It would have been better, I think, to submit an argument for veganism (or vegetarianism) for scrutiny here first. Then an argument about the best way to promote it. As it stands, the two issues are confused.
My own view is that for me, the productivity hit and adverse health impact outweigh the benefits. (vegan diet contributed to the loss of sight in my left eye among other things).
If we stop eating meat, these animals will not thereafter frolic gaily in the meadow. They will not exist at all. The merits of veganism make for a big enough topic on their own. You may also want to justify why this is a priority issue.
I am concerned about attempts to coopt LW in other causes that seem to me to not be rational at their core.
My personal reason for pursuing vegetarianism (and ultimately veganism) is simple: I want the result of me having existed, as compared to an alternative universe where I did not exist, to be less overall suffering in the world. If I eat meat for my whole life, I’ll already have contributed to the creation of such a vast amount of suffering that it will be very hard to do anything that will reliably catch up with that. Each day of my life, I’ll be racking up more “suffering debt” to pay off, and I’d rather not have my mere existence contribute to adding more suffering.
No. The “fleshed-out version” is rather complex, incomplete, and constantly-changing, as it’s effectively the current compromise that’s been forged between the negative utilitarian, positive utilitarian, deontological, and purely egoist factions within my brain. It has plenty of inconsistencies, but I resolve those on a case-by-case basis as I encounter them. I don’t have a good answer to the doomsday machine, because I currently don’t expect to encounter a situation where my actions would have considerable influence on the creation of a doomsday machine, so I haven’t needed to resolve that particular inconsistency.
Of course, there is the question of x-risk mitigation work and the fact that e.g. my work for MIRI might reduce the risk of a doomsday machine, so I have been forced to somewhat consider the question. My negative utilitarian faction would consider it a good thing if all life on Earth were eradicated, with the other factions strongly disagreeing. The current compromise balance is based around the suspicion that most kinds of x-risk would probably lead to massive suffering in the form of an immense death toll and then a gradual reconstruction that would eventually bring Earth’s population back to its current levels, rather than all life on the planet going extinct. (Even for AI/Singularity scenarios there is great uncertainty and a non-trivial possibility for such an outcome.) All my brain-factions agree on this being a Seriously Bad scenario to happen, so there is currently an agreement that work aimed at reducing the outcome of this scenario is good, even if it indirectly influences the probability of an “everyone dies” scenario in one way or another. The compromise is only possible because we are currently very unsure of what would have a very strong effect on the probability of an “everyone dies” scenario.
I am unsure of what would happen if we had good evidence of it really being possible to strongly increase or decrease the probability of an “everyone dies” scenario: with the current power balances, I expect that we’d just decide not to do anything either way, with the negative utilitarian faction being strong enough to veto attempts to save humanity, but not strong enough to override everyone else’s veto when it came to attempts to destroy humanity. Of course, this assumes that humanity would basically go on experiencing its current levels of suffering after being saved: if saving humanity would also involve a positive Singularity after which it was very sure that nobody would need to experience involuntary suffering anymore, then the power balance would very strongly shift to favor saving humanity.
I want the result of me having existed, as compared to an alternative universe where I did not exist, to be...
This seems like an arbitrary distinction. The value relevant to your ongoing decisions is in opportunity cost of the decisions (and you know that). Why take the popular sentiment seriously, or even merely indulge yourself in it, when it’s known to be wrong?
It is indeed wrong, but it seems to mostly produce the same recommendations as framing the issue in terms of opportunity costs while being more motivating. “Shifting to vegetarianism has a high expected suffering reduction” doesn’t compel action in nearly the same way as “I’m currently racking up a suffering debt every day of my life” does.
I’ll already have contributed to the creation of such a vast amount of suffering that it will be very hard to do anything that will reliably catch up with that.
Actually, it’s pretty easy: just donate enough money to organizations like Vegan Outreach such that you’re confident that you have caused the creation of a new vegetarian/vegan.
