Do you die in that process? How about N pieces? At some point pieces become small enough to just ship information about them being more convenient.
Maybe. This is a question about the definition of “die”, not about any experiences or reality. Legally, probably not. Experientially, it’s likely a pause, like a deep coma.
Would you bother?
Probably. I like puzzles, and I care (a little, at least) about all life. This particular life is one that will experience life continuous from my pre-copy memories, so I care even more.
Note: copies break our intuitions about identity. A good-enough copy means that both are indistinguishable—there’s no “original” and “copy”, just two forks from the same history.
color anticipation.
They are subtly different, because there are two entities who are you in the copy scenario. Remember, probability is subjective, reality is singular. In the non-copy case, you’re uncertain of color, red or green. In the copy case, each of you is uncertain of branch, which corresponds to color. 50% in both cases, for slightly different reasons.
Cellular regeneration speed.
I don’t think I care much about cellular replacement in my macro-level future evaluation. Does this affect the longevity or experience of my experienced lifetime?
huh?
If my memory is modified, I think that controls my prediction. I’m not sure what the copy has to do with it. I’m assuming you mean the “you” indicator to mean “the copy in question”, as once the copy is done they are distinct individuals that share a history.
A good-enough copy means that both are indistinguishable—there’s no “original” and “copy”, just two forks from the same history.
Hm. What’s your opinion on imperfect copies, like you can look at your blood with a microscope and tell for sure if you are the original, naturally grown person or a person assembled from nutrient slurry in couple minutes? But you are incapable of telling introspectively.
Depends on the impact of the differences in cognition and experience. I’d imagine that many small differences could be physically detectable, but not qualia-impacting. Both copies experience continuity from before the fork. Maybe one (or both) have a slight perceptible change, like getting a bad night of sleep in the single-thread case. But it’s not enough to break the experience of continuity for either one.
Maybe. This is a question about the definition of “die”, not about any experiences or reality. Legally, probably not. Experientially, it’s likely a pause, like a deep coma.
Probably. I like puzzles, and I care (a little, at least) about all life. This particular life is one that will experience life continuous from my pre-copy memories, so I care even more.
Note: copies break our intuitions about identity. A good-enough copy means that both are indistinguishable—there’s no “original” and “copy”, just two forks from the same history.
They are subtly different, because there are two entities who are you in the copy scenario. Remember, probability is subjective, reality is singular. In the non-copy case, you’re uncertain of color, red or green. In the copy case, each of you is uncertain of branch, which corresponds to color. 50% in both cases, for slightly different reasons.
I don’t think I care much about cellular replacement in my macro-level future evaluation. Does this affect the longevity or experience of my experienced lifetime?
If my memory is modified, I think that controls my prediction. I’m not sure what the copy has to do with it. I’m assuming you mean the “you” indicator to mean “the copy in question”, as once the copy is done they are distinct individuals that share a history.
Hm. What’s your opinion on imperfect copies, like you can look at your blood with a microscope and tell for sure if you are the original, naturally grown person or a person assembled from nutrient slurry in couple minutes? But you are incapable of telling introspectively.
Depends on the impact of the differences in cognition and experience. I’d imagine that many small differences could be physically detectable, but not qualia-impacting. Both copies experience continuity from before the fork. Maybe one (or both) have a slight perceptible change, like getting a bad night of sleep in the single-thread case. But it’s not enough to break the experience of continuity for either one.