The two are unrelated. Illusionism is specifically about consciousness (or rather its absence), while anthropics is about particular types of conditional probabilities and does not require any reference to consciousness or its absence. Denying first person experience does not make anthropic problems any more undefined than they already are.
One way to understand the anthropic debate is to consider them as different ways of interpreting the indexicals (such as “I” “now” “today” “our generation” etc) in probability calculation. And they are based on the first-person perspective. Furthermore, there is the looming question of “what should be considered observers?”. Which lacks any logical indicator, unless we bring in the concept of consciousness.
We can easily make the sleeping beauty problem more undefined. For example, by asking “Is the day Monday?”. Before attempting to answer it one would have to ask: “which day exactly are we talking about?”. Compare that question to “is today Monday?”, the latter is obviously more defined. Even though by using “now” or “today” no physical feature is used, we inherently think the latter question is clear because we can imagine being in Beauty’s perspective as she wakes up during the experiment: “today” is the one most closely connected to the first-person experience.
If I program a simulation of the SBP and run it under illusionist principles, aren’t the simulated Halfers going to inevitably win on average? After all, it’s a fair coin.
Can you explain what you mean by “underdetermined” in this context? How is there any ambiguity in resolving the payouts if the game is run as a third person simulation?
The two are unrelated. Illusionism is specifically about consciousness (or rather its absence), while anthropics is about particular types of conditional probabilities and does not require any reference to consciousness or its absence. Denying first person experience does not make anthropic problems any more undefined than they already are.
One way to understand the anthropic debate is to consider them as different ways of interpreting the indexicals (such as “I” “now” “today” “our generation” etc) in probability calculation. And they are based on the first-person perspective. Furthermore, there is the looming question of “what should be considered observers?”. Which lacks any logical indicator, unless we bring in the concept of consciousness.
We can easily make the sleeping beauty problem more undefined. For example, by asking “Is the day Monday?”. Before attempting to answer it one would have to ask: “which day exactly are we talking about?”. Compare that question to “is today Monday?”, the latter is obviously more defined. Even though by using “now” or “today” no physical feature is used, we inherently think the latter question is clear because we can imagine being in Beauty’s perspective as she wakes up during the experiment: “today” is the one most closely connected to the first-person experience.
So you’d say that it’s coherent to be an illusionist who rejects the Halfer position in the SBP?
Sure. Also coherent to be an illusionist who accepts the Halfer position in the SBP. It’s an underdetermined problem.
If I program a simulation of the SBP and run it under illusionist principles, aren’t the simulated Halfers going to inevitably win on average? After all, it’s a fair coin.
It depends upon how you score it, which is why both the original problem and various decision-problem variants are underdetermined.
Can you explain what you mean by “underdetermined” in this context? How is there any ambiguity in resolving the payouts if the game is run as a third person simulation?