Let me put it this way then, how do you combine all of these tiny little microexperiences into a coherent macroexperience?
Microexperiences are unphysical—there are no electrons, only global wavefunction. So you only have decomposition problem. It is solved by weak illusionism: there is no real fundamental perfect isolation of qualia, just qualia of isolation. For every detailed description of isolation of your qualia, there is either non-contradicting physical description of only approximately isolated part of reality, or your description is wrong—same way a description of a chair works.
Yes, but I have a principled reason to special plead here. The complete description of the world is only complete from the third person perspective. It’s incomplete from a first person perspective because we need to explain the phenomenal character of consciousness.
I think it circles here? You started by justifying incompleteness by inverted spectrum, received the objection about chairs being analogous, and then answer that the difference is in incompleteness. The problem is that the chair analogy is correct—the difference between blue and red is completely describable by physics. You only need intrinsic property of existence for the whole universe to solve zombies. But you also need it for a chair to be real.
Of course, I don’t think many physicalists actually believe in structural relations all the way down.
You only need intrinsic property of existence for the whole universe to solve zombies. But you also need it for a chair to be real.
Of course, I don’t think many physicalists actually believe in structural relations all the way down.
I agree that the dialogue could be strawmanning the typical C1 position by having them commit to a strong structural realism, but I’m genuinely unsure how to remove this in a way that’s consistent for their position and pushes back sufficiently on C2.
If you grant this “intrinsic property of existence” you open the door for C2 to press everything they want. C1 wants to say that worlds which are structurally isomorphic are literally the same world. If you start to say that some “intrinsic property” is needed to realise the structure then C2 has an opening to claim this is the categorical protophenomenal property required to fix phenomenal character.
Do you see any other options to improve C1’s position? Flagging that this is a genuine pressure point in wrestling with in my own view.
Microexperiences are unphysical—there are no electrons, only global wavefunction.
Agree that C2 needs to refine the view here so it’s consistent with modern physics. I think it’s possible for them to do this in principle, but agree it’s a point C1 could press.
I think it circles here? You started by justifying incompleteness by inverted spectrum, received the objection about chairs being analogous, and then answer that the difference is in incompleteness. The problem is that the chair analogy is correct—the difference between blue and red is completely describable by physics
Agree that C1 could press circularity but I don’t think C2 would concede it. They’re arguing that conscious experience of blue and red gives evidence of something that doesn’t purely fit the causal/functional role in the way a chair does. So it’s a test case the chair doesn’t pass. C1 would disagree and say the causal/functional role fully exhausts everything that needs explaining. I think this is just a restatement of the crux.
Microexperiences are unphysical—there are no electrons, only global wavefunction. So you only have decomposition problem. It is solved by weak illusionism: there is no real fundamental perfect isolation of qualia, just qualia of isolation. For every detailed description of isolation of your qualia, there is either non-contradicting physical description of only approximately isolated part of reality, or your description is wrong—same way a description of a chair works.
I think it circles here? You started by justifying incompleteness by inverted spectrum, received the objection about chairs being analogous, and then answer that the difference is in incompleteness. The problem is that the chair analogy is correct—the difference between blue and red is completely describable by physics. You only need intrinsic property of existence for the whole universe to solve zombies. But you also need it for a chair to be real.
Of course, I don’t think many physicalists actually believe in structural relations all the way down.
I agree that the dialogue could be strawmanning the typical C1 position by having them commit to a strong structural realism, but I’m genuinely unsure how to remove this in a way that’s consistent for their position and pushes back sufficiently on C2.
If you grant this “intrinsic property of existence” you open the door for C2 to press everything they want. C1 wants to say that worlds which are structurally isomorphic are literally the same world. If you start to say that some “intrinsic property” is needed to realise the structure then C2 has an opening to claim this is the categorical protophenomenal property required to fix phenomenal character.
Do you see any other options to improve C1’s position? Flagging that this is a genuine pressure point in wrestling with in my own view.
Agree that C2 needs to refine the view here so it’s consistent with modern physics. I think it’s possible for them to do this in principle, but agree it’s a point C1 could press.
Agree that C1 could press circularity but I don’t think C2 would concede it. They’re arguing that conscious experience of blue and red gives evidence of something that doesn’t purely fit the causal/functional role in the way a chair does. So it’s a test case the chair doesn’t pass. C1 would disagree and say the causal/functional role fully exhausts everything that needs explaining. I think this is just a restatement of the crux.