However, I still don’t see how you can infer bad character from ordinary, everyday rationalizations of the common people. Yes, these collectively add up to an awful tragedy of the commons
We cannot infer bad character from collective consequences of delusive socially approved beliefs. We can infer bad character if delusive beliefs are apt to result individual bad consequences to other people.
In the hypothetical case of the person who wholly genuinely believes in some delusive socially approved belief, one can easily see that it would result in bad consequences for friends, acquaintances, and business associates, while advancing the career of the holder of those beliefs: Therefore bad person
What however, about the person who semi genuinely believes in some delusive socially approved belief, but has clever rationalizations for acting as if the belief was not true in those situations where the falsity of the belief might afflict him personally?
Of course, such rationalizing Bs blur into As. How then shall we tell the difference? The difference is that a true B genuinely considers socially approved beliefs to be true, and therefore righteously imposes the corresponding socially approved behavior on others, while finding rationalizations to avoid it for himself. Therefore evil.
Though he applies those clever rationalizations to avoid bad consequences for himself, rationalizes himself avoiding bad consequences, he does not apply those clever rationalizations to avoid bad consequences for his friends, and those he does business with, since he does not have any motivation to fool himself in those cases, and further, by not fooling himself in those cases, he demonstrates genuine allegiance to socially approved beliefs at low cost to himself.
individuals in high positions who do extraordinary misdeeds and employ extraordinary rationalizations
But individuals in high positions don’t employ extraordinary rationalizations, unless you call the false but socially approved beliefs that everyone is supposed to believe in and most people believe or pretend to believe, “extraordinary”.
Indeed, these beliefs are socially approved precisely because the powerful find them convenient to do and justify evil. Those in high places perform extraordinary misdeeds by acting as if these beliefs were true.
Illustration 1: The financial crisis. Read the FDIC examining Beverly Hills bank for compliance with the CRA. Those who prepared this report were evil men, and their evil followed necessarily from their willingness to apply socially approved, but delusive, beliefs to other people.
Now Joe Sixpack, unlike the evil men who prepared that report, are seldom in a position to individually force other people to act as if delusive beliefs were true. But to the extent that he could, he would, and does, for example by voting. Since self delusion is a major source of evil, this self delusion is surely a predictor of his willingness to do evil in other ways.
Then there is the underclass, who, echoing their betters, claim that the reason they are depraved is because they are deprived. A member of the underclass who believes in the politically correct reasons for bad underclass behavior is more likely to live down to those behaviors than a member of the underclass who does not believe in those justifications.
So, if we look at the top, the guys who prepared that report on Beverly Hills bank, socially approved beliefs predict evil behavior. And if we look at the bottom, the guys who burned down parts of London recently, socially approved beliefs also predict evil behavior.
And if we look at the upper middle class, for example the guys who wanted to lynch the Lacrosse team at Duke University, socially approved beliefs also predicted bad behavior.
And, at the level of my individual people kin and associates, politically correct beliefs have predicted very great crimes and several minor crimes, though I cannot present you any evidence of that. My direct personal experience has been that there is a direct connection between individual bad conduct, such as embezzling funds, and the regular universally accepted pious rationalizations. That he who rationalizes one thing, can rationalize another thing.
You make your case very poignantly. I’ll have to think about this a bit more.
In particular, it does seem to me that people whom I find exceptionally trustworthy in my own life tend to have at least some serious disagreements with the respectable opinion, or at least aren’t prone to stonewalling with pious rationalizations and moral condemnations when presented with arguments against the respectable opinion. But I’m not sure how much this is a selection effect, given that I myself have some opinions that aren’t very respectable.
We cannot infer bad character from collective consequences of delusive socially approved beliefs. We can infer bad character if delusive beliefs are apt to result individual bad consequences to other people.
In the hypothetical case of the person who wholly genuinely believes in some delusive socially approved belief, one can easily see that it would result in bad consequences for friends, acquaintances, and business associates, while advancing the career of the holder of those beliefs: Therefore bad person
What however, about the person who semi genuinely believes in some delusive socially approved belief, but has clever rationalizations for acting as if the belief was not true in those situations where the falsity of the belief might afflict him personally?
Of course, such rationalizing Bs blur into As. How then shall we tell the difference? The difference is that a true B genuinely considers socially approved beliefs to be true, and therefore righteously imposes the corresponding socially approved behavior on others, while finding rationalizations to avoid it for himself. Therefore evil.
Though he applies those clever rationalizations to avoid bad consequences for himself, rationalizes himself avoiding bad consequences, he does not apply those clever rationalizations to avoid bad consequences for his friends, and those he does business with, since he does not have any motivation to fool himself in those cases, and further, by not fooling himself in those cases, he demonstrates genuine allegiance to socially approved beliefs at low cost to himself.
But individuals in high positions don’t employ extraordinary rationalizations, unless you call the false but socially approved beliefs that everyone is supposed to believe in and most people believe or pretend to believe, “extraordinary”.
Indeed, these beliefs are socially approved precisely because the powerful find them convenient to do and justify evil. Those in high places perform extraordinary misdeeds by acting as if these beliefs were true.
Illustration 1: The financial crisis. Read the FDIC examining Beverly Hills bank for compliance with the CRA. Those who prepared this report were evil men, and their evil followed necessarily from their willingness to apply socially approved, but delusive, beliefs to other people.
Now Joe Sixpack, unlike the evil men who prepared that report, are seldom in a position to individually force other people to act as if delusive beliefs were true. But to the extent that he could, he would, and does, for example by voting. Since self delusion is a major source of evil, this self delusion is surely a predictor of his willingness to do evil in other ways.
Then there is the underclass, who, echoing their betters, claim that the reason they are depraved is because they are deprived. A member of the underclass who believes in the politically correct reasons for bad underclass behavior is more likely to live down to those behaviors than a member of the underclass who does not believe in those justifications.
So, if we look at the top, the guys who prepared that report on Beverly Hills bank, socially approved beliefs predict evil behavior. And if we look at the bottom, the guys who burned down parts of London recently, socially approved beliefs also predict evil behavior.
And if we look at the upper middle class, for example the guys who wanted to lynch the Lacrosse team at Duke University, socially approved beliefs also predicted bad behavior.
And, at the level of my individual people kin and associates, politically correct beliefs have predicted very great crimes and several minor crimes, though I cannot present you any evidence of that. My direct personal experience has been that there is a direct connection between individual bad conduct, such as embezzling funds, and the regular universally accepted pious rationalizations. That he who rationalizes one thing, can rationalize another thing.
You make your case very poignantly. I’ll have to think about this a bit more.
In particular, it does seem to me that people whom I find exceptionally trustworthy in my own life tend to have at least some serious disagreements with the respectable opinion, or at least aren’t prone to stonewalling with pious rationalizations and moral condemnations when presented with arguments against the respectable opinion. But I’m not sure how much this is a selection effect, given that I myself have some opinions that aren’t very respectable.