I did read the article, and still I hastily reached for the concept of “intentional deceit” when grasping for what I felt (and still feel) to be a difference between your example and the author’s. Sorry.
But even now that you point out that the author excludes intentional deceit from his definition of bad faith (which I had read but somehow didn’t apply in my comment), I only feel like I missed the nail, but a nail is still there, which I will now try to hit on the head.
So here’s my second attempt: the difference between your example and the author’s has nothing to do with conscious intent to deceive, but with whether the behavior is misleading (as defined in the text) at all, consciously or not. You say that your friend’s behavior shows a desire to gather information, not a desire to enjoy a social interaction; but given that a social interaction is always about something (isn’t it?), is it even possible to enjoy an interaction without appearing to be motivated by the content of the interaction instead? If not, then what’s your reference for counting a behavior as “overtly motivated by a desire to socialize” or not?
What would you say about Tucker Carlson (while he was at Fox) and Rachel Maddow (MSBC) who argued in court that their audience doesn’t take them literally and know that they are just entertainers as a defense against claims of defamation.
I would expect Zack to say that both engage in Bad Faith when they are saying things that are not true but work for engaging the audience.
While the audience knows they are watching partly because of entertainment, the overt appearance of any statement is one of being told the truth. The same goes for questions asked during a friendly conversation. We know we are together because we care about spending time with each other but the surface appearence of any question is still about wanting to know the answer to that question.
I think I’ve found the source of our disagreement encapsulated in something you just said: ”The overt appearance of any statement is one of being told the truth” I counter that the overt appearance of any statement depends on common context.
Your statement only holds insofar as you ignore (or deny the legitimacy of) the role of context and non-verbal communication in determining the overt meaning of a statement. To start with an easy example, a sentence said in an exaggerately sarcastic tone has the overt appearance of being untrue; if sarcasm is a commonly understood device, then I think it should count as “part of the language”, as a legitimate operator over a sentence that overtly inverts its meaning just as the word “not” operates over a predicate to explicitly invert it.
If you can accept that sarcasm is a legitimate lingusitic device, now consider that sarcasm can also be clearly and unambiguously conveyed without the use of non-verbal tone at all, for example by using a phrase in a context that forces a sarcastic interpretation of said phrase, e.g. Person 1: “Do you think you have a good chance at being promoted to treasurer?” Person 2: “Considering the top requirements are trustworthiness and integrity, I expect my dense criminal record makes me a top candidate”.
If you wouldn’t deny that the latter sentence is overtly jestful, then please take some time to also consider how many different silent operators, of which sarcasm is but one, can be overtly conveyed only through something like a mutual understanding of context and its proper use.
On the other hand, if you would deny that it is overtly jestful, then I have the impression you’re operating under the notion that grammar is supreme in determining the overt meaning of a statement (but I’d venture that you even interpret the word “statement” as an inexorably grammatical concept). I think that’s a wishful oversimplification, but not one that holds when we consider what language really is, de facto and fundamentally: not a system of dictionary words, but of signs; and to qualify as a sign, a behavior need not be verbal, just mutually understood.
I have not heard about Carlson’s and Maddow’s cases. But in principle, I would agree with their defences insofar as their audiences did in fact understand the proper extent to which the reporters were being unserious—that’s all good faith requires to me. If, on the other hand, some people in the audience did take the reporters’ comments seriously enough to count as defamation, well then that throws into question whether the reporters’ signs of “not being serious” were commonly enough understood by the target audience, and therefore whether it really was just “good-faith entertainment” after all. But in any case, the (or at least a) real determiner of overt meaning remains that which is commonly understood, not just that which a grammatical parser understands.
Your statement only holds insofar as you ignore (or deny the legitimacy of) the role of context and non-verbal communication in determining the overt meaning of a statement.
Statements don’t have a single meaning. They have layers of meaning. “Overt” is a word that has a specific meaning. The overt meaning of something can be different than the deeper meaning of it.
Take a wife asking her husband whether she looks fat in her dress.
If you use a model like that of Schulz von Thun, you get an expression of meaning on all four layers. The information layer about whether or not she looks fat in the dress is the overt layer. However, most people do also understand that the question has a deeper relationship layer and answering it on the information layer would offend many wives.
Zach argues in this post that we should call this kind of question “bad faith”.
Sarcastic statements frequently have different overt and deep meanings. You need to understand the context to understand the deep meaning.
I have not heard about Carlson’s and Maddow’s cases.
Tucker Carlson and Rachel Maddow used to be two of the most popular prime show hosts, are you saying you have no idea of their programs? What do you think a Tucker Carlson or Rachel Maddow fan would say if you ask them whether they are truthful?
