Qualia—consciousness in general—seems most likely to me to be something akin to the quality of “wetness”. There is no specific atom or collection of hydrogen & oxygen atoms which are “wet”. Not even an individual H20 molecule at room temperature is “wet”—nor even, say, a dozen of them. But if you get a sufficient quantity of them together, the relationship between them manifests the quality of “wetness”.
This is exactly the sort of non-explanation I was warning against. None of that goes any way towards explaining wetness. In fact, wetness is explained, nowadays, in terms of atoms. We know how atoms combine into molecules; how forces exist between molecules which, under certain temperatures and pressures, result in the liquid state; how interatomic forces between a liquid and a solid in contact with it result in the liquid spreading over the solid surface or forming a bead on top of it. It takes a lot of atoms together to show these phenomena, but “emergent” (a word you used later) wetness is not something separate from the story I outlined, and without that story you do not have an explanation.
But it is true that you cannot have physical turbulence without atoms—not that anyone would discuss turbulence in terms of atoms—no more than one would discuss genetics in terms of subatomic reactions. It’s nonsensical to do so; the variances of scale are such that entire categories of manifest phenomena in one scale are entirely transparent to the lower.
Turbulence is less well understood. As far as I know, it isn’t even known if the Navier-Stokes equation has turbulent solutions. Either way, a real explanation of turbulence, if we ever find it, will provide a detailed connection between the macroscopic phenomenon and the atomic level.
That doesn’t make discussing consciousness in terms of specific neurons any more intelligible than discussing rats in terms of their atoms. It just means we need to understand the intermediate ‘scales of behavior’ between the atom and the rat, with the opposing “ends” of the ‘spectrum’ being the individual neuron and the fully ‘emergent’ consciousness.
A real explanation of consciousness as a physical process of the brain must go all the way down to atoms, as surely as an explanation of how rats work must go all the way down to atoms—and does, for all the explanations that we have of how rats work.
This is exactly the sort of non-explanation I was warning against. None of that goes any way towards explaining wetness. In fact, wetness is explained, nowadays, in terms of atoms.
The fact that you don’t like the explanation doesn’t make it a “non-explanation”.
In fact, wetness is explained, nowadays, in terms of atoms.
Reductively, yes. But I defy you to find me an explanation of wetness written in terms of atoms. Which atom in H20 contains the “wetness” property, exactly? That’s exactly my point: “wetness” itself is not a property of atoms. Nor even of individual molecules, nor even of small quantities of molecules—but rather of the interaction of a large quantity of molecules.
We know how atoms combine into molecules; how forces exist between molecules which, under certain temperatures and pressures, result in the liquid state;
That is more a “description” than an “explanation”.
Turbulence is less well understood.
Indeed. But what explanations we have for it do not depend upon the behaviors of individual quarks, and we never discuss it in those terms. That’s exactly the point: even attempting to discuss turbulence in terms of quarks is failing to properly address the right scale.
So, too, with consciousness and neurons—so goes the assertion which you reject out of hand as a “non-explanation”. It states that there are intermediary levels of explanation which must be engaged between consciousness and neurons. Minsky’s “Society of Mind” qualifies as this; neurons comprise individual components of select “agents”, and those agents together manifest “consciousness” in the same way that atoms comprise molecules which in turn manifest “wetness” when present in the correct quantity.
A real explanation of consciousness as a physical process of the brain must go all the way down to atoms
Ahem. This is absurd. Nowhere in scientific endeavors is this done. Emergence (non-epiphenomenalistic emergence that is) is not a rejection of reductivism, but an assertion of it.
as surely as an explanation of how rats work must go all the way down to atoms
Find me an explanation of rats written in terms of atoms—and I’ll accept what you say. You must, for your rejection of emergent-phenomena-as-consciousness-explanation to be accepted as valid by me—should this be your goal—find an explanation of rats that has no shift in scale other than atoms. It must explain everything about rats in terms of their atoms.
The fact that you don’t like the explanation doesn’t make it a “non-explanation”.
The causality is in the opposite direction.
neurons comprise individual components of select “agents”, and those agents together manifest “consciousness” in the same way that atoms comprise molecules which in turn manifest “wetness” when present in the correct quantity.
“those agents together manifest “consciousness”″ is not an explanation: it is a hole where an explanation should go. There is nothing in common with the way that atoms together produce wetness beyond that general outline. It is like the “map” of Africa consisting of the outline only. With wetness, we do know (pretty much) the actual explanation that fills that outline. With consciousness we do not.
Find me an explanation of rats written in terms of atoms—and I’ll accept what you say.
“those agents together manifest “consciousness”″ is not an explanation: it is a hole where an explanation should go.
No, it’s an assertion that you can’t use the wrong scale to discuss a given type of phenomenon.
There are not atoms that carry the property of “wetness”. They don’t exist. Pointing this out doesn’t mean that I’m not a Physicalist; nor does it mean that I have rejected reductivism. It’s frankly juvenile for it to be insisted that I do.
There is nothing in common with the way that atoms together produce wetness beyond that general outline.
And yet there is no such thing as the quality of “wetness” in an atom.
