I am not at all sure that there is a rational derivation of which entities should or should not be considered as moral patients by humans. So I’m not sure that demanding embodiment for moral patienthood is an error.
Generally I’m comfortable leaving these decisions of moral patienthood of entities that don’t yet exist to the sensibilities of future people.
So I’m not sure that demanding embodiment for moral patienthood is an error.
So, to give a specific example, if you considered a mind upload with conscious states identical to yours (but not embodied), it’s possible it would be morally permissible for (embodied) humans to torture it for fun?
Not a big believer in hypotheticals. Mind uploading gets into some very weird issues. I will leave it to decide to future society when and if that happens. I would say that if people are torturing anything for fun, even if that thing has no capacity for pain, then that doesn’t sound morally good to me.
It’s a little strange that you don’t mind hypothesizing about how embodiment might be necessary for moral patienthood from embodied agents, but once a counterexample arises, you’re no longer a big believer in hypotheticals.
I am not at all sure that there is a rational derivation of which entities should or should not be considered as moral patients by humans. So I’m not sure that demanding embodiment for moral patienthood is an error.
Generally I’m comfortable leaving these decisions of moral patienthood of entities that don’t yet exist to the sensibilities of future people.
So, to give a specific example, if you considered a mind upload with conscious states identical to yours (but not embodied), it’s possible it would be morally permissible for (embodied) humans to torture it for fun?
Not a big believer in hypotheticals. Mind uploading gets into some very weird issues. I will leave it to decide to future society when and if that happens. I would say that if people are torturing anything for fun, even if that thing has no capacity for pain, then that doesn’t sound morally good to me.
It’s a little strange that you don’t mind hypothesizing about how embodiment might be necessary for moral patienthood from embodied agents, but once a counterexample arises, you’re no longer a big believer in hypotheticals.