If in any thought experiment where you would say “there is no reason to assign the hypothetical outcomes different subjective probabilities” you would also say “they have equal subjective probability”, then that’s presumably a semantic fact about what you mean with these words. Similar to if in any thought experiment where you would say “this is known” you would also say “this is justified”. What you “would say”, which words you would apply to a hypothetical situation, that’s something your semantic intuitions tell you.
then that’s presumably a semantic fact about what you mean with these words
I don’t think so. This seems to conflate “A is coextensive with B” and “A is semantically identical to B”. My intuition in favor of assigning equal subjective probability to symmetric outcomes (assuming there’s a unique partition etc.) seems to be about the epistemic right-ness of doing so. (Where “right-ness” is compatible with normative anti-realism, I think.) That goes beyond semantics.
I don’t think so. This seems to conflate “A is coextensive with B” and “A is semantically identical to B”.
But I was talking about thought experiments, not just actual situations, so it’s not just coextensive, but necessarily coextensive.
My intuition in favor of assigning equal subjective probability to symmetric outcomes (assuming there’s a unique partition etc.) seems to be about the epistemic right-ness of doing so. (Where “right-ness” is compatible with normative anti-realism, I think.) That goes beyond semantics.
I don’t think so. It’s also epistemically rational to be certain of a tautology, even if you think (like I do) that being a tautology is a semantic fact. Because we have some internal insight into semantic facts which consitute a priori justification. A priori justification is a form of epistemic rationality/right-ness. Indeed, it’s hard to see where a priori justification could come from if not from semantic facts.
not just coextensive, but necessarily coextensive.
I meant to include necessarily coextensive, too.
It’s also epistemically rational to be certain of a tautology, even if you think (like I do) that being a tautology is a semantic fact
This seems like a non sequitur. I wasn’t claiming “norms of epistemic rationality can’t be functions of [whether a given proposition is a semantic fact]”. (Edit:) I was claiming “norms of epistemic rationality themselves aren’t merely semantic”. The semantic fact that X is a tautology doesn’t, by itself, dictate that you should have P(X) = 1. You need an (in this case, very obviously compelling) norm to tell you that.
Indeed, it’s hard to see where a priori justification could come from if not from semantic facts.
It can come from your intuitions in favor of some foundational norms. (Cf. “non-pragmatic principles” here.) Do you think that when, say, moral anti-realists talk about their bedrock moral intuitions, they’re just talking about semantic facts?
The semantic fact that X is a tautology doesn’t, by itself, dictate that you should have P(X) = 1. You need an (in this case, very obviously compelling) norm to tell you that.
I don’t think this detour via separate “compelling” “norms” is necessary. As I said, “[b]ecause we have some internal insight into semantic facts which consitute a priori justification.”
It can come from your intuitions in favor of some foundational norms. (Cf. “non-pragmatic principles” here.)
I agree it can come from semantic intuitions, but only from those. Because our semantic intuitions give us internal access to semantic facts (whe know what we mean), and other intuitions generally don’t give us direct access to any facts. They constitute at most limited evidence. Like the common intuition that your favorite team will win at football or that you should do certain things because God said so.
Do you think that when, say, moral anti-realists talk about their bedrock moral intuitions, they’re just talking about semantic facts?
I do think something like “Other things being equal, suffering is bad” is pretty clearly analytic. But the vast majority of ethical statements also have some degree of empirical content, as I said initially in my last paragraph above. So in these cases we are not merely stating semantic facts.
(I think there are probably some significant differences in general philosophical framings that make this discussion tricky, so I’m not sure if I’ll reply further.)
Because our semantic intuitions give us internal access to semantic facts (whe know what we mean),
I would say, we also know what we value — broadly construed, i.e., meant to encompass epistemic and decision-theoretic norms too. These normative attitudes are things we can directly introspect, and they’re neither merely semantic (as people usually use that term) nor empirical.
If you want to say claims about our values are really just semantic claims about our evaluative concepts, then I think:
That will be confusing to most people, based on how we usually use the term “semantic”.