It is like the “map” of Africa consisting of the outline only. With wetness, we do know (pretty much) the actual explanation that fills that outline. With consciousness we do not.
… I figured you’d say this, actually. It’s rather discouraging of any hope of getting heard by you.
The concept of consciousness as a recursive record of disparate agents is in no way shape or form “not an explanation”, nor is it “a hole where an explanation should go”. It is a solid, realistic, testable prediction of how consciousness operates. There are real things that must occur for it to be valid.
Tell me—are you familiar at all with superatoms? Do you understand that when I say to you that the elemental mimickry superatoms produce is an emergent phenomenona resultant from the interaction of those atoms—that is not an “outline with no details” but a precise statement?
Pick up any general textbook on physiology.
Done. Read ’em cover to cover. Several. Never found a single one that ever discussed physiology—of any organism, let alone a mammal, in terms of atoms. As I said: find me an explanation of rats written in terms of atoms. Being as generous as I possibly can, ‘pick up any general textbook on physiology’ is just wrong. The closest I can conceive of to what you’re saying is actually one that deeply contradicts your assertions: “it’s all genes!” is precisely the same as “it’s all neurons!”.
At this point, this conversation has lost all interest to me. It’s pretty clear that you are very skilled at rejecting this position regardless of how valid or useful the position might be. So let me instead ask you this:
What path would you recommend we follow towards gaining comprehension of consciousness? Note: I will not accept any answers that come in the form of a statement of ‘hard problem of consciousness’. I want real, practical approaches. Steps researchers could take to make the problem “simpler”, so we can worry at it like a dog with a bone.
I feel justified in asking you to provide this because that is exactly what you are rejecting when you reject my position as a “hole where an explanation ought to go”. For example; consciousness as an emergent property resultant from recursive realtime interaction between various agents predicts amongst other things “bleedover” in sensory faculty for those with failing senses; it predicts the existence of the utility of mnemonic devices such as the Roman Room, it predicts the ability of small portions of the brain to have major/significant roles in consciousness—as the hippocampus ; it also predicts that there should be no “central organ of consciousness”—which again has been experimentally corroborated; or how it could even be possible that the removal of specific “sub-agents” might improve cognition. Such as induced “autism-like symptoms” through TMS shows to be the case—or autistic savants in general. There are even edge-cases where we can see chances that it might be false, such as the case of the man with “no” brain—if there weren’t such a phenomenon as neuroplasticity, and if that process hadn’t developed so slowly, we would have expected very different results if the Socially-emergent Consciousness Hypothesis weren’t correct. We would also be left with absolutely no means of explaining how it could come to be that split brains should be able to produce two independent personalities which are not mirrors of one another.
It is a model which puts these pieces into place and creates of them a roadmap towards deeper understanding. It also makes predictions about whether or not “qualia” are explicable. To me, and anyone who accepts this position, there is nothing “mystical” or “inscrutable” about qualia. We can expect entirely to eventually uncover the existence of portions of the brain where specific categories of qualia occur when they are directly sensed. We can map where, when, and how—and we further assert what from the body of evidence governing how qualia can be prevented from occurring (as with the split brain patients). In fact, because of the ‘social’-emergent consciousness hypothesis, I am able to predict that split-brain patients are related to the ‘problem’ of the nature of qualia.
So what is this solution you offer? What is it about the ‘social’-emergent consciousness hypothesis’s deep explanatory power, exactly, that causes you to reject it as a “non-explanation”? What explanation can you provide that so deeply exceeds this that you are justified in your assertion?
This is exactly the sort of non-explanation I was warning against. None of that goes any way towards explaining wetness. In fact, wetness is explained, nowadays, in terms of atoms. We know how atoms combine into molecules; how forces exist between molecules which, under certain temperatures and pressures, result in the liquid state; how interatomic forces between a liquid and a solid in contact with it result in the liquid spreading over the solid surface or forming a bead on top of it. It takes a lot of atoms together to show these phenomena, but “emergent” (a word you used later) wetness is not something separate from the story I outlined, and without that story you do not have an explanation.
Turbulence is less well understood. As far as I know, it isn’t even known if the Navier-Stokes equation has turbulent solutions. Either way, a real explanation of turbulence, if we ever find it, will provide a detailed connection between the macroscopic phenomenon and the atomic level.
A real explanation of consciousness as a physical process of the brain must go all the way down to atoms, as surely as an explanation of how rats work must go all the way down to atoms—and does, for all the explanations that we have of how rats work.
The fact that you don’t like the explanation doesn’t make it a “non-explanation”.
Reductively, yes. But I defy you to find me an explanation of wetness written in terms of atoms. Which atom in H20 contains the “wetness” property, exactly? That’s exactly my point: “wetness” itself is not a property of atoms. Nor even of individual molecules, nor even of small quantities of molecules—but rather of the interaction of a large quantity of molecules.
That is more a “description” than an “explanation”.
Indeed. But what explanations we have for it do not depend upon the behaviors of individual quarks, and we never discuss it in those terms. That’s exactly the point: even attempting to discuss turbulence in terms of quarks is failing to properly address the right scale.
