“give the power over my final decisions to small random events around me” seems like a slightly confused concept if your preferences are truly indifferent. Can you say more about why you see that as a problem?
The potential adversary seems like a more straightforward problem, though one exciting possibility is that lightness of decisions lets a potential cooperator manipulate your decisions on favor of your common interests. And presumably you already have some system for filtering acquaintances into adversaries and cooperators. Is the concern that your filtering is faulty, or something else?
[Commitment] eventually often turn to be winning strategy, compared to the flexible strategy of constant updating expected utility.
Some real-world games are reducible to the game of Chicken. Commitment is often a winning strategy in them. Though I’m not certain that it’s a commitment to a particular set of beliefs about utility so much as a more-complex decision theory which sits between utility beliefs and actions.
In summary, if the acquaintances whose info you update on are sufficiently unaligned with you and your decision theory always selects the addition that your posterior assigns the highest utility, then your actions will be “over-updating on the evidence” if your beliefs are properly Bayesian. But I don’t think the best response is to bias yourself towards under-updating.
preference “my decisions should be mine”—and many people seems to have it
Fair. I’m not sure how to formalize this, though—to my intuition it seems confused in roughly the same way that the concept of free will is confused. Do you have a way to formalize what this means?
(In the absence of a compelling deconfusion of what this goal means, I’d be wary of hacking epistemics in defense of it.)
There are “friends” who claim to have the same goals as me, but later turns out that they have hidden motives.
Agreed and agreed that there’s a benefit to removing their affordance to exploit you. That said, why does this deserve more attention than the inverse case (there are parties you do not trust who later turn out to have benign motives)?
“preference “my decisions should be mine”—and many people seems to have it”
I think it could be explained by social games. A person whose decision are unmovable are more likely to dominate eventually and by demostrating inflexibility a person pretends to have higher status. Also the person escapes any possible exploits, playing game of chicken preventively.
“give the power over my final decisions to small random events around me” seems like a slightly confused concept if your preferences are truly indifferent. Can you say more about why you see that as a problem?
The potential adversary seems like a more straightforward problem, though one exciting possibility is that lightness of decisions lets a potential cooperator manipulate your decisions on favor of your common interests. And presumably you already have some system for filtering acquaintances into adversaries and cooperators. Is the concern that your filtering is faulty, or something else?
Some real-world games are reducible to the game of Chicken. Commitment is often a winning strategy in them. Though I’m not certain that it’s a commitment to a particular set of beliefs about utility so much as a more-complex decision theory which sits between utility beliefs and actions.
In summary, if the acquaintances whose info you update on are sufficiently unaligned with you and your decision theory always selects the addition that your posterior assigns the highest utility, then your actions will be “over-updating on the evidence” if your beliefs are properly Bayesian. But I don’t think the best response is to bias yourself towards under-updating.
If I have preference “my decisions should be mine”—and many people seems to have it—then letting taxi driver decide is not ok.
There are “friends” who claim to have the same goals as me, but later turns out that they have hidden motives.
Fair. I’m not sure how to formalize this, though—to my intuition it seems confused in roughly the same way that the concept of free will is confused. Do you have a way to formalize what this means?
(In the absence of a compelling deconfusion of what this goal means, I’d be wary of hacking epistemics in defense of it.)
Agreed and agreed that there’s a benefit to removing their affordance to exploit you. That said, why does this deserve more attention than the inverse case (there are parties you do not trust who later turn out to have benign motives)?
“preference “my decisions should be mine”—and many people seems to have it”
I think it could be explained by social games. A person whose decision are unmovable are more likely to dominate eventually and by demostrating inflexibility a person pretends to have higher status. Also the person escapes any possible exploits, playing game of chicken preventively.