That’s astonishing, if the text of the Budapest Memorandum actually reads
refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by the signatory of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind
then the US sanctioning Belarus in 2013 really was violating it first. ‘secure advantages of any kind’ leaves no wiggle room for even a ‘human rights’ argument. Especially since it wasn’t even cleared through the UN first.
I don’t understand why “secure advantages of any kind” leaves no wiggle room for a human rights argument. I think I may just not be understanding what you are saying.
I have no idea if the US argument was right, but it seems completely legitimate to argue that sanctions against government officials who are perceived to run fraudulent elections and suppress dissent are intended to protect the people of the country rather than to “secure an advantage” for the US. That feels like it has to come down to actual empirical claims about what happened rather than definitional moves. (For example, I don’t know whether sanctions were in fact mostly targeted at officials, though that seems to be the US story, and I don’t know how credible the case against Belarus was, but it doesn’t seem like anyone in this thread has addressed any of that and at face value the US case is plausible.)
A charitable (for Russia) interpretation is that USA judges human rights abuses unfairly—looking the other way when the dictator is pro-American, using sanctions when he is not. This provides an incentive for dictators to be pro-American. From that perspective, (selectively) applying sanctions against human rights abuses is just another way to increase American power.
I can totally see an objection along these lines and think that there might very well be something to it. But I don’t see why you’d call this response absurd, or think that there is “no wiggle room.”
A moral victory, or at least one side publicly claiming they have the moral high ground, is still an advantage of some kind.
If you think that implies ‘advantages of any kind’ covers an incredibly broad swath of actions, then yes, that’s the point. This is incredibly broad language for a serious document.
The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the united States of America reaffirm their commitment to the Republic of Belarus, in accordance with the Principles of the CSCE Final Act, to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate their own interest the exercise by the Republic of Belarus of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus secure advantages of any kind.
VI. Non-intervention in internal affairs The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations.
They will accordingly refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such intervention against another participating State.
They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military, or of political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.
Accordingly, they will, inter alia, refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities, or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State.
That’s astonishing, if the text of the Budapest Memorandum actually reads
then the US sanctioning Belarus in 2013 really was violating it first. ‘secure advantages of any kind’ leaves no wiggle room for even a ‘human rights’ argument. Especially since it wasn’t even cleared through the UN first.
I don’t understand why “secure advantages of any kind” leaves no wiggle room for a human rights argument. I think I may just not be understanding what you are saying.
I have no idea if the US argument was right, but it seems completely legitimate to argue that sanctions against government officials who are perceived to run fraudulent elections and suppress dissent are intended to protect the people of the country rather than to “secure an advantage” for the US. That feels like it has to come down to actual empirical claims about what happened rather than definitional moves. (For example, I don’t know whether sanctions were in fact mostly targeted at officials, though that seems to be the US story, and I don’t know how credible the case against Belarus was, but it doesn’t seem like anyone in this thread has addressed any of that and at face value the US case is plausible.)
A charitable (for Russia) interpretation is that USA judges human rights abuses unfairly—looking the other way when the dictator is pro-American, using sanctions when he is not. This provides an incentive for dictators to be pro-American. From that perspective, (selectively) applying sanctions against human rights abuses is just another way to increase American power.
I can totally see an objection along these lines and think that there might very well be something to it. But I don’t see why you’d call this response absurd, or think that there is “no wiggle room.”
A moral victory, or at least one side publicly claiming they have the moral high ground, is still an advantage of some kind.
If you think that implies ‘advantages of any kind’ covers an incredibly broad swath of actions, then yes, that’s the point. This is incredibly broad language for a serious document.
https://web.archive.org/web/20180822045920/https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202866/Part/volume-2866-I-50069.pdf gives you the original text:
The CSCE final act says: