Kamil Kazani proposed that Putin may be planning to use nukes as a face-saving gesture (in the eyes of Russian public opinion, not yours, you don’t matter to him no matter how absurd you think he’s being), since it’s not humiliating to lose to a retaliatory strike from powerful America, but losing to “inferior” Ukraine certainly is.
Presumably that would depend a lot on whether Putin expected American retaliation to be large enough to let him claim “we were pushed back by the Americans’ power, but we still stand, so we win”, and small enough to still make that claim (the destruction of the Black Sea Fleet, already threatened by the US, might be an example of this scale of response, though if it’s literally only the fleet destroyed that would still raise the question of why the Russian Army can’t handle Ukraine). A retaliation on that scale could conceivably save face, though everyone would still remember how poorly the Russians fared beforehand. A larger retaliation, though, one that threatened Putin’s image or even his life, would be something he’d presumably like to avoid (unless the rumors of him having a terminal illness and seeking to go out with a bang are actually true).
A serious wildcard here is that the West does not seem willing to risk nuclear war. During the Cold War, NATO projected the image of being absolutely willing to go to war if need be, even if that destroyed the world. Indeed, given some of the incidents that occurred (there was at least one instance of planes actually lining up for what they believed to be a nuclear strike; the aircrews were preparing to fight, rather than mutinying over the likely end of the world), that wasn’t a bluff: NATO was willing to fight, and the Soviets knew it.
Now, though, that isn’t the image the West projects. It’s possible that Biden would order nuclear retaliation, but it doesn’t seem like the certainty that it was in the Cold War. And that may increase the risk. A West that predictably retaliates at full force is one Putin won’t be willing to antagonize (barring the dying Putin scenario), while one that unpredictably retaliates is one that might end up actually doing so.
Was cold war NATO willing to retaliate “in full force” against an attack on a non-member?
If Russia uses tactical nuclear weapons in a limited theater, It seems to me that, given the West’s reticence, it may seem reasonable to expect from it a similarly limited, local retaliation.
Even if it’s not a certainty, Putin may be weighing such risks against the risk of what will happen to him if he is ousted from power (this idea speaks to me because it’s simple, mundane fear, it does not require Putin being about to keel over and looking for a dramatic end). Die the death of a deposed tsar = die in nuclear war, you’re dead either way. Maybe the latter is even better, as it’ll be more impersonal. As long as you’re selfish and amoral (which Putin obviously is), the fact that this is “bad for Russia” (let alone the world) won’t stop him.
Kamil Kazani proposed that Putin may be planning to use nukes as a face-saving gesture (in the eyes of Russian public opinion, not yours, you don’t matter to him no matter how absurd you think he’s being), since it’s not humiliating to lose to a retaliatory strike from powerful America, but losing to “inferior” Ukraine certainly is.
Thoughts on this?
Presumably that would depend a lot on whether Putin expected American retaliation to be large enough to let him claim “we were pushed back by the Americans’ power, but we still stand, so we win”, and small enough to still make that claim (the destruction of the Black Sea Fleet, already threatened by the US, might be an example of this scale of response, though if it’s literally only the fleet destroyed that would still raise the question of why the Russian Army can’t handle Ukraine). A retaliation on that scale could conceivably save face, though everyone would still remember how poorly the Russians fared beforehand. A larger retaliation, though, one that threatened Putin’s image or even his life, would be something he’d presumably like to avoid (unless the rumors of him having a terminal illness and seeking to go out with a bang are actually true).
A serious wildcard here is that the West does not seem willing to risk nuclear war. During the Cold War, NATO projected the image of being absolutely willing to go to war if need be, even if that destroyed the world. Indeed, given some of the incidents that occurred (there was at least one instance of planes actually lining up for what they believed to be a nuclear strike; the aircrews were preparing to fight, rather than mutinying over the likely end of the world), that wasn’t a bluff: NATO was willing to fight, and the Soviets knew it.
Now, though, that isn’t the image the West projects. It’s possible that Biden would order nuclear retaliation, but it doesn’t seem like the certainty that it was in the Cold War. And that may increase the risk. A West that predictably retaliates at full force is one Putin won’t be willing to antagonize (barring the dying Putin scenario), while one that unpredictably retaliates is one that might end up actually doing so.
Was cold war NATO willing to retaliate “in full force” against an attack on a non-member?
If Russia uses tactical nuclear weapons in a limited theater, It seems to me that, given the West’s reticence, it may seem reasonable to expect from it a similarly limited, local retaliation.
Even if it’s not a certainty, Putin may be weighing such risks against the risk of what will happen to him if he is ousted from power (this idea speaks to me because it’s simple, mundane fear, it does not require Putin being about to keel over and looking for a dramatic end). Die the death of a deposed tsar = die in nuclear war, you’re dead either way. Maybe the latter is even better, as it’ll be more impersonal. As long as you’re selfish and amoral (which Putin obviously is), the fact that this is “bad for Russia” (let alone the world) won’t stop him.