I was describing some of the implications of integrated information theory (IIT) for uploaded minds (see our paper that spells out the argument).
To be clear, IIT is not compatible with true p-zombies, in the sense of the zombie being physically identical—its predictions about the consciousness of two physically identical systems are necessarily the same. The casual structure of the physical substrate is what matters for consciousness according to IIT, so physical identity implies phenomenal identity.
Rather, IIT implies the possibility of functional or computational p-zombies, i.e. a simulation that’s indistinguishable from you once you abstract away the physical differences at the lower layer that’s running the simulation, but which does not reproduce your qualia (the simulation would be distinguishable if you’re allowed to look at the physical implementation). So IIT is compatible with digital minds because it says that consciousness is substrate-independent, but the substrate has to have the right kind of causal structure at the physical level.
Your argument is a clear articulation of why I think it’s rational to upload, and would choose to do it despite being an IIT author (modulo any concerns about loss of agency, possibility of being eternally tortured, etc.).
Any nonzero chance of continuing to be conscious is preferable no chance! (And I don’t think value is destroyed by the temporary p-zombie).
Not so elegantly! I’d considered the question of whether I’d upload, but only gotten as far as a general “What do I have to lose” (though there are serious practical worries about agency & control).
Pointing out the possibility of downloading again, if a theory like IIT is eventually validated, really clinches it.
By the way, this paper from Matthew Larkum’s group is quite relevant in case you haven’t seen it. It’s a thought experiment that I think makes IIT’s contention that causal structure is relevant for consciousness (including counterfactual / dispositional properties) more plausible than it may seem at first.
I just read the paper summary by Chat; interesting yeah, thanks for sharing! I’m not confident either way on that specific question, i.e. of whether a “perfect” replay is conscious. It reminds me of the lookup table, but just looking at a specific sequence. It might be more akin to a “telescope” looking at what happened originally rather than a new experience, but I don’t know. (Under current moral/philosophical uncertainty, I’d still lean on the safer side of assuming it has moral relevance of course.)
I think I was one of those people :)
I was describing some of the implications of integrated information theory (IIT) for uploaded minds (see our paper that spells out the argument).
To be clear, IIT is not compatible with true p-zombies, in the sense of the zombie being physically identical—its predictions about the consciousness of two physically identical systems are necessarily the same. The casual structure of the physical substrate is what matters for consciousness according to IIT, so physical identity implies phenomenal identity.
Rather, IIT implies the possibility of functional or computational p-zombies, i.e. a simulation that’s indistinguishable from you once you abstract away the physical differences at the lower layer that’s running the simulation, but which does not reproduce your qualia (the simulation would be distinguishable if you’re allowed to look at the physical implementation). So IIT is compatible with digital minds because it says that consciousness is substrate-independent, but the substrate has to have the right kind of causal structure at the physical level.
Your argument is a clear articulation of why I think it’s rational to upload, and would choose to do it despite being an IIT author (modulo any concerns about loss of agency, possibility of being eternally tortured, etc.).
Any nonzero chance of continuing to be conscious is preferable no chance! (And I don’t think value is destroyed by the temporary p-zombie).
Amazing!!! Thanks for your comment! Had you thought about that line of reasoning before?
Not so elegantly! I’d considered the question of whether I’d upload, but only gotten as far as a general “What do I have to lose” (though there are serious practical worries about agency & control).
Pointing out the possibility of downloading again, if a theory like IIT is eventually validated, really clinches it.
By the way, this paper from Matthew Larkum’s group is quite relevant in case you haven’t seen it. It’s a thought experiment that I think makes IIT’s contention that causal structure is relevant for consciousness (including counterfactual / dispositional properties) more plausible than it may seem at first.
I just read the paper summary by Chat; interesting yeah, thanks for sharing! I’m not confident either way on that specific question, i.e. of whether a “perfect” replay is conscious. It reminds me of the lookup table, but just looking at a specific sequence. It might be more akin to a “telescope” looking at what happened originally rather than a new experience, but I don’t know. (Under current moral/philosophical uncertainty, I’d still lean on the safer side of assuming it has moral relevance of course.)
I just added a section “On believing you’re not conscious”; I’d be curious to know your thoughts on it 😊