Substituting “intuition” for “faith”, I have come to a similar conclusion:-
III The Inconvenient Ineradicability of Intuition
There are a number of claims that can be made about an intuitions: that they are infallible, that they involve inexplicable mechanisms, that they are nonexistent, that they are unnecessary, that they are uniform or variable , and so on. I will be arguing that they are indispensable in epistemology, and that they are not necessarily good or bad.
(Epistemic status: Obvious and well-known in some circles, radical and disturbing in others).
Philosophers tend to have a fairly uniform set of attitudes about intuitions which are rarely set out explicitly . Rationalists tend to be dismissive towards intuition. I would like to put forward a lukewarm defence of intuition as something, which, while not ideal, is hard to avoid, because ideal, assumption-free epistemology is impossible. Indirectly, this will constitute a partial explanation of the difficulty of philosophy.
III.1The Meanings of Intuition
There’s a repeated pattern within philosophy where a term is ambiguous, and has a range of definitions from the obvious-but-trivial to the momentous-but-hard-to-defend. Intuition is no different
“Intuition” has the basic meaning off feeling that you know something without knowing how, but beyond that means more than several things:-
i) Aunt Nelly’s intuition that it’s going to rain tomorrow. Something that “feels right”. Mere phenomenology.
ii). Fast, but approximate, system 1 heuristic.
iii) Basic assumptions that you can’t do without, since you need them to prove things, but can’t prove, because they’re basic.
Iv). Infallible insight of mysterious, possibly supernatural origin. Like Platos forms , or Descartes clear and certain ideas.
type i) intuitions dont present much of a problem, because no one puts much weight on them.
Type ii intuitions imply a some epistemic reliability … and could have a naturalistic basis. We know that only a minority of the brain is dedicated to conscious thought. It is possible that the conscious and unconscious mind interact in a way where the conscious mind poses a question to the unconscious, which then processes it rapidly and efficientyefficiently, but unconsciously, in a black box, as it were, and presents the answer to the conscious From the perspective of the concsious mind, the answer “pops up out of nowhere” …but that’s an illusion: the answer arrives from neural activity, not an actual void.
How does it process it?
Again, no magic is needed. The unconscious mind/system 1 could perform some sort of pattern matching on the large volume of data it has gathered. That process could be inductive or Bayesian, or some other recognised epistemic process. Or it could perform deductions, and only present the final conclusion. Or abduction. This deductive/inductive/abductive model differs from the quasi-perceptual justification—perceiving the Form of the True—associated with type v intuitions. Even in the absence of of a known mechanism for intuition intuitions can be verified on a black box basis, so long as they are about empirically confirmable topics. Superforecasters are the (confirmable) experts at this type of intuition. Thus there are two ways of confirming that intuitions have some epistemic credibility...finding reliable mechanisms by neurological science, and empiricism about the results. Therefore, the existence of a faculty of intuition with some epistemic reliability can’t be ruled out.
Unfortunately , philosophy isn’t an area where intuitions can be empirically confirmed. Having said that, there is no need to condemn the philosophical use of intuitions as sweepingly as this:-
Moreover, its [philosophy’s] central tool is intuition, and this displays a near-total ignorance of how brains work. As Michael Vassar observes, philosophers are “spectacularly bad” at understanding that their intuitions are generated by cognitive algorithms.
—Rob Bensinger, Philosophy, a diseased discipline.
What’s the problem?
...since there is a possible naturalistically and epistemically viable justification—so long as one doesn’t require certainty—for at least one type of intuition. Inintuition isn’t defined as “non algorithmic” or “not how brains work”. Not always, anyway.
Its important to note that those who dismiss the use of intuitions by philosophers are generally unable to explain how they are managing without them themselves. One’s own intuitions don’t seem like intuitions to oneself; and it is easier to be unreflective about ones epistemic princesses than reflective.
Type iii are a kind reluctantly accepted by many philosophers, a group of people who would rather everything is epistemically well founded. Note that such a starting point need not be unconscious or cognitive.
Type iv, the type that Vassar assumes to be the only type, are accepted by some philosophers of a more mystical bent.
If intuitions are indeed the result of the operation of cognitive algorithms, then there is no
reason to accept them as infallible. But the present topic is not the infallibility of intuition, but the unavoidably of intuition. We will be discussing type iii intuitions.
