Gina and Lucius do not exist. You have constructed these imaginary people in order to be examples of your desired conclusion, which you then use to support that conclusion. You could equally well imagine a miserable version of Gina and a happy version of Lucius, should you want to boom rationality over ignorance. However vivid your imagination, daydreaming is not evidence.
This is a bizarre comment. Aren’t most examples hypothetical? When you start a math question with “Jack buys 3 melons”, does Jack need to be a real guy who actually bought 3 melons?...
The true question is whether the example is consistent with real empirical evidence. It appears to me perfectly possible and in fact anecdotally true that two people might have very similar beliefs with the exception of a small subset—which has little decision value but strong intrinsic value, in favour of the apparently less accurate beliefs. Which follows that it seems reasonable and realistic that holding a small and non-decision relevant set of “false” beliefs might turn out to be beneficial.
Although as I mentioned, the degree to which one can make this a conscious strategy is very much arguable.
Fiction is not evidence. You can invent examples consistent with anything. They prove nothing, not even that “it could be”.
Aren’t most examples hypothetical?
No? If someone makes a sweeping generalisation, and another challenges them, “Give three examples”, it is pointless for them to respond with imaginary ones.
Gina and Lucius do not exist. You have constructed these imaginary people in order to be examples of your desired conclusion, which you then use to support that conclusion. You could equally well imagine a miserable version of Gina and a happy version of Lucius, should you want to boom rationality over ignorance. However vivid your imagination, daydreaming is not evidence.
This is a bizarre comment. Aren’t most examples hypothetical? When you start a math question with “Jack buys 3 melons”, does Jack need to be a real guy who actually bought 3 melons?...
The true question is whether the example is consistent with real empirical evidence. It appears to me perfectly possible and in fact anecdotally true that two people might have very similar beliefs with the exception of a small subset—which has little decision value but strong intrinsic value, in favour of the apparently less accurate beliefs. Which follows that it seems reasonable and realistic that holding a small and non-decision relevant set of “false” beliefs might turn out to be beneficial.
Although as I mentioned, the degree to which one can make this a conscious strategy is very much arguable.
Fiction is not evidence. You can invent examples consistent with anything. They prove nothing, not even that “it could be”.
No? If someone makes a sweeping generalisation, and another challenges them, “Give three examples”, it is pointless for them to respond with imaginary ones.
And on the subject of trying to deliberately hold a false belief...