Of course, if the questions on which we need to use AI advice force those distributions to skew too much, and there’s no way for debaters to adapt and bootstrap from on-distribution human data, that will mean our protocol isn’t competitive.
This is my concern, and I’m glad it’s at least on your radar. How do you / your team think about competitiveness in general? (I did a simple search and the word doesn’t appear in this post or the previous one.) How much competitiveness are you aiming for? Will there be a “competitiveness case” later in this sequence, or later in the project? Etc.?
But generally this requires you to have some formal purchase on the philosophical aspects where humans are off distribution, which may be rough.
Because of the “slowness of philosophy” issue I talked about in my post, we have no way of quickly reaching high confidence that any such formalization is correct, and we have a number of negative examples where a proposed formal solution to some philosophical problem that initially looked good turned out to be flawed upon deeper examination. (See decision theory and Solomonoff induction.) AFAIK we don’t really have any positive examples of such formalizations that have stood the test of time. So I feel like this is basically not a viable approach.
The Dodging systematic human errors in scalable oversight post is out as you saw, we can mostly take the conversation over there. But briefly, I think I’m mostly just more bullish on the margin than you about the (1) the probability that we can in fact make purchase on the hard philosophy, should that be necessary and (2) the utility we can get out of solving other problems should the hard philosophy problems remain unsolved. The goal with the dodging human errors post would be that if fail at case (1), we’re more likely to recognise it and try to get utility out of (2) on other questions.
Part of this is that my mental model of formalisations standing the test of time is that we do have a lot of these: both of the links you point to are formalisations that have stood the test of time and have some reasonable domain of applicability in which they say useful things. I agree they aren’t bulletproof, but I think I’d place more chance than you of muddling through with imperfect machinery. This is similar to physics: I would argue for example that Newtonian physics has stood the test of time even though it is wrong, as it still applies across a large domain of applicability.
That said, I’m not all confident in this picture: I’d place a lower probability than you on these considerations biting, but not that low.
Sorry about the delayed reply. I’ve been thinking about how to respond. One of my worries is that human philosophy is path dependent, or another way of saying this is that we’re prone to accepting wrong philosophical ideas/arguments and then it’s hard to talk us out of them. The split of western philosophy into analytical and continental traditions seems to be an instance of this, then even within analytical philosophy, academic philosophers would strongly disagree with each other and each be confident in their own positions and rarely get talked out of them. I think/hope that humans collectively can still make philosophical progress over time (in some mysterious way that I wish I understood), if we’re left to our own devices but the process seems pretty fragile and probably can’t withstand much external optimization pressure.
On formalizations, I agree they’ve stood the test of time in your sense, but is that enough to build them into AI? We can see that they wrong on some questions, but can’t formally characterize the domain in which they are right. And even if we could, I don’t know why we’d muddle through… What if we built AI based on Debate, but used Newtonian physics to answer physics queries instead of human judgment, or the humans are pretty bad at answering physics related questions (including meta questions like how to do science)? That would be pretty disastrous, especially if there are any adversaries in the environment, right?
Continuing with the Newtonian physics analogy, the case for optimism would be:
1. We have some theories with limited domain of applicability. Say, theory A. 2. Theory A is wrong at some limit, where it is replaced by theory B. Theory B is still wrong, but it has a larger domain of applicability. 3. We don’t know theory B, and can’t access it despite our best scalable oversight techniques, even though the AIs do figure out theory B. (This is the hard case: I think there other cases where scalable oversight does work.) 4. However, we do have some purchase on the domain of applicability of theory A: we know the limits of where it’s been tested (energy levels, length scales, etc.). 5. Scalable oversight has an easier job talking about these limits to theory A than it doesn’t about theory B itself. Concretely, what this means is that you can express arguments like “theory A doesn’t resolve question Q, as the answer depends on applying theory A beyond it’s decent-confidence domain of applicability”. 6. Profit.
