Person X honestly believes that intelligence tests are meaningless, and everyone can acheive anything , yet he will see no problem in using low test scores of a political opponent as a form of mockery, since clearly they really are stupid.
He may consider the preferences of parents who think group Y on average would have an undesirable effect on the values or academic achievement of their child and wish to make sure they have minimal influence on them to be so utterly immoral that must be proactively fought in personal and public life. But in practice he will never send his children to a school where group Y is a high percentage of the pupils. You see that is because naturally, the school is a bad school and no self respecting parent sends their child to a bad school.
These sound to me like good reasons for not associating with B. Selective rationality makes it likely he will do bad things for bad reasons and be sincerely unaware that he is doing bad things. He can probably rationalize embezzling my money as glibly as he can rationalize avoiding a “bad school”, whereas if he is person A, and knows perfectly well he does not want his children to associate with group X, he would know if he was cheating you.
Rationalization predicts bad behavior. Avoiding the inquisition does not predict bad behavior.
Selective rationality makes it likely he will do bad things for bad reasons and be sincerely unaware that he is doing bad things. He can probably rationalize embezzling my money as glibly as he can rationalize avoiding a “bad school”...
But that’s not what I observe in reality. As Konkvistador said, common problems generate commonly accepted solutions. A strong discrepancy between respectable beliefs and reality leads to a common problem, and a specific mode of rationalization then becomes a commonly accepted and socially approved solution. And in my experience, the fact that someone suspends rationality and adopts rationalizations in a commonly accepted way doesn’t imply bad character otherwise.
In fact, as a reductio ad absurdum of your position, I would point out that a complete rejection of all pious rationalizations that are common today would mean adopting a number of views that are shared only by an infinitesimal minority. But clearly it’s absurd to claim that everyone outside of this tiny minority
is untrustworthy and of bad character.
On the other hand, I agree with you when it comes to rationalizations that are uncommon and not approved tacitly as an unspoken social convention. They are indeed a red flag as you describe.
Selective rationality makes it likely he will do bad things for bad reasons and be sincerely unaware that he is doing bad things. He can probably rationalize embezzling my money as glibly as he can rationalize avoiding a “bad school”...
But that’s not what I observe in reality.
It is what we observed in the recent banking crisis. To take an even more extreme example, Pol Pot was a true believer who glibly rationalized away discrepancies. One of his rationalizations was that the bad consequences of his policies were the result of comrades betraying him, which led him to torture his comrades to death.
I would point out that a complete rejection of all pious rationalizations that are common today would mean adopting a number of views that are shared only by an infinitesimal minority. But clearly it’s absurd to claim that everyone outside of this tiny minority is untrustworthy and of bad character.
Our financial system has just collapsed in a way that suggests that the great majority of those who adopt certain pious rationalizations applicable to the financial system are untrustworthy and of bad character. Certain single payer medical systems are apply an alarming level of involuntary euthanasia, aka murder, and everyone is piously rationalizing it, except for a tiny minority.
What I see is a terrifying and extremely dangerous level of bad behavior, glibly justified by pious and politically correct rationalizations.
Breathing difficulties in old people are a wide range of complex and extremely urgent problems, frequently difficult to diagnose and expensive to treat, and apt to progress rapidly to death over a few hours. Tracheotomy or similar urgent and immediate surgical treatment is often absolutely necessary, but for administrative reasons single payer medical systems find it very difficult to provide immediate surgery, surgery that is urgent in the sense of right now not urgent in the sense that in a couple of weeks you will eventually be be put on the extra urgent special emergency queue of people waiting to jump the rest of the merely ordinarily urgent special emergency queue. Therefore, old people who show up at the British health care system struggling to breath, are always treated with barbiturates, which of course stops them struggling. The inability to provide emergency surgery gets rationalized by the great majority of all respectable believers in right things, and these rationalizations are an indication of moral failure. Finding that it is administratively difficult for a single payer system to provide certain kinds of treatment, we see people rationalizing that the treatment actually provided is desirable, which rationalization makes them murderers or accomplices to murder.
What I see is a terrifying and extremely dangerous level of bad behavior, glibly justified by pious and politically correct rationalizations.
I agree with this as a general assessment (though we might argue about the concrete examples). I also see plenty of terrifying and ominous deeds justified by pious rationalizations.
However, I still don’t see how you can infer bad character from ordinary, everyday rationalizations of the common people. Yes, these collectively add up to an awful tragedy of the commons, and individuals in high positions who do extraordinary misdeeds and employ extraordinary rationalizations are usually worse than lying, cynical climbers. But among the common folk, I really don’t see any connection between individual bad character and the regular, universally accepted pious rationalizatons.
However, I still don’t see how you can infer bad character from ordinary, everyday rationalizations of the common people. Yes, these collectively add up to an awful tragedy of the commons
We cannot infer bad character from collective consequences of delusive socially approved beliefs. We can infer bad character if delusive beliefs are apt to result individual bad consequences to other people.
