I think one of the unstated assumptions here is that individual humans remain roughly the same. I suspect that, by the year 2200, a decent amount of genetic improvements will have occurred—either selection or direct editing that increases intelligence and decreases rates of mental illnesses. (At the very least, I expect most parents will arrange to not have any children with e.g. genes that are known to cause schizophrenia.) Then you really will have fewer “crazy” people. And while I don’t expect higher intelligence to eliminate vulnerability to crazy doctrines and the specious arguments supporting them, I do expect it to reduce vulnerability.
Genetics aside, the framing of the post seemed around ‘social change’ and ‘this social thing isn’t going away’. Over longer periods of time, I would guess that social change at the level of ‘institutions or types of belief’ (what the essay tried to point at) does occur, but I haven’t seen a lot of models of that, especially looking at the future.
It might have historically taken a long time for ‘social change at the level of ‘institutions or types of belief’. Or what change did occur is hard to find from records/not well known. (After all, if belief X is widespread now, why would people know when that changed? Or what it replaced—and whether that replaced anything, etc.)
Whether that happens faster now (internet, faster communication over larger differences, different culture) is a question that should probably be asked, not assumed. (Also, old people often live longer, more recently in history. That historical trend probably helps with preservation of knowledge—including implicit stuff. But ‘percentage of people that believe something’ as a metric may well change when the length of time people live changes. Though ‘knowledge’/beliefs* which work against (or for) health might reduce (or increase) that, and that to some extent isn’t just a personal thing. If you see a doctor, it isn’t just your knowledge and ideas of actions to take which is important. (This is true of both good and bad doctors—which is very important historically.) You could say there (might be) a useful parallel between:
knowledge advances as the old people that stubbornly clung to old belief X die out**
Your quality of care might improve if you get a new doctor who is more up to date
*and also actions, interventions etc.
**The context of this statement (the source isn’t often cited) seems to be academia. Intuitively, people with more knowledge about a subject can contribute more. Roughly, it seems meant to serves as a counter to that ‘intuition’ - suggesting something like a U-shaped curve perhaps. Not in that the slope towards ability to advance field X has the same slope as a way from it, but that as things change old things taken for granted eventually have to be re-examined and updated. Arguably, someone who keeps updating and stays up to date, wouldn’t experience a reduction. (If a field ‘advances wrong/into a dead-end’, then people who ‘didn’t update’ are ahead.)
I think one of the unstated assumptions here is that individual humans remain roughly the same. I suspect that, by the year 2200, a decent amount of genetic improvements will have occurred—either selection or direct editing that increases intelligence and decreases rates of mental illnesses. (At the very least, I expect most parents will arrange to not have any children with e.g. genes that are known to cause schizophrenia.) Then you really will have fewer “crazy” people. And while I don’t expect higher intelligence to eliminate vulnerability to crazy doctrines and the specious arguments supporting them, I do expect it to reduce vulnerability.
Genetics aside, the framing of the post seemed around ‘social change’ and ‘this social thing isn’t going away’. Over longer periods of time, I would guess that social change at the level of ‘institutions or types of belief’ (what the essay tried to point at) does occur, but I haven’t seen a lot of models of that, especially looking at the future.
It might have historically taken a long time for ‘social change at the level of ‘institutions or types of belief’. Or what change did occur is hard to find from records/not well known. (After all, if belief X is widespread now, why would people know when that changed? Or what it replaced—and whether that replaced anything, etc.)
Whether that happens faster now (internet, faster communication over larger differences, different culture) is a question that should probably be asked, not assumed. (Also, old people often live longer, more recently in history. That historical trend probably helps with preservation of knowledge—including implicit stuff. But ‘percentage of people that believe something’ as a metric may well change when the length of time people live changes. Though ‘knowledge’/beliefs* which work against (or for) health might reduce (or increase) that, and that to some extent isn’t just a personal thing. If you see a doctor, it isn’t just your knowledge and ideas of actions to take which is important. (This is true of both good and bad doctors—which is very important historically.) You could say there (might be) a useful parallel between:
knowledge advances as the old people that stubbornly clung to old belief X die out**
Your quality of care might improve if you get a new doctor who is more up to date
*and also actions, interventions etc.
**The context of this statement (the source isn’t often cited) seems to be academia. Intuitively, people with more knowledge about a subject can contribute more. Roughly, it seems meant to serves as a counter to that ‘intuition’ - suggesting something like a U-shaped curve perhaps. Not in that the slope towards ability to advance field X has the same slope as a way from it, but that as things change old things taken for granted eventually have to be re-examined and updated. Arguably, someone who keeps updating and stays up to date, wouldn’t experience a reduction. (If a field ‘advances wrong/into a dead-end’, then people who ‘didn’t update’ are ahead.)