One can easily imagine some weird data easily described by (and predicted by) very simple mathematical formula, but yet I don’t consider this to be explanation. Something lacks here; my curiosity just doesn’t accept bare formulas as answers.
I suspect that this situation arises because of the very small prior probability of formula being true. But is it really?
I think the situation happens because of bias. Demonstrating an empirical effect to be real takes work. Finding an explanation of an effect also takes work.
It’s very seldom in science that both happens at exactly the same time.
Their are a lot of drugs that are designed in a way where we think that the drug works by binding to specific receptors. Those explanations aren’t very predictive for telling you whether a prospective drug works.
Once it’s shown that a drug actually works it’s often that we don’t fully understand why it does work.
It’s very seldom in science that both happens at exactly the same time.
Interesting.
I imagined a world where Wegener appeared, out of blue, with all that data about geological strata and fossils (nobody noticed any of that before), and declared that it’s all because of continental drift. That was anticlimactic and unsatisfactory.
I imagined a world with a great unsolved mystery: all that data about geological strata and fossils. For a century, nobody is unable to explain it. Then Wegener appeared, and pointed that the shapes of continents are similar, and perhaps it’s all because of continental drift. That was more satisfactory, and I suspect that most of traces of disappointment are due to hindsight bias.
I think that there are several factors causing that:
1) Story-mode thinking
2) Suspicions concerning the unknown person claiming to solve the problem nobody has ever heard of.
3) (now it’s my working hypothesis) The idea that some phenomena are and ‘hard’ to reduce, and some are ‘easy’:
I know that fall of apple can be explained in terms of atoms, reduced to the fundamental interactions. Most of things can. I know that we are unable to explain fundamental interactions yet, so equations-without-understanding are justified.
So, if I learn about some strange phenomenon, I believe that it can be easily explained in terms of atoms. Now suppose that it turned out to be very hard problem, and nobody managed to reduce it to something more fundamental. Now I feel that I should be satisfied with bare equations because making something more is hard. Maybe a century later.
This isn’t complete explanation, but it feels like a step in the right direction.
I think the situation happens because of bias. Demonstrating an empirical effect to be real takes work. Finding an explanation of an effect also takes work. It’s very seldom in science that both happens at exactly the same time.
Their are a lot of drugs that are designed in a way where we think that the drug works by binding to specific receptors. Those explanations aren’t very predictive for telling you whether a prospective drug works. Once it’s shown that a drug actually works it’s often that we don’t fully understand why it does work.
Interesting.
I imagined a world where Wegener appeared, out of blue, with all that data about geological strata and fossils (nobody noticed any of that before), and declared that it’s all because of continental drift. That was anticlimactic and unsatisfactory.
I imagined a world with a great unsolved mystery: all that data about geological strata and fossils. For a century, nobody is unable to explain it. Then Wegener appeared, and pointed that the shapes of continents are similar, and perhaps it’s all because of continental drift. That was more satisfactory, and I suspect that most of traces of disappointment are due to hindsight bias.
I think that there are several factors causing that:
1) Story-mode thinking
2) Suspicions concerning the unknown person claiming to solve the problem nobody has ever heard of.
3) (now it’s my working hypothesis) The idea that some phenomena are and ‘hard’ to reduce, and some are ‘easy’:
I know that fall of apple can be explained in terms of atoms, reduced to the fundamental interactions. Most of things can. I know that we are unable to explain fundamental interactions yet, so equations-without-understanding are justified.
So, if I learn about some strange phenomenon, I believe that it can be easily explained in terms of atoms. Now suppose that it turned out to be very hard problem, and nobody managed to reduce it to something more fundamental. Now I feel that I should be satisfied with bare equations because making something more is hard. Maybe a century later.
This isn’t complete explanation, but it feels like a step in the right direction.