A few more reasons that the basilisk is not compelling:
1) Every decision you make has a “compared to what” implicit in it. A rational agent does NOT have Q1 as phrased. It’s _not_ ” Should I do everything I can to …”, but “what resources should I divert from my goals toward …”. And here, the answer is “none” very plausibly for all rational agents.
2) Do you know who worries most about being blackmailed in the future? Blackmailers. Any agent that believes this works is going to be to be driven to placate their own future simulation-enforcer, which probably doesn’t include wasting time on long-dead agents with no remaining causal power. Note: there is one path where this works with #1 to argue for the basilisk—if the agent is afraid that they’ll be punished for not punishing you. This could be part of a very long chain that ends with the heat death of the universe, rendering the fear ultimately unfounded.
3) All the arguments against Pascal’s wager apply just as well. Notably, it’s easy to imagine so many possible goals that you might be resurrected and punished for not pursuing. There’s no particular way to know which god to bet on—you’re going to lose no matter what.
A few more reasons that the basilisk is not compelling:
1) Every decision you make has a “compared to what” implicit in it. A rational agent does NOT have Q1 as phrased. It’s _not_ ” Should I do everything I can to …”, but “what resources should I divert from my goals toward …”. And here, the answer is “none” very plausibly for all rational agents.
2) Do you know who worries most about being blackmailed in the future? Blackmailers. Any agent that believes this works is going to be to be driven to placate their own future simulation-enforcer, which probably doesn’t include wasting time on long-dead agents with no remaining causal power. Note: there is one path where this works with #1 to argue for the basilisk—if the agent is afraid that they’ll be punished for not punishing you. This could be part of a very long chain that ends with the heat death of the universe, rendering the fear ultimately unfounded.
3) All the arguments against Pascal’s wager apply just as well. Notably, it’s easy to imagine so many possible goals that you might be resurrected and punished for not pursuing. There’s no particular way to know which god to bet on—you’re going to lose no matter what.