Hi, I’m Alistair – am mostly new to LessWrong and rationality, but have been interested in and to differing extents involved in effective altruism for about five years now.
Some beliefs I hold:
Veganism is a moral obligation, i.e. not being vegan is morally unjustifiable
Defining veganism not as a 100% plant-based diet, but rather as the ethical stance that commits one to avoid causing the exploitation (non-consensual use) and suffering of sentient non-humans, as far as practicable
This definition is inspired by but in my view better than the Vegan Society’s definition
“As far as practicable” is ambiguous – this is deliberate
And there may be some trade-offs between exploitation and suffering when you take into account e.g. crop deaths and wild animal suffering
Transformative AI is probably coming, and it’s probably coming soon (maybe 70% chance we start seeing a likely irreversible paradigm shift in the world by 2027)
If the way we treat members of other species relative to whom we are superintelligent is anything to go by, AGI/ASI/TAI could go really badly for us and all sentients
As far as I can tell, the only solution we currently have is not building AGI until we know it won’t e.g. invasively experiment on us (i.e. PauseAI)
I’m currently lead organiser of the AI, Animals, & Digital Minds conference in London in June 2025, and would love to speak to people who are interested in the intersection of those three things, especially if they’re in London.
Defining veganism not as a 100% plant-based diet, but rather as the ethical stance that commits one to avoid causing the exploitation (non-consensual use) and suffering of sentient non-humans, as far as practicable
Hmm, it seems bad to define “veganism” as something that has nothing to do with dietary choice. I.e. this would make someone who donates to effective animal welfare charities more “vegan”, since many animal welfare charities are order of magnitudes more effective with a few thousand dollars than what could be achieved by any personal dietary change.
I think that veganism is deontological, or at least has a deontological component to it; it relies on the act-omission distinction.
Imagine a world in which child sex abuse was as common and accepted as animal exploitation is in ours. In this world of rampant child sex abuse, some people would adopt protectchildrenism, the ethical stance that commits you to avoid causing the sexual exploitation (and suffering?) of human children as far as practicable – i.e. analogous to my definition of veganism.
It seems inaccurate/misleading for a child sex abuser to call themselves a protectchildrenist because they save more children from sexual abuse (by donating to effective child protection charities) than they themselves sexually abuse.
Also it seems morally worse for the child sex abuser to a) save more children through donations than they themselves abuse than b) not abuse the children but not donate; even though the world in which a) happens is a better world than the world in which b) happens (all else being equal).
Hi, I’m Alistair – am mostly new to LessWrong and rationality, but have been interested in and to differing extents involved in effective altruism for about five years now.
Some beliefs I hold:
Veganism is a moral obligation, i.e. not being vegan is morally unjustifiable
Defining veganism not as a 100% plant-based diet, but rather as the ethical stance that commits one to avoid causing the exploitation (non-consensual use) and suffering of sentient non-humans, as far as practicable
This definition is inspired by but in my view better than the Vegan Society’s definition
“As far as practicable” is ambiguous – this is deliberate
And there may be some trade-offs between exploitation and suffering when you take into account e.g. crop deaths and wild animal suffering
Transformative AI is probably coming, and it’s probably coming soon (maybe 70% chance we start seeing a likely irreversible paradigm shift in the world by 2027)
If the way we treat members of other species relative to whom we are superintelligent is anything to go by, AGI/ASI/TAI could go really badly for us and all sentients
As far as I can tell, the only solution we currently have is not building AGI until we know it won’t e.g. invasively experiment on us (i.e. PauseAI)
I’m currently lead organiser of the AI, Animals, & Digital Minds conference in London in June 2025, and would love to speak to people who are interested in the intersection of those three things, especially if they’re in London.
I’ll be co-working in the LEAH Coworking Space and the Ambitious Impact office in London in 2025, and will be in the Bay Area in California in Feb-Mar for EAG Bay Area (if accepted) and the AI for Animals conference there.
Please reach out by DM!
Interested in:
Sentience- & suffering-focused ethics; sentientism; painism; s-risks
Animal ethics & abolitionism
AI safety & governance
Activism, direct action & social change
Trying to make transformative AI go less badly for sentient beings, regardless of species and substrate
Bio:
From London
BA in linguistics at the University of Cambridge
Almost five years in the British Army as an officer
MSc in global governance and ethics at University College London
One year working full time in environmental campaigning and animal rights activism at Plant-Based Universities / Animal Rising
Now pivoting to the (future) impact of AI on biologically and artifically sentient beings
Hmm, it seems bad to define “veganism” as something that has nothing to do with dietary choice. I.e. this would make someone who donates to effective animal welfare charities more “vegan”, since many animal welfare charities are order of magnitudes more effective with a few thousand dollars than what could be achieved by any personal dietary change.
I think that veganism is deontological, or at least has a deontological component to it; it relies on the act-omission distinction.
Imagine a world in which child sex abuse was as common and accepted as animal exploitation is in ours. In this world of rampant child sex abuse, some people would adopt protectchildrenism, the ethical stance that commits you to avoid causing the sexual exploitation (and suffering?) of human children as far as practicable – i.e. analogous to my definition of veganism.
It seems inaccurate/misleading for a child sex abuser to call themselves a protectchildrenist because they save more children from sexual abuse (by donating to effective child protection charities) than they themselves sexually abuse.
Also it seems morally worse for the child sex abuser to a) save more children through donations than they themselves abuse than b) not abuse the children but not donate; even though the world in which a) happens is a better world than the world in which b) happens (all else being equal).