So, too, with consciousness and neurons—so goes the assertion which you reject out of hand as a “non-explanation”. It states that there are intermediary levels of explanation which must be engaged between consciousness and neurons. Minsky’s “Society of Mind” qualifies as this; neurons comprise individual components of select “agents”, and those agents together manifest “consciousness” in the same way that atoms comprise molecules which in turn manifest “wetness” when present in the correct quantity.
Ahem. This is absurd. Nowhere in scientific endeavors is this done. Emergence (non-epiphenomenalistic emergence that is) is not a rejection of reductivism, but an assertion of it.
Find me an explanation of rats written in terms of atoms—and I’ll accept what you say. You must, for your rejection of emergent-phenomena-as-consciousness-explanation to be accepted as valid by me—should this be your goal—find an explanation of rats that has no shift in scale other than atoms. It must explain everything about rats in terms of their atoms.
The causality is in the opposite direction.
“those agents together manifest “consciousness”″ is not an explanation: it is a hole where an explanation should go. There is nothing in common with the way that atoms together produce wetness beyond that general outline. It is like the “map” of Africa consisting of the outline only. With wetness, we do know (pretty much) the actual explanation that fills that outline. With consciousness we do not.
Pick up any general textbook on physiology.
Explain.
No, it’s an assertion that you can’t use the wrong scale to discuss a given type of phenomenon.
There are not atoms that carry the property of “wetness”. They don’t exist. Pointing this out doesn’t mean that I’m not a Physicalist; nor does it mean that I have rejected reductivism. It’s frankly juvenile for it to be insisted that I do.
And yet there is no such thing as the quality of “wetness” in an atom.
… I figured you’d say this, actually. It’s rather discouraging of any hope of getting heard by you.
The concept of consciousness as a recursive record of disparate agents is in no way shape or form “not an explanation”, nor is it “a hole where an explanation should go”. It is a solid, realistic, testable prediction of how consciousness operates. There are real things that must occur for it to be valid.
Tell me—are you familiar at all with superatoms? Do you understand that when I say to you that the elemental mimickry superatoms produce is an emergent phenomenona resultant from the interaction of those atoms—that is not an “outline with no details” but a precise statement?
Done. Read ’em cover to cover. Several. Never found a single one that ever discussed physiology—of any organism, let alone a mammal, in terms of atoms. As I said: find me an explanation of rats written in terms of atoms. Being as generous as I possibly can, ‘pick up any general textbook on physiology’ is just wrong. The closest I can conceive of to what you’re saying is actually one that deeply contradicts your assertions: “it’s all genes!” is precisely the same as “it’s all neurons!”.
At this point, this conversation has lost all interest to me. It’s pretty clear that you are very skilled at rejecting this position regardless of how valid or useful the position might be. So let me instead ask you this:
What path would you recommend we follow towards gaining comprehension of consciousness? Note: I will not accept any answers that come in the form of a statement of ‘hard problem of consciousness’. I want real, practical approaches. Steps researchers could take to make the problem “simpler”, so we can worry at it like a dog with a bone.
I feel justified in asking you to provide this because that is exactly what you are rejecting when you reject my position as a “hole where an explanation ought to go”. For example; consciousness as an emergent property resultant from recursive realtime interaction between various agents predicts amongst other things “bleedover” in sensory faculty for those with failing senses; it predicts the existence of the utility of mnemonic devices such as the Roman Room, it predicts the ability of small portions of the brain to have major/significant roles in consciousness—as the hippocampus ; it also predicts that there should be no “central organ of consciousness”—which again has been experimentally corroborated; or how it could even be possible that the removal of specific “sub-agents” might improve cognition. Such as induced “autism-like symptoms” through TMS shows to be the case—or autistic savants in general. There are even edge-cases where we can see chances that it might be false, such as the case of the man with “no” brain—if there weren’t such a phenomenon as neuroplasticity, and if that process hadn’t developed so slowly, we would have expected very different results if the Socially-emergent Consciousness Hypothesis weren’t correct. We would also be left with absolutely no means of explaining how it could come to be that split brains should be able to produce two independent personalities which are not mirrors of one another.
It is a model which puts these pieces into place and creates of them a roadmap towards deeper understanding. It also makes predictions about whether or not “qualia” are explicable. To me, and anyone who accepts this position, there is nothing “mystical” or “inscrutable” about qualia. We can expect entirely to eventually uncover the existence of portions of the brain where specific categories of qualia occur when they are directly sensed. We can map where, when, and how—and we further assert what from the body of evidence governing how qualia can be prevented from occurring (as with the split brain patients). In fact, because of the ‘social’-emergent consciousness hypothesis, I am able to predict that split-brain patients are related to the ‘problem’ of the nature of qualia.
So what is this solution you offer? What is it about the ‘social’-emergent consciousness hypothesis’s deep explanatory power, exactly, that causes you to reject it as a “non-explanation”? What explanation can you provide that so deeply exceeds this that you are justified in your assertion?
That’s downvote worthy.
Why? It’s a factual statement.