It would have been better, I think, to submit an argument for veganism (or vegetarianism) for scrutiny here first. Then an argument about the best way to promote it. As it stands, the two issues are confused.
Perhaps I’m a bad advocate, but I don’t think there is an “argument” for veganism/vegetarianism, outside what you would see in the pamphlets, videos, or “Why Eat Less Meat?” linked within. I suppose I could upload my “Why Eat Less Meat” piece?
Another problem I’m having is that there are like sixty million objections that someone might raise against veganism/vegetarianism, and it would be impossible to answer them all.
~
My own view is that for me, the productivity hit and adverse health impact outweigh the benefits. (vegan diet contributed to the loss of sight in my left eye among other things).
I’m not going to be a lecturer on vegan health or say you “did it wrong”, but the eye thing definitely strikes me as an atypical result. I’m doing a vegetarian diet right now with no health or productivity demerits.
~
If we stop eating meat, these animals will not thereafter frolic gaily in the meadow. They will not exist at all.
Of that, I’m obviously aware. I count that as suffering reduced.
~
The merits of veganism make for a big enough topic on their own. You may also want to justify why this is a priority issue.
It’s potentially a priority issue if it can be accomplished so cheaply; hence the cost-effectiveness estimate. I wasn’t even here to argue that veganism was a global priority. Right now, I think at best it would be in the “top five”. Even if this essay were read as an advocacy piece instead of an evaluation piece, it’s advocating for philanthropy toward vegetarianism rather than vegetarianism itself.
I have to agree with waveman that we should establish that vegetarianism is a worthwhile cause before we devote LW posts to figuring out how best to promote it. We could, in theory, investigate how best to promote all sorts of things, but let’s not actually advocate promoting arbitrary values or ideologies that may or may not be good ideas. Doing so seems like a straightforward way of wasting our time and doing actual harm (by, among other things, creating the impression that the cause in question has been accepted by the LW community as being worthwhile). (i.e. “What is the best way to get out the word about cheese-only diets?” implicates that we’ve already determined cheese-only diets to be not only a good idea, but worth actively advocating.)
Even if this essay were read as an advocacy piece instead of an evaluation piece, it’s advocating for philanthropy toward vegetarianism rather than vegetarianism itself.
It seems nonsensical to view advocacy for philanthropy toward vegetarianism as different from advocacy for vegetarianism itself, if you take the view (as you seem to do) that vegetarianism is a moral issue.
we should establish that vegetarianism is a worthwhile cause before we devote LW posts to figuring out how best to promote it.
I don’t know how to establish it as a worthwhile cause to those who don’t already value nonhuman animals, so I skipped that step.
For those who do already value nonhuman animals, though, I had hoped this essay was such an evaluation, given that it is a cost-effectiveness estimate and evidence survey. It’s not a comparison of advocacy efforts, since no other advocacy efforts are considered.
-
It seems nonsensical to view advocacy for philanthropy toward vegetarianism as different from advocacy for vegetarianism itself, if you take the view (as you seem to do) that vegetarianism is a moral issue.
That’s true. I suppose one could consider advocating vegetarianism without personally becoming vegetarian, though that would be somewhat hypocritical.
I don’t know how to establish it as a worthwhile cause to those who don’t already value nonhuman animals, so I skipped that step.
I do sympathize with the difficulty of persuading someone with whom you do not share the relevant values, but I’m afraid I can’t help but object to “this part of the argument is hard, so I skipped it”.
Changing values is not impossible. I don’t think valuing nonhuman animals is a terminal value; the terminal value in question probably looks something more like “valuing the experiences of minds that are capable of conscious suffering” or something to that general effect. (That is, if we insist on tracing this preference to a value per se, rather than assuming that it’s just signaling or somesuch.) And most people here do, I think, place at least some importance on reflective equilibrium, which is a force for value change.
