Still don’t buy this “realityfluid” business. Certainly not in the “Born measure is measure of realness” sense. It’s not necessary to conclude that some number is realness just because otherwise your epistemology doesn’t work so good—it’s not a law, that you must find surprising finding yourself in a branch with high measure, when all branches are equally real. Them all being equally real doesn’t contradict observations, it’s just means the policy of expecting stuff to happen according to Born probabilities gives you high Born measure of knowing about Born measure, not real knowledge about reality.
that’s fair, but if “amounts of how much this is matters”/”amount of how much this is real” is not “amounts of how much you expect to observe things”, then how could we possibly determine what it is? (see also this)
I think that expecting to observe things according to branch counting instead of Born probabilities is a valid choice. Anything bad happens if you do it only of you already care about Born measure.
But if the question is “how do you use observations to determine what’s real” than—indirectly by using observations to figure out that QM is true? Not sure if even this makes sense without some preference for high measure, but maybe it is. Maybe by only excluding possibility of your branch not existing, once your observe it? And valuing the measure of you indirectly knowing about realness of everything is not incoherent too ¯\(ツ)/¯. I more in “advocating for people to figure it out in more detail” stage, than having any answers^^.
you should rationally expect to observe things according to them
I disagree. It’s only rational if you already value having high Born measure. Otherwise what bad thing happens if you expect to observe every quantum outcome with equal probability? It’s not that you would be wrong. It’s just that Born measure of you in the state of being wrong will be high. But no one forces you to care about that. And other valuable things, like consciousness, work fine with arbitrary low measure.
You have to speak of a “happening” density over a continuous space the points of which are branches.
Yeah, but why you can’t use uniform density? Or I don’t know, I’m bad at math, maybe something else analogous to branch counting in discrete case. And you would need to somehow define “you” and other parts of your preferences in term of continuous space anyway—there is no reason this definition have to involve Born measure.
I’m not against distributions in general. I’m just saying that conditional on MWI there is no uncertainty about quantum outcomes—they all happen.
if you prepared a billlion such qubits in a lab and measured them all, the number of 0s would be in the vicinity of 360 million with virtual certainty.
But that’s not what the (interpretation of the) equations say(s). The equations say that all sequences of 0s and 1s exist and you will observe all of them.
it’ll end up either in epistemic probabilities that concord with long-run empirical frequencies
They only concord with long-run empirical frequencies in regions of configuration space with high Born measure. They don’t concord with, for example, average frequencies across all observers of the experiment.
For instance, if I find an atom with a 1m half-life and announce to the world that I’ll blow up the moon when it decays, and you care about the moon enough to take a ten-minute Uber to my secret base but aren’t sure whether you should pay extra for a seven-minute express ride, the optimal decision requires determining whether the extent to which riding express decreases my probability of destroying the moon is, when multiplied by your valuation of the moon, enough to compensate for the cost of express.
The point is there is no (quantum-related) uncertainty about moon being destroyed—it will be destroyed and also will be saved. My actions then should depend on how I count/weight moons across configuration space. And that choice of weights depends on arbitrary preferences. I may as well stop caring about the moon after two days.
Still don’t buy this “realityfluid” business. Certainly not in the “Born measure is measure of realness” sense. It’s not necessary to conclude that some number is realness just because otherwise your epistemology doesn’t work so good—it’s not a law, that you must find surprising finding yourself in a branch with high measure, when all branches are equally real. Them all being equally real doesn’t contradict observations, it’s just means the policy of expecting stuff to happen according to Born probabilities gives you high Born measure of knowing about Born measure, not real knowledge about reality.
that’s fair, but if “amounts of how much this is matters”/”amount of how much this is real” is not “amounts of how much you expect to observe things”, then how could we possibly determine what it is? (see also this)
I think that expecting to observe things according to branch counting instead of Born probabilities is a valid choice. Anything bad happens if you do it only of you already care about Born measure.
But if the question is “how do you use observations to determine what’s real” than—indirectly by using observations to figure out that QM is true? Not sure if even this makes sense without some preference for high measure, but maybe it is. Maybe by only excluding possibility of your branch not existing, once your observe it? And valuing the measure of you indirectly knowing about realness of everything is not incoherent too ¯\(ツ)/¯. I more in “advocating for people to figure it out in more detail” stage, than having any answers^^.
I disagree. It’s only rational if you already value having high Born measure. Otherwise what bad thing happens if you expect to observe every quantum outcome with equal probability? It’s not that you would be wrong. It’s just that Born measure of you in the state of being wrong will be high. But no one forces you to care about that. And other valuable things, like consciousness, work fine with arbitrary low measure.
Yeah, but why you can’t use uniform density? Or I don’t know, I’m bad at math, maybe something else analogous to branch counting in discrete case. And you would need to somehow define “you” and other parts of your preferences in term of continuous space anyway—there is no reason this definition have to involve Born measure.
I’m not against distributions in general. I’m just saying that conditional on MWI there is no uncertainty about quantum outcomes—they all happen.
But that’s not what the (interpretation of the) equations say(s). The equations say that all sequences of 0s and 1s exist and you will observe all of them.
They only concord with long-run empirical frequencies in regions of configuration space with high Born measure. They don’t concord with, for example, average frequencies across all observers of the experiment.
The point is there is no (quantum-related) uncertainty about moon being destroyed—it will be destroyed and also will be saved. My actions then should depend on how I count/weight moons across configuration space. And that choice of weights depends on arbitrary preferences. I may as well stop caring about the moon after two days.