Really appreciate the exchange, helped me clarify my thoughts.
As a brief note for potential future exploration (no need to reply if you don’t want to):
A crux seems to be that with chroma world, I think experience is of difference between chroma, assuming chromatic realism (real quiddites). Whereas the Russelian monist wants the experience to be of identity of internal chroma. This is perhaps a disagreement on the phenomenology / epistemology relationship.
I think the analogy with Newtonian mechanics (if absolute positions are real, then experience is of relative positions, even if located at absolute positions) is pretty strong; chroma world “just” has different physical symmetries.
On my end I think I could continue this line of exploration by studying Deleuze (difference as more ontologically/metaphysically primary than identity), Dennett (more clarity on whether I agree/disagree with his basic picture), and Russell as a primary source.
A crux seems to be that with chroma world, I think experience is of differencebetween chroma, assuming chromatic realism (real quiddites). Whereas the Russelian monist wants the experience to be of identity of internal chroma. This is perhaps a disagreement on the phenomenology / epistemology relationship.
I agree this is the crux. The Russellian Monist wants to say there’s an intrinsic component to experience which is not exhausted by the structure.
I’d also recommend this paper on Russellian Monism by Chalmers. And to add Frankish to your list of illusionists alongside Dennett to explore e.g. this paper against panpsychism.
From my side you’ve motivated me to read more of Sellars’ work which I wasn’t familiar with before this exchange.
Really appreciate the exchange, helped me clarify my thoughts.
As a brief note for potential future exploration (no need to reply if you don’t want to):
A crux seems to be that with chroma world, I think experience is of difference between chroma, assuming chromatic realism (real quiddites). Whereas the Russelian monist wants the experience to be of identity of internal chroma. This is perhaps a disagreement on the phenomenology / epistemology relationship.
I think the analogy with Newtonian mechanics (if absolute positions are real, then experience is of relative positions, even if located at absolute positions) is pretty strong; chroma world “just” has different physical symmetries.
On my end I think I could continue this line of exploration by studying Deleuze (difference as more ontologically/metaphysically primary than identity), Dennett (more clarity on whether I agree/disagree with his basic picture), and Russell as a primary source.
I agree this is the crux. The Russellian Monist wants to say there’s an intrinsic component to experience which is not exhausted by the structure.
I’d also recommend this paper on Russellian Monism by Chalmers. And to add Frankish to your list of illusionists alongside Dennett to explore e.g. this paper against panpsychism.
From my side you’ve motivated me to read more of Sellars’ work which I wasn’t familiar with before this exchange.