In the hypothetical case of the person who wholly genuinely believes in some delusive socially approved belief, one can easily see that it would result in bad consequences for friends, acquaintances, and business associates, while advancing the career of the holder of those beliefs: Therefore bad person
What however, about the person who semi genuinely believes in some delusive socially approved belief, but has clever rationalizations for acting as if the belief was not true in those situations where the falsity of the belief might afflict him personally?
Of course, such rationalizing Bs blur into As. How then shall we tell the difference? The difference is that a true B genuinely considers socially approved beliefs to be true, and therefore righteously imposes the corresponding socially approved behavior on others, while finding rationalizations to avoid it for himself. Therefore evil.
Though he applies those clever rationalizations to avoid bad consequences for himself, rationalizes himself avoiding bad consequences, he does not apply those clever rationalizations to avoid bad consequences for his friends, and those he does business with, since he does not have any motivation to fool himself in those cases, and further, by not fooling himself in those cases, he demonstrates genuine allegiance to socially approved beliefs at low cost to himself.
individuals in high positions who do extraordinary misdeeds and employ extraordinary rationalizations
But individuals in high positions don’t employ extraordinary rationalizations, unless you call the false but socially approved beliefs that everyone is supposed to believe in and most people believe or pretend to believe, “extraordinary”.
Indeed, these beliefs are socially approved precisely because the powerful find them convenient to do and justify evil. Those in high places perform extraordinary misdeeds by acting as if these beliefs were true.
Illustration 1: The financial crisis. Read the FDIC examining Beverly Hills bank for compliance with the CRA. Those who prepared this report were evil men, and their evil followed necessarily from their willingness to apply socially approved, but delusive, beliefs to other people.
Now Joe Sixpack, unlike the evil men who prepared that report, are seldom in a position to individually force other people to act as if delusive beliefs were true. But to the extent that he could, he would, and does, for example by voting. Since self delusion is a major source of evil, this self delusion is surely a predictor of his willingness to do evil in other ways.
Then there is the underclass, who, echoing their betters, claim that the reason they are depraved is because they are deprived. A member of the underclass who believes in the politically correct reasons for bad underclass behavior is more likely to live down to those behaviors than a member of the underclass who does not believe in those justifications.
So, if we look at the top, the guys who prepared that report on Beverly Hills bank, socially approved beliefs predict evil behavior. And if we look at the bottom, the guys who burned down parts of London recently, socially approved beliefs also predict evil behavior.
And if we look at the upper middle class, for example the guys who wanted to lynch the Lacrosse team at Duke University, socially approved beliefs also predicted bad behavior.
And, at the level of my individual people kin and associates, politically correct beliefs have predicted very great crimes and several minor crimes, though I cannot present you any evidence of that. My direct personal experience has been that there is a direct connection between individual bad conduct, such as embezzling funds, and the regular universally accepted pious rationalizations. That he who rationalizes one thing, can rationalize another thing.
You make your case very poignantly. I’ll have to think about this a bit more.
In particular, it does seem to me that people whom I find exceptionally trustworthy in my own life tend to have at least some serious disagreements with the respectable opinion, or at least aren’t prone to stonewalling with pious rationalizations and moral condemnations when presented with arguments against the respectable opinion. But I’m not sure how much this is a selection effect, given that I myself have some opinions that aren’t very respectable.
These sound to me like good reasons for not associating with B. Selective rationality makes it likely he will do bad things for bad reasons and be sincerely unaware that he is doing bad things. He can probably rationalize embezzling my money as glibly as he can rationalize avoiding a “bad school”, whereas if he is person A, and knows perfectly well he does not want his children to associate with group X, he would know if he was cheating you.
Rationalization predicts bad behavior. Avoiding the inquisition does not predict bad behavior.
But that’s not what I observe in reality. As Konkvistador said, common problems generate commonly accepted solutions. A strong discrepancy between respectable beliefs and reality leads to a common problem, and a specific mode of rationalization then becomes a commonly accepted and socially approved solution. And in my experience, the fact that someone suspends rationality and adopts rationalizations in a commonly accepted way doesn’t imply bad character otherwise.
In fact, as a reductio ad absurdum of your position, I would point out that a complete rejection of all pious rationalizations that are common today would mean adopting a number of views that are shared only by an infinitesimal minority. But clearly it’s absurd to claim that everyone outside of this tiny minority is untrustworthy and of bad character.
On the other hand, I agree with you when it comes to rationalizations that are uncommon and not approved tacitly as an unspoken social convention. They are indeed a red flag as you describe.
It is what we observed in the recent banking crisis. To take an even more extreme example, Pol Pot was a true believer who glibly rationalized away discrepancies. One of his rationalizations was that the bad consequences of his policies were the result of comrades betraying him, which led him to torture his comrades to death.
Our financial system has just collapsed in a way that suggests that the great majority of those who adopt certain pious rationalizations applicable to the financial system are untrustworthy and of bad character. Certain single payer medical systems are apply an alarming level of involuntary euthanasia, aka murder, and everyone is piously rationalizing it, except for a tiny minority.