I did read the article, and still I hastily reached for the concept of “intentional deceit” when grasping for what I felt (and still feel) to be a difference between your example and the author’s. Sorry.
But even now that you point out that the author excludes intentional deceit from his definition of bad faith (which I had read but somehow didn’t apply in my comment), I only feel like I missed the nail, but a nail is still there, which I will now try to hit on the head.
So here’s my second attempt: the difference between your example and the author’s has nothing to do with conscious intent to deceive, but with whether the behavior is misleading (as defined in the text) at all, consciously or not. You say that your friend’s behavior shows a desire to gather information, not a desire to enjoy a social interaction; but given that a social interaction is always about something (isn’t it?), is it even possible to enjoy an interaction without appearing to be motivated by the content of the interaction instead? If not, then what’s your reference for counting a behavior as “overtly motivated by a desire to socialize” or not?
What would you say about Tucker Carlson (while he was at Fox) and Rachel Maddow (MSBC) who argued in court that their audience doesn’t take them literally and know that they are just entertainers as a defense against claims of defamation.
I would expect Zack to say that both engage in Bad Faith when they are saying things that are not true but work for engaging the audience.
While the audience knows they are watching partly because of entertainment, the overt appearance of any statement is one of being told the truth. The same goes for questions asked during a friendly conversation. We know we are together because we care about spending time with each other but the surface appearence of any question is still about wanting to know the answer to that question.
I think I’ve found the source of our disagreement encapsulated in something you just said:
”The overt appearance of any statement is one of being told the truth”
I counter that the overt appearance of any statement depends on common context.
Your statement only holds insofar as you ignore (or deny the legitimacy of) the role of context and non-verbal communication in determining the overt meaning of a statement. To start with an easy example, a sentence said in an exaggerately sarcastic tone has the overt appearance of being untrue; if sarcasm is a commonly understood device, then I think it should count as “part of the language”, as a legitimate operator over a sentence that overtly inverts its meaning just as the word “not” operates over a predicate to explicitly invert it.
If you can accept that sarcasm is a legitimate lingusitic device, now consider that sarcasm can also be clearly and unambiguously conveyed without the use of non-verbal tone at all, for example by using a phrase in a context that forces a sarcastic interpretation of said phrase, e.g. Person 1: “Do you think you have a good chance at being promoted to treasurer?” Person 2: “Considering the top requirements are trustworthiness and integrity, I expect my dense criminal record makes me a top candidate”.
If you wouldn’t deny that the latter sentence is overtly jestful, then please take some time to also consider how many different silent operators, of which sarcasm is but one, can be overtly conveyed only through something like a mutual understanding of context and its proper use.
On the other hand, if you would deny that it is overtly jestful, then I have the impression you’re operating under the notion that grammar is supreme in determining the overt meaning of a statement (but I’d venture that you even interpret the word “statement” as an inexorably grammatical concept). I think that’s a wishful oversimplification, but not one that holds when we consider what language really is, de facto and fundamentally: not a system of dictionary words, but of signs; and to qualify as a sign, a behavior need not be verbal, just mutually understood.
I have not heard about Carlson’s and Maddow’s cases. But in principle, I would agree with their defences insofar as their audiences did in fact understand the proper extent to which the reporters were being unserious—that’s all good faith requires to me. If, on the other hand, some people in the audience did take the reporters’ comments seriously enough to count as defamation, well then that throws into question whether the reporters’ signs of “not being serious” were commonly enough understood by the target audience, and therefore whether it really was just “good-faith entertainment” after all. But in any case, the (or at least a) real determiner of overt meaning remains that which is commonly understood, not just that which a grammatical parser understands.
Statements don’t have a single meaning. They have layers of meaning. “Overt” is a word that has a specific meaning. The overt meaning of something can be different than the deeper meaning of it.
Take a wife asking her husband whether she looks fat in her dress.
If you use a model like that of Schulz von Thun, you get an expression of meaning on all four layers. The information layer about whether or not she looks fat in the dress is the overt layer. However, most people do also understand that the question has a deeper relationship layer and answering it on the information layer would offend many wives.
Zach argues in this post that we should call this kind of question “bad faith”.
Sarcastic statements frequently have different overt and deep meanings. You need to understand the context to understand the deep meaning.
Tucker Carlson and Rachel Maddow used to be two of the most popular prime show hosts, are you saying you have no idea of their programs? What do you think a Tucker Carlson or Rachel Maddow fan would say if you ask them whether they are truthful?