Is “The dog” in “The dog crossed the street” perhaps similar to “this dog”? “This” is often conceptualized logically as a constant/name. I guess “Porthos the dog” could also be analyzed as a name. Though one would have to ensure that “Porthos the dog is a dog” is a logical truth. Usually “a dog” would be formalized as “some dog”, “there is at least one dog such that”, which is usually plausible but not the intended meaning of “A dog has four legs” (in that intended meaning “A dog has three legs” would be false).
One underappreciated fact (which in my opinion clearly invalidates Russell’s analysis of the definite article) is that several languages use the definite article in front of names. So e.g. “The porthos crossed the street” rather than “porthos crossed the street.” Even English does that sometimes, e.g. “the Eiffel Tower”, “the NSA” (but not “the NASA”). Which suggests there is no fundamental logical difference between proper nouns (or “proper names”, as philosophers like to call them) and common nouns. Which suggests that names (parthos) are not logical constants, but predicates, just like common nouns (dog).
Is “The dog” in “The dog crossed the street” perhaps similar to “this dog”? “This” is often conceptualized logically as a constant/name. I guess “Porthos the dog” could also be analyzed as a name. Though one would have to ensure that “Porthos the dog is a dog” is a logical truth. Usually “a dog” would be formalized as “some dog”, “there is at least one dog such that”, which is usually plausible but not the intended meaning of “A dog has four legs” (in that intended meaning “A dog has three legs” would be false).
One underappreciated fact (which in my opinion clearly invalidates Russell’s analysis of the definite article) is that several languages use the definite article in front of names. So e.g. “The porthos crossed the street” rather than “porthos crossed the street.” Even English does that sometimes, e.g. “the Eiffel Tower”, “the NSA” (but not “the NASA”). Which suggests there is no fundamental logical difference between proper nouns (or “proper names”, as philosophers like to call them) and common nouns. Which suggests that names (parthos) are not logical constants, but predicates, just like common nouns (dog).