III.2. The Use of Intuition in Philosophy
It’s not that philosophers weirdly and unreasonably prefer intuition to empirical facts and mathematical/logical reasoning, it is that those things either don’t go far enough, or are themselves based on intuition.Y
“Just use empircism” doesn’t work, because philosophy is about interpreting empirical data.
“Just use maths/logic” doesn’t work , because those things are based on axioms justified by intuitive appeal.
“Just use reductionism” doesn’t work , because its not clear what lies at the bottom of the stack, or if anything does. Logic, epistemology and ontology have been held to be First Philosophy at different times. Logic, epistemology and ontology also seen to interact. Correct ontology depends on direct epistemology..but what minds are capable of knowing depends on ontology. Logic possibly depends on ontology too, since quantum.mechanics arguable challenges traditional bivalent logic.
Philosophers don’t embrace intuitions because they think they are particularly reliable, they have reasoned that they can’t do without them. That is the essence of the Inconvenient Ineradicability of Intuition. An unfounded foundation is what philosophers mean by “intuition”, that is to say, meaning iii above. Philosophers talk about intuitions a lot because that is where arguments and trains of thought ground out...it is a way of cutting to the chase.
Most arguers and arguments are able to work out the consequences of basic intuitions correctly, so disagreements are likely to arise form differences in basic intuitions themselves.
Philosophers therefore appeal to intuitions because they can’t see how to avoid them...whatever a line of thought grounds out in, is definitionally an intuition. It is not a case of using
intuitions when there are better alternatives, epistemologically speaking. And the critics of their use of intuitions tend to be people who haven’t seen the problem of unfounded foundations because they have never thought deeply enough, not people who have solved the problem of finding sub-foundations for your foundational assumptions.
Scientists are typically taught that the basic principles maths, logic and empiricism are their foundations, and take that uncritically, without digging deeper. Empiricism is presented as a black box that produces the goods...somehow. Their subculture encourages use of basic principles to move forward, not a turn backwards to critically reflect on the validity of basic principles. That does not mean the foundational principles are not “there”. Considering the foundational principles of science is a major part of philosophy of science, and philosophy of science is a philosophy-like enterprise, not a science-like enterprise, in the sense it consists of problems that have been open for a long time, and which do not have straightforward empirical solutions.
Substituting “intuition” for “faith”, I have come to a similar conclusion:-
III The Inconvenient Ineradicability of Intuition
There are a number of claims that can be made about an intuitions: that they are infallible, that they involve inexplicable mechanisms, that they are nonexistent, that they are unnecessary, that they are uniform or variable , and so on. I will be arguing that they are indispensable in epistemology, and that they are not necessarily good or bad.
(Epistemic status: Obvious and well-known in some circles, radical and disturbing in others).
Philosophers tend to have a fairly uniform set of attitudes about intuitions which are rarely set out explicitly . Rationalists tend to be dismissive towards intuition. I would like to put forward a lukewarm defence of intuition as something, which, while not ideal, is hard to avoid, because ideal, assumption-free epistemology is impossible. Indirectly, this will constitute a partial explanation of the difficulty of philosophy.
III.1The Meanings of Intuition
There’s a repeated pattern within philosophy where a term is ambiguous, and has a range of definitions from the obvious-but-trivial to the momentous-but-hard-to-defend. Intuition is no different
“Intuition” has the basic meaning off feeling that you know something without knowing how, but beyond that means more than several things:-
i) Aunt Nelly’s intuition that it’s going to rain tomorrow. Something that “feels right”. Mere phenomenology.
ii). Fast, but approximate, system 1 heuristic.
iii) Basic assumptions that you can’t do without, since you need them to prove things, but can’t prove, because they’re basic.
Iv). Infallible insight of mysterious, possibly supernatural origin. Like Platos forms , or Descartes clear and certain ideas.
type i) intuitions dont present much of a problem, because no one puts much weight on them.
Type ii intuitions imply a some epistemic reliability … and could have a naturalistic basis. We know that only a minority of the brain is dedicated to conscious thought. It is possible that the conscious and unconscious mind interact in a way where the conscious mind poses a question to the unconscious, which then processes it rapidly and efficientyefficiently, but unconsciously, in a black box, as it were, and presents the answer to the conscious From the perspective of the concsious mind, the answer “pops up out of nowhere” …but that’s an illusion: the answer arrives from neural activity, not an actual void.
