The defeat of the Maginot Line is somewhat misunderstood in general (but not in ways that undermine this argument). German technical overmatch played a significant role. There were two plans for defeating it. The first is best detailed in Adm McRaven’s 1993 masters thesis on the theory of special operations: https://www.afsoc.af.mil/Portals/86/documents/history/AFD-051228-021.pdf
The fortress of Eben Emael in Belgium was the hardest part of the line. It had artillery, built into bunkers, pointed at a key bridge. The Germans invented a man portable explosive that could destroy the bunkers, and trained glider-borne forces that could take the fortress by surprise. The germans succeeded and drove across the bridge.
In terms of the overall thesis, I think it persuades in the opposite of the intended direction. A lot of political challenges are like this, whether it’s the environment, certain construction projects, or passing certain kinds of laws. Most of life is oneshot in this sense.
Irrevocable decisions can be attractive when you know your time in power is fleeting.
If there’s a premium to be paid for taking a risk that you externalize onto ‘the whole biosphere’ or ‘the future survival of the human race’, someone who wants to take that premium is certain to emerge eventually.
So...‘hey if we get this right, we are rich and all our problems are solved by the god robot, if we get it wrong, we all die (and therefore don’t have to worry about these problems)’ is likely to be seen as an argument in favor of taking the risk.
The defeat of the Maginot Line is somewhat misunderstood in general (but not in ways that undermine this argument). German technical overmatch played a significant role. There were two plans for defeating it. The first is best detailed in Adm McRaven’s 1993 masters thesis on the theory of special operations: https://www.afsoc.af.mil/Portals/86/documents/history/AFD-051228-021.pdf
The fortress of Eben Emael in Belgium was the hardest part of the line. It had artillery, built into bunkers, pointed at a key bridge. The Germans invented a man portable explosive that could destroy the bunkers, and trained glider-borne forces that could take the fortress by surprise. The germans succeeded and drove across the bridge.
If the Germans had failed in their attempt to take the fortress, their backup plan was a direct assault on the Maginot line using shells filled with Chlorine Trifluoride to set the concrete on fire. https://www.chemeurope.com/en/encyclopedia/Chlorine_trifluoride.html
In terms of the overall thesis, I think it persuades in the opposite of the intended direction. A lot of political challenges are like this, whether it’s the environment, certain construction projects, or passing certain kinds of laws. Most of life is oneshot in this sense.
Irrevocable decisions can be attractive when you know your time in power is fleeting.
If there’s a premium to be paid for taking a risk that you externalize onto ‘the whole biosphere’ or ‘the future survival of the human race’, someone who wants to take that premium is certain to emerge eventually.
So...‘hey if we get this right, we are rich and all our problems are solved by the god robot, if we get it wrong, we all die (and therefore don’t have to worry about these problems)’ is likely to be seen as an argument in favor of taking the risk.