Slightly different frame: predictive coding / perceptual control, instead of active inference. I think it plausibly explains why “believing in” and beliefs-as-predictions are very near in human conceptspace, to the extent that many languages don’t distinguish them?
“Believing in” → beliefs-as-predictions: If you want a project to yield good future outcomes, you would “believe in” the project, and the target-setting of your brain would predict good project outcomes (hold a target set-point of “the project has yielded good outcomes”), and the perceptual control part of your brain steers your actions towards making the project go well.
Beliefs-as-predictions → “believing in”: If you believe that a prediction market contract is underpriced and buy YES shares, you would then be incentivised to act to help the YES outcome actually happen. You’ve come to “believe in” the YES outcome.
Slightly different frame: predictive coding / perceptual control, instead of active inference. I think it plausibly explains why “believing in” and beliefs-as-predictions are very near in human conceptspace, to the extent that many languages don’t distinguish them?
“Believing in” → beliefs-as-predictions: If you want a project to yield good future outcomes, you would “believe in” the project, and the target-setting of your brain would predict good project outcomes (hold a target set-point of “the project has yielded good outcomes”), and the perceptual control part of your brain steers your actions towards making the project go well.
Beliefs-as-predictions → “believing in”: If you believe that a prediction market contract is underpriced and buy YES shares, you would then be incentivised to act to help the YES outcome actually happen. You’ve come to “believe in” the YES outcome.