Most of what I’ve learned here has become background ideas that I can’t quite point to real-world direct instances of; most of the thinking I do is ‘intuitive’, or rather, not reflected upon and poorly remembered. That said:
“Multiplication.” That is, the notion that you actually can compute expected value of real-world choices. Most blandly, I won an iPod in a raffle after a very rough computation that buying tickets was actually worthwhile compared to buying the item at retail, whereas I had previously been ‘irrationally’ opposed to anything resembling ‘gambling’.
Recognizing the pattern of disputes over definitions has helped me avoid disputing definitions, or caring about the outcome of such disputes, when they are not actually useful.
“Multiplication.” That is, the notion that you actually can compute expected value of real-world choices. Most blandly, I won an iPod in a raffle after a very rough computation that buying tickets was actually worthwhile compared to buying the item at retail, whereas I had previously been ‘irrationally’ opposed to anything resembling ‘gambling’.
This. One time my grad school department wanted to have the most donations to charity through the university’s program, and so they arranged that a donation of any size (even $1) would constitute an entry into a department-organized raffle-y thing. I don’t know where the prizes came from, but instead of dismissing the prospect out of hand I did a little arithmetic, got an estimate of how many people were entering from the school secretary, and determined that the cash prizes alone (let alone the gift basket and whatnot) constituted positive expected value. So I gave Planned Parenthood a dollar. (I lost, though.)
Upvoted for distinguishing the anecdotal outcome (a loss) from the expected outcome (positive). In other words, anecdotes are only good data when everyone reports on their outcome.
BTW, as long as I could give to a charity I considered worthwhile, this would almost always be a slam dunk regardless of the expected gain from the raffle itself. For example, if I valued the good produced by giving $1 to the charity at $0.95, then $0.05 in expected winnings would be my break-even point, not $1.00
I meant to imply by “a charity I considered worthwhile” that you’re near the utility break-even point already. Obviously if you think the charity only does a tiny amount of good, then you need a bigger expected win to make the raffle it worth playing.
Most of what I’ve learned here has become background ideas that I can’t quite point to real-world direct instances of; most of the thinking I do is ‘intuitive’, or rather, not reflected upon and poorly remembered. That said:
“Multiplication.” That is, the notion that you actually can compute expected value of real-world choices. Most blandly, I won an iPod in a raffle after a very rough computation that buying tickets was actually worthwhile compared to buying the item at retail, whereas I had previously been ‘irrationally’ opposed to anything resembling ‘gambling’.
Recognizing the pattern of disputes over definitions has helped me avoid disputing definitions, or caring about the outcome of such disputes, when they are not actually useful.
It is clear from my experience that working hurts less than procrastinating; I have a poor record of actually applying this knowledge, however.
This. One time my grad school department wanted to have the most donations to charity through the university’s program, and so they arranged that a donation of any size (even $1) would constitute an entry into a department-organized raffle-y thing. I don’t know where the prizes came from, but instead of dismissing the prospect out of hand I did a little arithmetic, got an estimate of how many people were entering from the school secretary, and determined that the cash prizes alone (let alone the gift basket and whatnot) constituted positive expected value. So I gave Planned Parenthood a dollar. (I lost, though.)
Upvoted for distinguishing the anecdotal outcome (a loss) from the expected outcome (positive). In other words, anecdotes are only good data when everyone reports on their outcome.
BTW, as long as I could give to a charity I considered worthwhile, this would almost always be a slam dunk regardless of the expected gain from the raffle itself. For example, if I valued the good produced by giving $1 to the charity at $0.95, then $0.05 in expected winnings would be my break-even point, not $1.00
Why would you? Charities differ in effectiveness by far more than 5%..
I meant to imply by “a charity I considered worthwhile” that you’re near the utility break-even point already. Obviously if you think the charity only does a tiny amount of good, then you need a bigger expected win to make the raffle it worth playing.