A person (as such) is a social fiction: an abstraction specifying the contract for an idealized interaction partner. Most of our institutions, even whole civilizations, are built to this interface — but fundamentally we are human beings, i.e., mere creatures. Some of us implement the person interface, but many of us (such as infants or the profoundly psychotic) don’t. Even the most ironclad person among us will find herself the occasional subject of an outburst or breakdown that reveals what a leaky abstraction her personhood really is.
In other words, the concept of personhood that I’m articulating is both more and less than being human.
Of course personhood, being an abstract behavioral specification, isn’t reserved merely for humans. Any creature (or artifact) capable of presenting itself as a person will thereby earn the benefits. That’s the beauty of an interface: as long as the system behaves properly, we don’t have to care how it’s implemented.
Really nice. Reminds me of Kevin Simler’s essay Personhood: A Game for Two Players:
I interpret the paper you linked to at the bottom as recommending this perspective as well.
Thank you! I had not read this Kevin Simler essay but I quite like it, and it does match my perspective.