The problem I have with your approach (and I hope you’ll forgive me for this continued criticism of what is, to be truthful, a fairly interesting post) is that it’s a nigh-fully-general justification for advocating arbitrary things, like so:
“Here is an analysis of how to most cost-effectively promote the eating of babies. I don’t know how to establish baby-eating as a worthwhile cause for people who don’t already think that eating babies is a good idea, so I skipped that step.”
Ditto ” … saving cute kittens from rare diseases …”, ditto ” … reducing the incidence of premarital sex …”, ditto pretty much anything ever.
What I would be curious to see is whether the LW populace perhaps already thinks that vegetarianism is a settled question. If so, my objections might be misplaced. Was this covered in one of the surveys? Hmm...
SaidAchmiz, I wonder if a more revealing question would be to ask if / when in vitro meat products of equivalent taste and price hit the market, will you switch? Lesswrong readers tend not to be technophobes, so I assume the majority(?) of lesswrongers who are not already vegetarian will make the transition. However, you say above that you are “not interested in reducing the suffering of animals”. Do you mean that you are literally indifferent one way or the other to nonhuman animal suffering—in which case presumably you won’t bother changing to the cruelty-free alternative? Or do you mean merely that you don’t consider nonhuman animal suffering important?
Do you mean that you are literally indifferent one way or the other to nonhuman animal suffering—in which case presumably you won’t bother changing to the cruelty-free alternative? Or do you mean merely that you don’t consider nonhuman animal suffering important?
In (current) practice those are the same, as you realize, I’m sure. My attitude is closest to something like “no amount of animal suffering adds up to any amount of human suffering”, or more generally “no amount of utility to animals [to the extent that the concept of utility to a non-sapient being is coherent] adds up to any amount of utility to humans”. However, note that I am skeptical of the concept of consistent aggregation of utility across individuals in general (and thus of utilitarian ethical theories, though I endorse consequentialism), so adjust your appraisal of my views accordingly.
In vitro meat products could change that; that is, the existence of in vitro meat would make the two views you listed meaningfully different in practice, as you suggest. If in vitro meat cost no more than regular meat, and tasted no worse, and had no worse health consequences, and in general if there was no downside for me to switch...
… well, in that case, I would switch, with the caveat that “switch” is not exactly the right term; I simply would not care whether the meat I bought were IV or non, making my purchasing decisions based on price, taste, and all those other mundane factors by means of which people typically make their food purchasing decisions.
I guess that’s a longwinded way of saying that no, I wouldn’t switch exclusively to IV meat if doing so cost me anything.
It would have been better, I think, to submit an argument for veganism (or vegetarianism) for scrutiny here first. Then an argument about the best way to promote it. As it stands, the two issues are confused.
My own view is that for me, the productivity hit and adverse health impact outweigh the benefits. (vegan diet contributed to the loss of sight in my left eye among other things).
If we stop eating meat, these animals will not thereafter frolic gaily in the meadow. They will not exist at all. The merits of veganism make for a big enough topic on their own. You may also want to justify why this is a priority issue.
I am concerned about attempts to coopt LW in other causes that seem to me to not be rational at their core.
My personal reason for pursuing vegetarianism (and ultimately veganism) is simple: I want the result of me having existed, as compared to an alternative universe where I did not exist, to be less overall suffering in the world. If I eat meat for my whole life, I’ll already have contributed to the creation of such a vast amount of suffering that it will be very hard to do anything that will reliably catch up with that. Each day of my life, I’ll be racking up more “suffering debt” to pay off, and I’d rather not have my mere existence contribute to adding more suffering.
That’s probably the abridged version, because if that were the actual goal, a doomsday machine would do the trick.
If you count pleasure as negative suffering…
Yes.
