If you can’t generate your parents’ genomes and everything from memory, then yes, you are in a state of uncertainty about who they are, in the same qualitative way you are in a state of uncertainty about who your young children will grow up to be.
Ditto for the isomorphism between your epistemic state w.r.t. never-met grandparents vs your epistemic state w.r.t. not-yet-born children.
It may be helpful to distinguish the subjective future, which contains the outcomes of all not-yet-performed experiments [i.e. all evidence/info not yet known] from the physical future, which is simply a direction in physical time.
If you can’t generate your parents’ genomes and everything from memory, then yes, you are in a state of uncertainty about who they are, in the same qualitative way you are in a state of uncertainty about who your young children will grow up to be.
Here you seem to confuse “which person has quality X” with “what are all the other qualities that a person, who has quality X has”.
I’m quite confident about which people are my parents. I’m less confident about all the qualities that my parents have. The former is relevant to Doomsday argument, the latter is not.
And even if I had no idea about who my parents are I’d still be pretty confident that they were born in the last century not in 6th BC.
It may be helpful to distinguish the subjective future, which contains the outcomes of all not-yet-performed experiments [i.e. all evidence/info not yet known] from the physical future, which is simply a direction in physical time
If you can’t generate your parents’ genomes and everything from memory, then yes, you are in a state of uncertainty about who they are, in the same qualitative way you are in a state of uncertainty about who your young children will grow up to be.
Ditto for the isomorphism between your epistemic state w.r.t. never-met grandparents vs your epistemic state w.r.t. not-yet-born children.
It may be helpful to distinguish the subjective future, which contains the outcomes of all not-yet-performed experiments [i.e. all evidence/info not yet known] from the physical future, which is simply a direction in physical time.
Here you seem to confuse “which person has quality X” with “what are all the other qualities that a person, who has quality X has”.
I’m quite confident about which people are my parents. I’m less confident about all the qualities that my parents have. The former is relevant to Doomsday argument, the latter is not.
And even if I had no idea about who my parents are I’d still be pretty confident that they were born in the last century not in 6th BC.
Sure. But I don’t see how it’s relevant here.