If you’re saying that ethics is the conventional wisdom about true morality, then (1) it could be wrong and (2) even if it’s right, we have the right to ask for more detail: an appeal to authority can answer “what?” but not “why?”
Alternatively, you might be distinguishing between “morality” meaning indivisible goodness and “ethics” meaning the accepted rules of society, which we hope promote morality.
If so, are you saying that all these examples are immoral, but some are ethical? and we shouldn’t worry about the harm we do by objectifying the bus driver because he knows its coming and has accepted it? (that the means justify the ends)
As a quick aside, avoid relying on any distinction between the terms “morality” and “ethics”. I don’t think there is any coherent, universally agreed-upon difference and inventing one tends to lead to confusion.
Community norms are inherently an appeal to (diffuse) authority, yes, and have little explanatory power; hence my noting it as a non-answer in the comment you linked to. Nevertheless, the norms objectively exist even if their foundations may be arbitrary.
The “real” answer, from my perspective, is that it’s still a (mildly) inethical way to interact with people, but some combination of your “its part of his job” and a more general argument for impersonal economic transactions providing social benefits in the big picture outweighs it in many cases. On this basis, I accept the status quo of the afforementioned social norms.
morals/ethics: I probably read your definition of social acceptability in terms of ethics backwards.
I think that you’re too trusting of society’s verbalization of morality and that this is rather different from what people actually accept. This is similar to the discussion of lying. It also reminds me of Michael Vassar’s comment about homosexuality. Even if generally accepted ethics deviate from generally verbalized ethics, it’s not clear what to choose.
I think that you’re too trusting of society’s verbalization of morality and that this is rather different from what people actually accept.
My metric is actually closer to “what are people embarrassed to admit” or “what will cause others to impose a social censure”. This seems to best fit the concept of community norms. What people say, and what people do when they don’t expect to get caught, may of course diverge (usually in opposing directions).
ETA: In case it wasn’t clear, I’m not advocating social norms in the general case, just noting their existence and arguing for the reasonability of a specific norm.
I’m not talking about what people do when they don’t expect to get caught. I think people blatantly lie and objectify all the time with no social sanction. Maybe they’d be in trouble if you called them on it, but so would you, for bringing it to the verbal sphere.
No, being normal is not inherently moral, but it suggests that there are other factors to weigh against the lying and the objectification, like with the bus driver. (It suggests it to me, but I feel like there’s a missing step I can’t verbalize here.)
I think people blatantly lie and objectify all the time with no social sanction.
Yes, these are both examples where the social norm is more lax than what people tend to say. Advocating certain kinds of stricter ethical standards than are actually enforced is mainly social signalling of the sort that Robin Hanson likes to discuss.
As a side note, one of the common “geek” social failings is to take stated ethical standards at face value, especially with regard to lying.
I’m not sure what you’re getting at otherwise. As I’ve stated elsewhere, objectifying people in economic contexts is socially permitted (except in extreme cases), while objectifying in “social peer” contexts is of borderline status, depending on (class/region/&c.) fluctuations in norms.
If you’re saying that ethics is the conventional wisdom about true morality, then (1) it could be wrong and (2) even if it’s right, we have the right to ask for more detail: an appeal to authority can answer “what?” but not “why?”
Alternatively, you might be distinguishing between “morality” meaning indivisible goodness and “ethics” meaning the accepted rules of society, which we hope promote morality.
If so, are you saying that all these examples are immoral, but some are ethical? and we shouldn’t worry about the harm we do by objectifying the bus driver because he knows its coming and has accepted it? (that the means justify the ends)
As a quick aside, avoid relying on any distinction between the terms “morality” and “ethics”. I don’t think there is any coherent, universally agreed-upon difference and inventing one tends to lead to confusion.
Community norms are inherently an appeal to (diffuse) authority, yes, and have little explanatory power; hence my noting it as a non-answer in the comment you linked to. Nevertheless, the norms objectively exist even if their foundations may be arbitrary.
The “real” answer, from my perspective, is that it’s still a (mildly) inethical way to interact with people, but some combination of your “its part of his job” and a more general argument for impersonal economic transactions providing social benefits in the big picture outweighs it in many cases. On this basis, I accept the status quo of the afforementioned social norms.
Thanks for that clarification!
morals/ethics: I probably read your definition of social acceptability in terms of ethics backwards.
I think that you’re too trusting of society’s verbalization of morality and that this is rather different from what people actually accept. This is similar to the discussion of lying. It also reminds me of Michael Vassar’s comment about homosexuality. Even if generally accepted ethics deviate from generally verbalized ethics, it’s not clear what to choose.
My metric is actually closer to “what are people embarrassed to admit” or “what will cause others to impose a social censure”. This seems to best fit the concept of community norms. What people say, and what people do when they don’t expect to get caught, may of course diverge (usually in opposing directions).
ETA: In case it wasn’t clear, I’m not advocating social norms in the general case, just noting their existence and arguing for the reasonability of a specific norm.
I’m not talking about what people do when they don’t expect to get caught. I think people blatantly lie and objectify all the time with no social sanction. Maybe they’d be in trouble if you called them on it, but so would you, for bringing it to the verbal sphere.
No, being normal is not inherently moral, but it suggests that there are other factors to weigh against the lying and the objectification, like with the bus driver. (It suggests it to me, but I feel like there’s a missing step I can’t verbalize here.)
Yes, these are both examples where the social norm is more lax than what people tend to say. Advocating certain kinds of stricter ethical standards than are actually enforced is mainly social signalling of the sort that Robin Hanson likes to discuss.
As a side note, one of the common “geek” social failings is to take stated ethical standards at face value, especially with regard to lying.
I’m not sure what you’re getting at otherwise. As I’ve stated elsewhere, objectifying people in economic contexts is socially permitted (except in extreme cases), while objectifying in “social peer” contexts is of borderline status, depending on (class/region/&c.) fluctuations in norms.
I agree with most of what you say here. Probably I shouldn’t have brought up divergence from verbalized rules; that’s a different conversation.