Do you have a fleshed-out version formulated somewhere? *tries to hide iron fireplace poker behind his back*
No. The “fleshed-out version” is rather complex, incomplete, and constantly-changing, as it’s effectively the current compromise that’s been forged between the negative utilitarian, positive utilitarian, deontological, and purely egoist factions within my brain. It has plenty of inconsistencies, but I resolve those on a case-by-case basis as I encounter them. I don’t have a good answer to the doomsday machine, because I currently don’t expect to encounter a situation where my actions would have considerable influence on the creation of a doomsday machine, so I haven’t needed to resolve that particular inconsistency.
Of course, there is the question of x-risk mitigation work and the fact that e.g. my work for MIRI might reduce the risk of a doomsday machine, so I have been forced to somewhat consider the question. My negative utilitarian faction would consider it a good thing if all life on Earth were eradicated, with the other factions strongly disagreeing. The current compromise balance is based around the suspicion that most kinds of x-risk would probably lead to massive suffering in the form of an immense death toll and then a gradual reconstruction that would eventually bring Earth’s population back to its current levels, rather than all life on the planet going extinct. (Even for AI/Singularity scenarios there is great uncertainty and a non-trivial possibility for such an outcome.) All my brain-factions agree on this being a Seriously Bad scenario to happen, so there is currently an agreement that work aimed at reducing the outcome of this scenario is good, even if it indirectly influences the probability of an “everyone dies” scenario in one way or another. The compromise is only possible because we are currently very unsure of what would have a very strong effect on the probability of an “everyone dies” scenario.
I am unsure of what would happen if we had good evidence of it really being possible to strongly increase or decrease the probability of an “everyone dies” scenario: with the current power balances, I expect that we’d just decide not to do anything either way, with the negative utilitarian faction being strong enough to veto attempts to save humanity, but not strong enough to override everyone else’s veto when it came to attempts to destroy humanity. Of course, this assumes that humanity would basically go on experiencing its current levels of suffering after being saved: if saving humanity would also involve a positive Singularity after which it was very sure that nobody would need to experience involuntary suffering anymore, then the power balance would very strongly shift to favor saving humanity.
This seems like an arbitrary distinction. The value relevant to your ongoing decisions is in opportunity cost of the decisions (and you know that). Why take the popular sentiment seriously, or even merely indulge yourself in it, when it’s known to be wrong?
It is indeed wrong, but it seems to mostly produce the same recommendations as framing the issue in terms of opportunity costs while being more motivating. “Shifting to vegetarianism has a high expected suffering reduction” doesn’t compel action in nearly the same way as “I’m currently racking up a suffering debt every day of my life” does.
Actually, it’s pretty easy: just donate enough money to organizations like Vegan Outreach such that you’re confident that you have caused the creation of a new vegetarian/vegan.
Perhaps I’m a bad advocate, but I don’t think there is an “argument” for veganism/vegetarianism, outside what you would see in the pamphlets, videos, or “Why Eat Less Meat?” linked within. I suppose I could upload my “Why Eat Less Meat” piece?
Another problem I’m having is that there are like sixty million objections that someone might raise against veganism/vegetarianism, and it would be impossible to answer them all.
~
I’m not going to be a lecturer on vegan health or say you “did it wrong”, but the eye thing definitely strikes me as an atypical result. I’m doing a vegetarian diet right now with no health or productivity demerits.
~
Of that, I’m obviously aware. I count that as suffering reduced.
~
It’s potentially a priority issue if it can be accomplished so cheaply; hence the cost-effectiveness estimate. I wasn’t even here to argue that veganism was a global priority. Right now, I think at best it would be in the “top five”. Even if this essay were read as an advocacy piece instead of an evaluation piece, it’s advocating for philanthropy toward vegetarianism rather than vegetarianism itself.
