I have a plausibly equivalent (or at least implies Ey’s) candidate for the fabric of real things, i.e., the space of hypotheses which could in principle be true, i.e., the space of beliefs which have sense:
A Hypothesis has nonzero probability, iff it’s computable or semi computable.
It’s rather obviously inspired by Solomonoff abduction, and is a sound principle for any being attempting to approximate the universal prior.
Hmm, it depends on whether or not you can give finite complete descriptions of those algorithms, if so, I don’t see the problem with just tagging them on. If you can give finite descriptions of the algorithm, then its komologorov complexity will be finite, and the prior: 2^-k(h) will still give nonzero probabilities to hyper environments.
If there are no such finite complete descriptions, then I gotta go back to the drawing board, cause the universe could totally allow hyper computations.
On a side note, where should I go to read more about hyper-computation?
I have a plausibly equivalent (or at least implies Ey’s) candidate for the fabric of real things, i.e., the space of hypotheses which could in principle be true, i.e., the space of beliefs which have sense:
A Hypothesis has nonzero probability, iff it’s computable or semi computable.
It’s rather obviously inspired by Solomonoff abduction, and is a sound principle for any being attempting to approximate the universal prior.
What if the universe permits hyper-computation?
Hmm, it depends on whether or not you can give finite complete descriptions of those algorithms, if so, I don’t see the problem with just tagging them on. If you can give finite descriptions of the algorithm, then its komologorov complexity will be finite, and the prior: 2^-k(h) will still give nonzero probabilities to hyper environments.
If there are no such finite complete descriptions, then I gotta go back to the drawing board, cause the universe could totally allow hyper computations.
On a side note, where should I go to read more about hyper-computation?