A central example: on my current models, yes-man psychosis was why Putin thought it was a good idea to invade Ukraine. Before the invasion, I remember reading e.g. RAND’s commentary (among others), which was basically “invading Ukraine would be peak idiocy, so presumably this is all sabre-rattling for diplomatic purposes”. Alas, in hindsight it seems Putin legitimately thought the invasion would be over in a few days, and Western powers wouldn’t do much about it. After all, the bureaucratic and advisory structures around him told him what he wanted to hear: that Russia’s military advantage would be utterly conclusive, Western leaders had no willingness to help, presumably nobody even mentioned the issues of endgame/exit strategy, etc.
This seems wrong. Putin likely also thinks in retrospect that invading Ukraine was a good idea with the information available to him now. While he might have thought that it would be easier, from his perspective this is likely still a good outcome. He managed to overcome historic low approval ratings. He managed to consolidate power in many other ways.
While the war is more expensive than initially assumed, Russia seems to be advancing. The Russian public largely doesn’t believe that Putin made a mistake to decide to start the war.
This seems wrong. Putin likely also thinks in retrospect that invading Ukraine was a good idea with the information available to him now. While he might have thought that it would be easier, from his perspective this is likely still a good outcome. He managed to overcome historic low approval ratings. He managed to consolidate power in many other ways.
While the war is more expensive than initially assumed, Russia seems to be advancing. The Russian public largely doesn’t believe that Putin made a mistake to decide to start the war.