To me the more interesting thing is not the mechanism you must invent to protect Heisenberg uncertainty from this hypothetical classical gravitational field, but the reason you must invent it. What, in Heisenberg uncertainty, are you protecting?
Roughly speaking, it’s the ability for a quantum atom that goes through a double slit experiment to exhibit superposition of different locations, and it creates an interference pattern when it reaches the detector, which at this point is well established by experiments, and if you don’t want to quantize gravity, ala quantum gravity approaches, but still want to reproduce quantum behavior, then you need to introduce physically random stuff.
Does standard QED, by itself, contain something of the in-the-territory state-of-omitted-knowledge class you imagine precludes anthropic thinking?
No, because it’s not a theory that includes gravity.
If not, what does it contain, that requires such in-the-territory obscurity to preserve its nature when it comes into contact with a force field that is deterministic?
The uncertainty principle fundamentally is inconsistent with a classical, deterministic field.
If we assume that gravity is quantum in our universe, which is likely but not certain, then there’s no problem, but in quantum universes with classical gravity, then we need noise to make both theories consistent with each other.
Is the quantum behavior itself, with the state of the system extant but stored in [what we perceive as] an unusual format, deterministic? If you grant that there’s no in-the-territory uncertainty with mere quantum mechanics, I bet I can construct a workaround for fusing classical gravity with it that doesn’t involve randomness, which you’ll accept as just as plausible as the one that does.
So you already suspected or knew it came from logical independence, similar to how mathematical statements in a formal system may be neither disproved or proved, like the continuum hypothesis?
Is this your claim—that quantum indeterminacy “comes from” logical independence? I’m not confused about quantum indeterminacy, but I am confused about in what sense you mean that. Do you mean that there exists a formulation of a principle of logical independence which would hold under all possible physics, which implies quantum indeterminacy? Would this principle still imply quantum indeterminacy in an all-classical universe?
Is this your claim—that quantum indeterminacy “comes from” logical independence?
More so that quantum indeterminacy can be thought of as logical independence, not that it necessarily comes from logical independence.
Do you mean that there exists a formulation of a principle of logical independence which would hold under all possible physics, which implies quantum indeterminacy? Would this principle still imply quantum indeterminacy in an all-classical universe?
I’m not claiming anything this strong, and in particular, in an all-classical universe, quantum states don’t exist, so the building blocks of logical independence don’t exist.
As far as what the principle of logical independence is, I direct you to this article:
Maybe, as far as I can tell I can’t rule out that possibility, but the big difference is that a classical universe can add arbitrary/infinite amounts of information in certain physical law sets in an arbitrarily small space, but quantum mechanics can’t do this, and there are limits to how far you can complete a system such that no independent propositions remain (assuming finite space is used).
Oh, sorry, I wasn’t clear: I didn’t mean a classical universe in the sense of conforming to Newton’s assumptions about the continuity / indefinite divisibility of space [and time]. I meant a classical universe in the sense of all quasi-tangible parameters simultaneously having a determinate value. I think we could still use the concept of logical independence, under such conditions.
Are you focusing on hidden-variable theories of quantum mechanic?
If so, there possibly is such a object, with the caveat that we can’t both have the values be determinate and objective in the sense that the parameter value is the same for any device if we want to reproduce standard quantum mechanics, due to a new no-go theorem:
No, what I’m talking about here has nothing to do with hidden-variable theories. And I still don’t think you understand my position on the EPR argument.
I’m talking about a universe which is classical in the sense of having all parameters be simultaneously determinate without needing hidden variables, but not necessarily classical in the sense of space[/time] always being arbitrarily divisible.
Is the quantum behavior itself, with the state of the system extant but stored in [what we perceive as] an unusual format, deterministic?
For all the other forces, uncertainty creeps in because of the measurement process and quantum system interacting with the environment, and is compatible with determinism.
If you grant that there’s no in-the-territory uncertainty with mere quantum mechanics, I bet I can construct a workaround for fusing classical gravity with it that doesn’t involve randomness, which you’ll accept as just as plausible as the one that does.
This is exactly what Feynman’s argument disallows, because if you could do this, you end up knowing too much, and can measure a field to infinite precision.
I don’t know why it’s true, but it is in fact true that determinism cannot persist if you lived in a universe where gravity is classical but the other forces obey quantum mechanics, and this matters because what you are asking for is logically contradictory, sorry.