How does it process it?
Again, no magic is needed. The unconscious mind/system 1 could perform some sort of pattern matching on the large volume of data it has gathered. That process could be inductive or Bayesian, or some other recognised epistemic process. Or it could perform deductions, and only present the final conclusion. Or abduction. This deductive/inductive/abductive model differs from the quasi-perceptual justification—perceiving the Form of the True—associated with type v intuitions. Even in the absence of of a known mechanism for intuition intuitions can be verified on a black box basis, so long as they are about empirically confirmable topics. Superforecasters are the (confirmable) experts at this type of intuition. Thus there are two ways of confirming that intuitions have some epistemic credibility...finding reliable mechanisms by neurological science, and empiricism about the results. Therefore, the existence of a faculty of intuition with some epistemic reliability can’t be ruled out.
Unfortunately , philosophy isn’t an area where intuitions can be empirically confirmed. Having said that, there is no need to condemn the philosophical use of intuitions as sweepingly as this:-
What’s the problem?
...since there is a possible naturalistically and epistemically viable justification—so long as one doesn’t require certainty—for at least one type of intuition. Inintuition isn’t defined as “non algorithmic” or “not how brains work”. Not always, anyway.
Its important to note that those who dismiss the use of intuitions by philosophers are generally unable to explain how they are managing without them themselves. One’s own intuitions don’t seem like intuitions to oneself; and it is easier to be unreflective about ones epistemic princesses than reflective.
Type iii are a kind reluctantly accepted by many philosophers, a group of people who would rather everything is epistemically well founded. Note that such a starting point need not be unconscious or cognitive.
Type iv, the type that Vassar assumes to be the only type, are accepted by some philosophers of a more mystical bent.
If intuitions are indeed the result of the operation of cognitive algorithms, then there is no reason to accept them as infallible. But the present topic is not the infallibility of intuition, but the unavoidably of intuition. We will be discussing type iii intuitions.
III.2. The Use of Intuition in Philosophy
It’s not that philosophers weirdly and unreasonably prefer intuition to empirical facts and mathematical/logical reasoning, it is that those things either don’t go far enough, or are themselves based on intuition.Y
“Just use empircism” doesn’t work, because philosophy is about interpreting empirical data.
“Just use maths/logic” doesn’t work , because those things are based on axioms justified by intuitive appeal.
“Just use reductionism” doesn’t work , because its not clear what lies at the bottom of the stack, or if anything does. Logic, epistemology and ontology have been held to be First Philosophy at different times. Logic, epistemology and ontology also seen to interact. Correct ontology depends on direct epistemology..but what minds are capable of knowing depends on ontology. Logic possibly depends on ontology too, since quantum.mechanics arguable challenges traditional bivalent logic.
Philosophers don’t embrace intuitions because they think they are particularly reliable, they have reasoned that they can’t do without them. That is the essence of the Inconvenient Ineradicability of Intuition. An unfounded foundation is what philosophers mean by “intuition”, that is to say, meaning iii above. Philosophers talk about intuitions a lot because that is where arguments and trains of thought ground out...it is a way of cutting to the chase.
Most arguers and arguments are able to work out the consequences of basic intuitions correctly, so disagreements are likely to arise form differences in basic intuitions themselves.
Philosophers therefore appeal to intuitions because they can’t see how to avoid them...whatever a line of thought grounds out in, is definitionally an intuition. It is not a case of using
intuitions when there are better alternatives, epistemologically speaking. And the critics of their use of intuitions tend to be people who haven’t seen the problem of unfounded foundations because they have never thought deeply enough, not people who have solved the problem of finding sub-foundations for your foundational assumptions.
Scientists are typically taught that the basic principles maths, logic and empiricism are their foundations, and take that uncritically, without digging deeper. Empiricism is presented as a black box that produces the goods...somehow. Their subculture encourages use of basic principles to move forward, not a turn backwards to critically reflect on the validity of basic principles. That does not mean the foundational principles are not “there”. Considering the foundational principles of science is a major part of philosophy of science, and philosophy of science is a philosophy-like enterprise, not a science-like enterprise, in the sense it consists of problems that have been open for a long time, and which do not have straightforward empirical solutions.