This gives you a capability cap: the AIs know theory B but you can’t use it. But I do think if you can pull off the necessary restriction to which questions you can answer you can muddle through, even if you know only theory A and have some sense of its limits. The limits of Newtonian physics started to appear long before the replacement theories (relativity and quantum). I think we’re in a similar place with the philosophical worries: we have both a bunch of specific games that fail with older theories, and a bunch of proposals (say, variants of FDT) without a clear winner.
The additional big thing you need here is a property of the world that makes that capability cap okay: if the only way to succeed is find perfect solutions using theory B, say because that gives you a necessary edge in an adversarial competition between multiple AIs, then lacking theory B sinks you. But I think we have a shot about not being in the worst case here.
I think we’re in a similar place with the philosophical worries: we have both a bunch of specific games that fail with older theories, and a bunch of proposals (say, variants of FDT) without a clear winner.
I read Wei as saying “debate will be hard because philosophy will be hard (and path-dependent and brittle), and one of the main things making philosophy hard is decision theory”. I quite strongly disagree.
About decision theory in particular:
I think Wei (and most people) are confused about updatelessness in ways that I’m not. I’m actually writing a post about this right now (but the closest thing for now is this one). More concretely, this is a problem of choosing our priors, which requires a kind of moral deliberation not unique to decision theory.
About philosophy more generally:
I would differentiate between “there is a ground truth but it’s expensive to compute” and “there is literally no ground truth, this is a subjective call we just need to engage in some moral deliberation, pitting our philosophical intuitions against each other, to discover what we want to do”.
For the former category, I agree “expensive ground truths” can be a problem for debate, or alignment in general, but I expect it to also appear (and in fact do so sooner) on technical topics that we wouldn’t call philosophy. And I’d hope to have solutions that are mostly agnostic on subject matter, so the focus on philosophy doesn’t seem warranted (although it can be a good case study!).
I think it squarely includes ethics, normativity, decision theory, and some other philosophy fall squarely into the latter category. I’m sympathetic to Wei (and others)’s worries that most of the value of the future can be squandered if we solve intent alignment and then choose the wrong kind of moral deliberation. But this problem seems totally orthogonal to getting debate to work in the technical sense that the UKAISI Alignment team focuses on.
This is my concern, and I’m glad it’s at least on your radar. How do you / your team think about competitiveness in general? (I did a simple search and the word doesn’t appear in this post or the previous one.) How much competitiveness are you aiming for? Will there be a “competitiveness case” later in this sequence, or later in the project? Etc.?
Because of the “slowness of philosophy” issue I talked about in my post, we have no way of quickly reaching high confidence that any such formalization is correct, and we have a number of negative examples where a proposed formal solution to some philosophical problem that initially looked good turned out to be flawed upon deeper examination. (See decision theory and Solomonoff induction.) AFAIK we don’t really have any positive examples of such formalizations that have stood the test of time. So I feel like this is basically not a viable approach.
The Dodging systematic human errors in scalable oversight post is out as you saw, we can mostly take the conversation over there. But briefly, I think I’m mostly just more bullish on the margin than you about the (1) the probability that we can in fact make purchase on the hard philosophy, should that be necessary and (2) the utility we can get out of solving other problems should the hard philosophy problems remain unsolved. The goal with the dodging human errors post would be that if fail at case (1), we’re more likely to recognise it and try to get utility out of (2) on other questions.
Part of this is that my mental model of formalisations standing the test of time is that we do have a lot of these: both of the links you point to are formalisations that have stood the test of time and have some reasonable domain of applicability in which they say useful things. I agree they aren’t bulletproof, but I think I’d place more chance than you of muddling through with imperfect machinery. This is similar to physics: I would argue for example that Newtonian physics has stood the test of time even though it is wrong, as it still applies across a large domain of applicability.
That said, I’m not all confident in this picture: I’d place a lower probability than you on these considerations biting, but not that low.