I don’t know why it’s true, but it is in fact true
Oh, I hadn’t been reading carefully. I’d thought it was your argument. Well, unfortunately, I haven’t solved exorcism yet, sorry. BEGONE, EVIL SPIRIT. YOU IMPEDE SCIENCE. Did that do anything?
Roughly speaking, it’s the ability for a quantum atom that goes through a double slit experiment to exhibit superposition of different locations, and it creates an interference pattern when it reaches the detector, which at this point is well established by experiments, and if you don’t want to quantize gravity, ala quantum gravity approaches, but still want to reproduce quantum behavior, then you need to introduce physically random stuff.
No, because it’s not a theory that includes gravity.
The uncertainty principle fundamentally is inconsistent with a classical, deterministic field.
If we assume that gravity is quantum in our universe, which is likely but not certain, then there’s no problem, but in quantum universes with classical gravity, then we need noise to make both theories consistent with each other.
The classical part was important here.
Is the quantum behavior itself, with the state of the system extant but stored in [what we perceive as] an unusual format, deterministic? If you grant that there’s no in-the-territory uncertainty with mere quantum mechanics, I bet I can construct a workaround for fusing classical gravity with it that doesn’t involve randomness, which you’ll accept as just as plausible as the one that does.
There’s an interesting paper and book about where quantum indeterminacy possibly comes from in our universe in a way that is relevant to the question.
Links below:
https://arxiv.org/abs/0811.4542
https://quantum-indeterminacy.science/
I am not confused about the nature of quantum indeterminacy.
So you already suspected or knew it came from logical independence, similar to how mathematical statements in a formal system may be neither disproved or proved, like the continuum hypothesis?
If so, this is fascinating.
Is this your claim—that quantum indeterminacy “comes from” logical independence? I’m not confused about quantum indeterminacy, but I am confused about in what sense you mean that. Do you mean that there exists a formulation of a principle of logical independence which would hold under all possible physics, which implies quantum indeterminacy? Would this principle still imply quantum indeterminacy in an all-classical universe?
More so that quantum indeterminacy can be thought of as logical independence, not that it necessarily comes from logical independence.
I’m not claiming anything this strong, and in particular, in an all-classical universe, quantum states don’t exist, so the building blocks of logical independence don’t exist.
As far as what the principle of logical independence is, I direct you to this article:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_(mathematical_logic)
Though you should also try to read the arxiv paper I gave for a better explanation on how it could possibly work.
This is more so an exploration than a conclusive answer.
“building blocks of logical independence”? There can still be logical independence in the classical universe, can’t there?
Maybe, as far as I can tell I can’t rule out that possibility, but the big difference is that a classical universe can add arbitrary/infinite amounts of information in certain physical law sets in an arbitrarily small space, but quantum mechanics can’t do this, and there are limits to how far you can complete a system such that no independent propositions remain (assuming finite space is used).
Oh, sorry, I wasn’t clear: I didn’t mean a classical universe in the sense of conforming to Newton’s assumptions about the continuity / indefinite divisibility of space [and time]. I meant a classical universe in the sense of all quasi-tangible parameters simultaneously having a determinate value. I think we could still use the concept of logical independence, under such conditions.
Are you focusing on hidden-variable theories of quantum mechanic?
If so, there possibly is such a object, with the caveat that we can’t both have the values be determinate and objective in the sense that the parameter value is the same for any device if we want to reproduce standard quantum mechanics, due to a new no-go theorem:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kochen–Specker_theorem
No, what I’m talking about here has nothing to do with hidden-variable theories. And I still don’t think you understand my position on the EPR argument.
I’m talking about a universe which is classical in the sense of having all parameters be simultaneously determinate without needing hidden variables, but not necessarily classical in the sense of space[/time] always being arbitrarily divisible.
For all the other forces, uncertainty creeps in because of the measurement process and quantum system interacting with the environment, and is compatible with determinism.
This is exactly what Feynman’s argument disallows, because if you could do this, you end up knowing too much, and can measure a field to infinite precision.
I don’t know why it’s true, but it is in fact true that determinism cannot persist if you lived in a universe where gravity is classical but the other forces obey quantum mechanics, and this matters because what you are asking for is logically contradictory, sorry.
.
Oh, I hadn’t been reading carefully. I’d thought it was your argument. Well, unfortunately, I haven’t solved exorcism yet, sorry. BEGONE, EVIL SPIRIT. YOU IMPEDE SCIENCE. Did that do anything?