in retrospect) that its obviousness would be proportional to the percentage of bombers that didn’t make it back at all.
In retrospect, sure. But regardless of how many bombers get shot down, it takes a certain clarity of mind to look at the survivors and realize that the damage they’ve received isn’t necessarily representative of the damage the non-survivors received.
On consideration, I suspect the inverse error gets made quite a lot when analyzing failure modes in situations where failure renders an instance unavailable for further analysis.
You’re right, of course: I’d heard the story without working out the solution myself, and my mind leapt to the “obvious” solution.
s/inverse error/identical error? I’m having trouble imagining the inverse error, unless it’s leaning too hard on boolean, non-probabilistic anthropic reasoning and ignoring real damage distributions.
I meant the error that was (sloppily phrased) the inverse of “look at the survivors and realize that the damage they’ve received isn’t necessarily representative of the damage the non-survivors received”. So, yes, the identical error to the one we’ve been discussing all along.
Speculation: if they were ‘damaged planes’ as opposed to ‘destroyed planes’, the parts that were damaged were obviously non-critical. All the planes that got hit in the critical parts didn’t make it back.