What I see is a terrifying and extremely dangerous level of bad behavior, glibly justified by pious and politically correct rationalizations.
Breathing difficulties in old people are a wide range of complex and extremely urgent problems, frequently difficult to diagnose and expensive to treat, and apt to progress rapidly to death over a few hours. Tracheotomy or similar urgent and immediate surgical treatment is often absolutely necessary, but for administrative reasons single payer medical systems find it very difficult to provide immediate surgery, surgery that is urgent in the sense of right now not urgent in the sense that in a couple of weeks you will eventually be be put on the extra urgent special emergency queue of people waiting to jump the rest of the merely ordinarily urgent special emergency queue. Therefore, old people who show up at the British health care system struggling to breath, are always treated with barbiturates, which of course stops them struggling. The inability to provide emergency surgery gets rationalized by the great majority of all respectable believers in right things, and these rationalizations are an indication of moral failure. Finding that it is administratively difficult for a single payer system to provide certain kinds of treatment, we see people rationalizing that the treatment actually provided is desirable, which rationalization makes them murderers or accomplices to murder.
I agree with this as a general assessment (though we might argue about the concrete examples). I also see plenty of terrifying and ominous deeds justified by pious rationalizations.
However, I still don’t see how you can infer bad character from ordinary, everyday rationalizations of the common people. Yes, these collectively add up to an awful tragedy of the commons, and individuals in high positions who do extraordinary misdeeds and employ extraordinary rationalizations are usually worse than lying, cynical climbers. But among the common folk, I really don’t see any connection between individual bad character and the regular, universally accepted pious rationalizatons.
We cannot infer bad character from collective consequences of delusive socially approved beliefs. We can infer bad character if delusive beliefs are apt to result individual bad consequences to other people.
In the hypothetical case of the person who wholly genuinely believes in some delusive socially approved belief, one can easily see that it would result in bad consequences for friends, acquaintances, and business associates, while advancing the career of the holder of those beliefs: Therefore bad person
What however, about the person who semi genuinely believes in some delusive socially approved belief, but has clever rationalizations for acting as if the belief was not true in those situations where the falsity of the belief might afflict him personally?
Of course, such rationalizing Bs blur into As. How then shall we tell the difference? The difference is that a true B genuinely considers socially approved beliefs to be true, and therefore righteously imposes the corresponding socially approved behavior on others, while finding rationalizations to avoid it for himself. Therefore evil.
Though he applies those clever rationalizations to avoid bad consequences for himself, rationalizes himself avoiding bad consequences, he does not apply those clever rationalizations to avoid bad consequences for his friends, and those he does business with, since he does not have any motivation to fool himself in those cases, and further, by not fooling himself in those cases, he demonstrates genuine allegiance to socially approved beliefs at low cost to himself.
But individuals in high positions don’t employ extraordinary rationalizations, unless you call the false but socially approved beliefs that everyone is supposed to believe in and most people believe or pretend to believe, “extraordinary”.
Indeed, these beliefs are socially approved precisely because the powerful find them convenient to do and justify evil. Those in high places perform extraordinary misdeeds by acting as if these beliefs were true.
Illustration 1: The financial crisis. Read the FDIC examining Beverly Hills bank for compliance with the CRA. Those who prepared this report were evil men, and their evil followed necessarily from their willingness to apply socially approved, but delusive, beliefs to other people.
Now Joe Sixpack, unlike the evil men who prepared that report, are seldom in a position to individually force other people to act as if delusive beliefs were true. But to the extent that he could, he would, and does, for example by voting. Since self delusion is a major source of evil, this self delusion is surely a predictor of his willingness to do evil in other ways.
Then there is the underclass, who, echoing their betters, claim that the reason they are depraved is because they are deprived. A member of the underclass who believes in the politically correct reasons for bad underclass behavior is more likely to live down to those behaviors than a member of the underclass who does not believe in those justifications.
So, if we look at the top, the guys who prepared that report on Beverly Hills bank, socially approved beliefs predict evil behavior. And if we look at the bottom, the guys who burned down parts of London recently, socially approved beliefs also predict evil behavior.
And if we look at the upper middle class, for example the guys who wanted to lynch the Lacrosse team at Duke University, socially approved beliefs also predicted bad behavior.
And, at the level of my individual people kin and associates, politically correct beliefs have predicted very great crimes and several minor crimes, though I cannot present you any evidence of that. My direct personal experience has been that there is a direct connection between individual bad conduct, such as embezzling funds, and the regular universally accepted pious rationalizations. That he who rationalizes one thing, can rationalize another thing.
You make your case very poignantly. I’ll have to think about this a bit more.
In particular, it does seem to me that people whom I find exceptionally trustworthy in my own life tend to have at least some serious disagreements with the respectable opinion, or at least aren’t prone to stonewalling with pious rationalizations and moral condemnations when presented with arguments against the respectable opinion. But I’m not sure how much this is a selection effect, given that I myself have some opinions that aren’t very respectable.