Sorry about the delayed reply. I’ve been thinking about how to respond. One of my worries is that human philosophy is path dependent, or another way of saying this is that we’re prone to accepting wrong philosophical ideas/arguments and then it’s hard to talk us out of them. The split of western philosophy into analytical and continental traditions seems to be an instance of this, then even within analytical philosophy, academic philosophers would strongly disagree with each other and each be confident in their own positions and rarely get talked out of them. I think/hope that humans collectively can still make philosophical progress over time (in some mysterious way that I wish I understood), if we’re left to our own devices but the process seems pretty fragile and probably can’t withstand much external optimization pressure.
On formalizations, I agree they’ve stood the test of time in your sense, but is that enough to build them into AI? We can see that they wrong on some questions, but can’t formally characterize the domain in which they are right. And even if we could, I don’t know why we’d muddle through… What if we built AI based on Debate, but used Newtonian physics to answer physics queries instead of human judgment, or the humans are pretty bad at answering physics related questions (including meta questions like how to do science)? That would be pretty disastrous, especially if there are any adversaries in the environment, right?
Continuing with the Newtonian physics analogy, the case for optimism would be:
1. We have some theories with limited domain of applicability. Say, theory A.
2. Theory A is wrong at some limit, where it is replaced by theory B. Theory B is still wrong, but it has a larger domain of applicability.
3. We don’t know theory B, and can’t access it despite our best scalable oversight techniques, even though the AIs do figure out theory B. (This is the hard case: I think there other cases where scalable oversight does work.)
4. However, we do have some purchase on the domain of applicability of theory A: we know the limits of where it’s been tested (energy levels, length scales, etc.).
5. Scalable oversight has an easier job talking about these limits to theory A than it doesn’t about theory B itself. Concretely, what this means is that you can express arguments like “theory A doesn’t resolve question Q, as the answer depends on applying theory A beyond it’s decent-confidence domain of applicability”.
6. Profit.
This gives you a capability cap: the AIs know theory B but you can’t use it. But I do think if you can pull off the necessary restriction to which questions you can answer you can muddle through, even if you know only theory A and have some sense of its limits. The limits of Newtonian physics started to appear long before the replacement theories (relativity and quantum). I think we’re in a similar place with the philosophical worries: we have both a bunch of specific games that fail with older theories, and a bunch of proposals (say, variants of FDT) without a clear winner.
The additional big thing you need here is a property of the world that makes that capability cap okay: if the only way to succeed is find perfect solutions using theory B, say because that gives you a necessary edge in an adversarial competition between multiple AIs, then lacking theory B sinks you. But I think we have a shot about not being in the worst case here.
(Sorry as well for delay! Was sick.)
I think the situation in decision theory is way more confusing than this. See https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/wXbSAKu2AcohaK2Gt/udt-shows-that-decision-theory-is-more-puzzling-than-ever and I would be happy to have a chat about this if that would help convey my view of the current situation.
I read Wei as saying “debate will be hard because philosophy will be hard (and path-dependent and brittle), and one of the main things making philosophy hard is decision theory”. I quite strongly disagree.
About decision theory in particular:
I think Wei (and most people) are confused about updatelessness in ways that I’m not. I’m actually writing a post about this right now (but the closest thing for now is this one). More concretely, this is a problem of choosing our priors, which requires a kind of moral deliberation not unique to decision theory.
About philosophy more generally:
I would differentiate between “there is a ground truth but it’s expensive to compute” and “there is literally no ground truth, this is a subjective call we just need to engage in some moral deliberation, pitting our philosophical intuitions against each other, to discover what we want to do”.
For the former category, I agree “expensive ground truths” can be a problem for debate, or alignment in general, but I expect it to also appear (and in fact do so sooner) on technical topics that we wouldn’t call philosophy. And I’d hope to have solutions that are mostly agnostic on subject matter, so the focus on philosophy doesn’t seem warranted (although it can be a good case study!).
I think it squarely includes ethics, normativity, decision theory, and some other philosophy fall squarely into the latter category. I’m sympathetic to Wei (and others)’s worries that most of the value of the future can be squandered if we solve intent alignment and then choose the wrong kind of moral deliberation. But this problem seems totally orthogonal to getting debate to work in the technical sense that the UKAISI Alignment team focuses on.