That loses something important about the substance of bedrock normative attitudes: They’re, well, attitudes. To me it seems clear that a claim like “Other things being equal, suffering is bad” is doing something more than expressing meanings of terms. Someone who says “I understand what bad means, but I don’t see why suffering is bad” would be making a normative error by our lights, not a semantic one — unlike “I understand what bachelor means, but I don’t see why bachelors are unmarried”.
(“Bedrock” is the operative word here. Meant to exclude the “vast majority of ethical statements [that] also have some degree of empirical content”.)
If in any thought experiment where you would say “there is no reason to assign the hypothetical outcomes different subjective probabilities” you would also say “they have equal subjective probability”, then that’s presumably a semantic fact about what you mean with these words. Similar to if in any thought experiment where you would say “this is known” you would also say “this is justified”. What you “would say”, which words you would apply to a hypothetical situation, that’s something your semantic intuitions tell you.
I don’t think so. This seems to conflate “A is coextensive with B” and “A is semantically identical to B”. My intuition in favor of assigning equal subjective probability to symmetric outcomes (assuming there’s a unique partition etc.) seems to be about the epistemic right-ness of doing so. (Where “right-ness” is compatible with normative anti-realism, I think.) That goes beyond semantics.
But I was talking about thought experiments, not just actual situations, so it’s not just coextensive, but necessarily coextensive.
I don’t think so. It’s also epistemically rational to be certain of a tautology, even if you think (like I do) that being a tautology is a semantic fact. Because we have some internal insight into semantic facts which consitute a priori justification. A priori justification is a form of epistemic rationality/right-ness. Indeed, it’s hard to see where a priori justification could come from if not from semantic facts.
I meant to include necessarily coextensive, too.
This seems like a non sequitur. I wasn’t claiming “norms of epistemic rationality can’t be functions of [whether a given proposition is a semantic fact]”. (Edit:) I was claiming “norms of epistemic rationality themselves aren’t merely semantic”. The semantic fact that X is a tautology doesn’t, by itself, dictate that you should have P(X) = 1. You need an (in this case, very obviously compelling) norm to tell you that.
It can come from your intuitions in favor of some foundational norms. (Cf. “non-pragmatic principles” here.) Do you think that when, say, moral anti-realists talk about their bedrock moral intuitions, they’re just talking about semantic facts?
I don’t think this detour via separate “compelling” “norms” is necessary. As I said, “[b]ecause we have some internal insight into semantic facts which consitute a priori justification.”
I agree it can come from semantic intuitions, but only from those. Because our semantic intuitions give us internal access to semantic facts (whe know what we mean), and other intuitions generally don’t give us direct access to any facts. They constitute at most limited evidence. Like the common intuition that your favorite team will win at football or that you should do certain things because God said so.
I do think something like “Other things being equal, suffering is bad” is pretty clearly analytic. But the vast majority of ethical statements also have some degree of empirical content, as I said initially in my last paragraph above. So in these cases we are not merely stating semantic facts.
(I think there are probably some significant differences in general philosophical framings that make this discussion tricky, so I’m not sure if I’ll reply further.)
I would say, we also know what we value — broadly construed, i.e., meant to encompass epistemic and decision-theoretic norms too. These normative attitudes are things we can directly introspect, and they’re neither merely semantic (as people usually use that term) nor empirical.
If you want to say claims about our values are really just semantic claims about our evaluative concepts, then I think:
That will be confusing to most people, based on how we usually use the term “semantic”.
That loses something important about the substance of bedrock normative attitudes: They’re, well, attitudes. To me it seems clear that a claim like “Other things being equal, suffering is bad” is doing something more than expressing meanings of terms. Someone who says “I understand what bad means, but I don’t see why suffering is bad” would be making a normative error by our lights, not a semantic one — unlike “I understand what bachelor means, but I don’t see why bachelors are unmarried”.
(“Bedrock” is the operative word here. Meant to exclude the “vast majority of ethical statements [that] also have some degree of empirical content”.)