I have to agree with waveman that we should establish that vegetarianism is a worthwhile cause before we devote LW posts to figuring out how best to promote it. We could, in theory, investigate how best to promote all sorts of things, but let’s not actually advocate promoting arbitrary values or ideologies that may or may not be good ideas. Doing so seems like a straightforward way of wasting our time and doing actual harm (by, among other things, creating the impression that the cause in question has been accepted by the LW community as being worthwhile). (i.e. “What is the best way to get out the word about cheese-only diets?” implicates that we’ve already determined cheese-only diets to be not only a good idea, but worth actively advocating.)
It seems nonsensical to view advocacy for philanthropy toward vegetarianism as different from advocacy for vegetarianism itself, if you take the view (as you seem to do) that vegetarianism is a moral issue.
I don’t know how to establish it as a worthwhile cause to those who don’t already value nonhuman animals, so I skipped that step.
For those who do already value nonhuman animals, though, I had hoped this essay was such an evaluation, given that it is a cost-effectiveness estimate and evidence survey. It’s not a comparison of advocacy efforts, since no other advocacy efforts are considered.
-
That’s true. I suppose one could consider advocating vegetarianism without personally becoming vegetarian, though that would be somewhat hypocritical.
I do sympathize with the difficulty of persuading someone with whom you do not share the relevant values, but I’m afraid I can’t help but object to “this part of the argument is hard, so I skipped it”.
Changing values is not impossible. I don’t think valuing nonhuman animals is a terminal value; the terminal value in question probably looks something more like “valuing the experiences of minds that are capable of conscious suffering” or something to that general effect. (That is, if we insist on tracing this preference to a value per se, rather than assuming that it’s just signaling or somesuch.) And most people here do, I think, place at least some importance on reflective equilibrium, which is a force for value change.
The problem I have with your approach (and I hope you’ll forgive me for this continued criticism of what is, to be truthful, a fairly interesting post) is that it’s a nigh-fully-general justification for advocating arbitrary things, like so:
“Here is an analysis of how to most cost-effectively promote the eating of babies. I don’t know how to establish baby-eating as a worthwhile cause for people who don’t already think that eating babies is a good idea, so I skipped that step.”
Ditto ” … saving cute kittens from rare diseases …”, ditto ” … reducing the incidence of premarital sex …”, ditto pretty much anything ever.
What I would be curious to see is whether the LW populace perhaps already thinks that vegetarianism is a settled question. If so, my objections might be misplaced. Was this covered in one of the surveys? Hmm...
Edit: Aha.
SaidAchmiz, I wonder if a more revealing question would be to ask if / when in vitro meat products of equivalent taste and price hit the market, will you switch? Lesswrong readers tend not to be technophobes, so I assume the majority(?) of lesswrongers who are not already vegetarian will make the transition. However, you say above that you are “not interested in reducing the suffering of animals”. Do you mean that you are literally indifferent one way or the other to nonhuman animal suffering—in which case presumably you won’t bother changing to the cruelty-free alternative? Or do you mean merely that you don’t consider nonhuman animal suffering important?
In (current) practice those are the same, as you realize, I’m sure. My attitude is closest to something like “no amount of animal suffering adds up to any amount of human suffering”, or more generally “no amount of utility to animals [to the extent that the concept of utility to a non-sapient being is coherent] adds up to any amount of utility to humans”. However, note that I am skeptical of the concept of consistent aggregation of utility across individuals in general (and thus of utilitarian ethical theories, though I endorse consequentialism), so adjust your appraisal of my views accordingly.
In vitro meat products could change that; that is, the existence of in vitro meat would make the two views you listed meaningfully different in practice, as you suggest. If in vitro meat cost no more than regular meat, and tasted no worse, and had no worse health consequences, and in general if there was no downside for me to switch...
… well, in that case, I would switch, with the caveat that “switch” is not exactly the right term; I simply would not care whether the meat I bought were IV or non, making my purchasing decisions based on price, taste, and all those other mundane factors by means of which people typically make their food purchasing decisions.
I guess that’s a longwinded way of saying that no, I wouldn’t switch exclusively to IV meat if doing so cost me anything.